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ABSTRACT
An alternative scheme has been suggested to the reference pncmg framework
currently used in New Zealand. The subsidisation scheme outlined in Johnston, M
and Zeckhauser, R. (1991) The Australian Pharmaceutical Subsidy Gambit:
Transmuting Deadweight Loss and Oligopoly Rents to Consumer Surplus offers only
the subsidy required to prompt acceptance of subsidisation by firms. This scheme is
valid only where marginal costs are known. This thesis incorporates the creation of a
framework for the comparison of pharmaceutical subsidy schemes, the expansion of
the Johnston and Zeckhauser scheme into an environment of imperfect information,
and the comparison of this modified scheme with the variant of reference pricing
used in New Zealand.
This comparison finds that the Johnston and Zeckhauser scheme generally provides
subsidisation at a lower cost than reference pricing provided that a suitable threshold
is placed on the time taken for a firm to accept subsidisation. Unfortunately the JZ
scheme does not appear to provide a valid alternative to reference pricing as, on
average, it is likely to promote a lower level of efficiency than the status quo. The
thesis finds that reference pricing is however not without its problems, as the
possibility exists that reference pricing will, in some cases, provide firms with less
than the level of profit necessary to convince them to accept subsidisation.
1
2CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION AND AIMS
Pharmac was set up in 1993 in New Zealand to decide which medicines and related products
receive subsidies. Pharmac, on page 6 of PHARMAC: the first 20 months, states that it seeks to
incorporate "a balanced view of the needs of both prescribers and patients. Decisions aim to
achieve long term gains and efficient ways of supplying pharmaceuticals to the community."
Pharmac's aim is to ensure that there is fair and equitable patient access to medicines which
contribute to New Zealander's health, through vigorous assessment of medicines and the
effective management ofpublic subsidies for them.'
Pharmac cannot provide what it cannot afford. If Pharmac is to provide the highest level of
quality medication it can with the notional budget at its disposal it must use the scheme
providing predictable subsidisation at the lowest cost. This thesis attempts to compare reference
pricing with an alternative scheme suggested by Johnston, M and Zeckhauser, R. (1991) The
Australian Pharmaceutical Subsidy Gambit: Transmuting Deadweight Loss and Oligopoly Rents
to Consumer Surplus. This alternative scheme attempts to use the strategic advantage of the
subsidising agency to the benefit of both the patient and the taxpayer.
The first task undertaken in this thesis is the creation of a framework for consumer choice.
This framework will then be used to compare reference pricing with the Johnston and
Zeckhauser (JZ) scheme referred to above. This scheme uses cost information to offer firms only
that subsidy required to prompt acceptance of the offer. The schemes will first be compared
under perfect information. The major results of this thesis are expected in the second
comparison however where marginal costs must be revealed before subsidisation can take place.
The delay that cost revelation requires may make reference pricing superior in the more realistic
case where marginal costs are initially unknown. Finally, it is hoped that a recommendation can
be made as to whether the JZ scheme is worth exploring further in the New Zealand context.
I http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/page_2.htm.
3CHAPTER 2
A MODEL OF PATIENT CHOICE
A framework for patient choice must be formulated before any analysis of the market for
pharmaceuticals and subsequent analysis of pharmaceutical subsidisation can occur. The aim of
this chapter is to compose such a model of patient behaviour where, given the price and overall
quality of different drugs (in addition to the estimation of doctors about these qualities), the
quantity of each drug consumed can be determined. This quantity shall be independent of time
except where time affects the values of price, quality and the doctor's estimation of quality.
The consumption of pharmaceuticals contains inherent risk because no patient can be sure
of their reaction to a specific drug. 1 Any model of patient behaviour concerned with drug
consumption must carefully consider this risk. Superior quality drugs involve either lower
uncertainty in outcome for consumers or, alternatively, a greater efficacy to compensate for an
increased risk of suffering a serious side effect. Section I contains a framework for dealing with
drug quality while Section IT addresses the relationship between doctors and patients. Section ill
addresses the method patients use to discover the quality of different drugs while Section IV
discusses the method used to choose between drugs once some drug qualities are known.
Finally, Sections V to VIT discuss expected utility, interternporal concerns and, finally, outline
the quantities of different drugs chosen.
I Before either a pre-treatment test of the drug or treatment using the drug.
4I . DRUG QUALITY AND DIMENSIONS
The multi-dimensional facets of drug quality make complete dominance of one drug over
another unlikely. Pharmac identifies the following criteria in its operating policies as pertinent
pharmacological and therapeutic information required when applying for listing on the
pharmaceutical schedule: 2
(i) Forms, strengths and arranged pack sizes,
(ii) pharmacological action,
(iii) recommended dosages,
(iv) contra-indications, interactions and adverse effects,
(v) therapeutic claims,
(vi) position in therapy,
(vii) how the pharmaceutical compares with previously listed pharmaceuticals with respect to
the following: efficacy, toxicity and side effects, general equivalence, whether the
pharmaceutical is considered a breakthrough, convenience and shelf-life.
(viii) Complementary pharmaceuticals, medical devices, products or things.
Although lengthy, the above list does not represent an exhaustive specification of the
dimensions of interest. Temin (1980)3 identified the following items, in addition to any
evaluation of the severity and likelihood of adverse reactions, as relevant considerations when
comparing pharmaceuticals:4
(i) the actual effectiveness of a drug,
(ii) the method of administration (which can affect the time taken for a drug to work),
(iii) dosage,
(iv) general speed of action, and
(v) rapidity of doses.
Assessing drugs over the correct dimensions is important when modelling the choices
made with regard to which treatment option is best for a particular illness. The considerations
2 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited. (1993) Operating Policies and Procedures
ofPHARMAC. Wellington, Pharmac. p 16
3 Temin, P. (1980) Taking your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States.
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 274p.
4 Temin, P. (1980) pp.9-1O.
5outlined here grve a picture of the costliness and difficulty of comparing even two drugs.
Necessity demands that when evaluating several treatment options comparisons must occur on
fewer criteria than those given above.
The essential characteristic and purpose of a drug is to act as a healing agent; it will either
cure an ailment or alleviate the symptoms associated with it.s The model used to approximate
drug choice must take into account that, for any particular patient, no drug is completely
predictable in its outcome. Uncertainty exists both in possible drug interactions and in the
individual specific side effects a drug causes. Drug interactions are not considered in isolation as
they represent a highly complex area of study. Rather drug interactions are modelled as a
contributing factor in the distribution of individual specific side effects.
For a drug to be profitable it must obtain a positive market share. As patients typically
choose only one of the many drugs available to treat an illness the variation in their choices must
occur as a result of differences between patients and/or the information they receive. Such a
difference can be incorporated into a model in several ways:
(i) Individual assessmentsof the merits of drug effectiveness and risk may be allowed to vary.
(ii) The relative importancepatients place on consumption and health may vary.
(iii) The effectiveness or side effect of a particular drug may differ for each individual along a
pre-defined distribution.
The consumer framework defined here attempts to model how patients approach the
inherent risk in taking pharmaceuticals. The choice of the third approach as the method used
hinges on its incorporation of the greatest degree of variability in drug risk. Assessments of the
relative merits of health and consumption are assumed constant between individuals while quasi-
linear utility removes variance in the trade-off between income and consumption.
It is reasonable to assume that any drug will at best promote a full recovery. The quality
measure for consumer j for drug i is given the symbol cp ij' Quality may vary between negative
infinity (representing death) and, at most, one (signifying a full recovery). Quality is denoted as
the difference between two distinct factors; the overall efficacy of a drug (A) and the side effect
5 Preventative treatments are ignored since they represent a massive complication to the general
framework used here.
6(E) that an individual faces. The overall effectiveness of a particular drug is fixed for all
individuals which allows for the adoption of a standard quantity measure (q) for each drug." The
quantity of treatment varies between zero, where no treatment occurs, and one, representing a full
course of treatment. Full treatment mayor may not be sufficient to allow for either a complete
cure or suppression of an illness?
The individual specific side effect" is of great importance in the choices made by
individuals. The choice of the distribution these individual specific side effects are drawn from
was based on the concerns that the distribution must promote reasonable assumptions about side
effects and that the distribution must not cause excessive problems in evaluation.
These factors suggested that the side effect of a drug on a population be modelled using an
exponential distribution. The exponential distribution (with parameter 17) is always positive and
its probability density function decreases quickly as the severity of side effects increase. The
choice of an exponential distribution suggests that side effects are always adverse and generally
small, although the possibility exists for significant side effects to occur in small numbers of
individuals. The side effect of a drug on an individual is drawn from this distribution and, once
drawn, remains fixed for all time.
The lognormal distribution, which also has a strictly positive domain, was not selected
because of the difficulty faced when evaluating expected utility. The exponential distribution
caused far fewer problems in evaluation which weighed in final considerations over the type of
distribution to use.
A normal distribution would unrealistically have assumed that a large adverse side effect
was as likely as a large positive one. It is conceivable that an individual may have a strong
enough allergy to, say, penicillin for it to be potentially fatal. There is however no realistic
parallel when addressing positive side effects. Although small positive side effects no doubt
6 This quantity varies between drugs and may imply that the dose for full treatment may be an
important area in which drugs differ.
7 For serious illnesses that are as yet incurable it is unrealistic to allow a cure to exist at any price
yet some form of treatment is still available.
8 Which, in addition to efficacy, determines quality.
7occur it is difficult enough in practice for a doctor to determine exactly the effect a drug has on a
targeted illness, let alone on an unrelated one. Restricting side effects to be of an adverse nature
only does not appear to be an unjustifiable assumption. Symmetric distributions were therefore
not considered for the distribution of side effects. The uniform distribution would have made the
model far simpler than the exponential distribution. The uniform distribution would also have
assumed that instant death was as likely as a full recovery from an illness. Under this distribution
a realistic model of the pharmaceutical market would be impossible to develop.
The probability and cumulative density functions below display the general shape of the
distribution of drug quality. Displayed are the probability and cumulative density functions for
the values It = 1 and 11 = 0.75. The relationship cp = It-e was substituted into the probability density
function for side effects U£(e)=ne-T)£) to obtain the algebraic form of each of these functions.
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Figure 2.1: Probability density function (frp(cp)=ne-1j(A-rp))
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative density function (Frp(cp)=e-11(A-rp))
8u THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Two major relationships affect drug choice: the connection between doctors and the
government, and that shared by doctors and their patients. A transaction cost analysis of the
relationship between doctors and the government assesses that the government will choose not to
monitor the actions of any particular doctor closely. The government restricts itself to defining a
framework within which doctors and their patients decide the form and specifics of treatment.
This framework includes rules on the conduct of doctors, the fee doctors receive from the
government, and the rights doctors have with respect to prescribing treatments.
The principal-agent model predicts the relationship between doctors and patients badly
since for the purpose of incentive compatibility such models predict a positive correlation
between the improvement in patient health and payment. In New Zealand doctors receive a flat
fee per consultation rather than an outcome-based scheme, rendering the predictions of the
standard principal-agent model irrelevant. A possible reason for this lies in the private
information patients have about their own health status. Since doctors cannot costlessly verify
this status" patients can easily under report the effectiveness of treatment in order to avoid paying
a greater sum.
Temin (1980)10 presents a model in which he predicts that three distinct modes of
behaviour exist in the relationship between doctors and their patients. Temin's argument appeals
to techniques used in different academic disciplines to predict the behaviour of each party. The
first of the behavioural patterns addressed is rationality.
Economics as a discipline suggests that decisions attempt to satisfy set goals with some
form of optimisation typically involved. Physicians make decisions according to self interest
with utility functions that may incorporate an incentive to give quality health advice.!' Under
strict rationality of this type doctors typically also satisfy any conditions imposed upon them by
medical associations (codes of conduct) and the government (legal duties).
9 Partly because of the subjective nature of health status.
10 Temin, P. (1980) pp. 12-17, 163-192.
II Be it through an altruistic motive or the benefit accruing to a good reputation.
9Temin argues that rational behaviour is most likely to occur where a patient's health is
ikely to remain moderately stable over time and where individuals tend to value their autonomy.
~ime is an important consideration here because there is little incentive for an individual to
esearch an illness that is likely to change before treatment is possible.
The second mode of operation was that of customary or traditional behaviour where today's
ictions are primarily a reflection of actions taken in the past. Sociology and management are
ooth stated to be users of this form of patterned behaviour. Temin presented the organisational
theory of the firm as an example of customary behaviour. Here an organisation chooses to
behave according to pre-specified rules of thumb so long as results fall within an acceptable
range. Once observations no longer lie in the acceptable range the firm searches for a new set of
rules. Temin postulated that this form of behaviour characterises those with little autonomy
when they face slowly changing conditions.
Command behaviour was said to occur where every party defers to the next level of a
pre-determined hierarchy. This system forces compliance and requires a direct threat from
doctor to patient to enforce orders. Temin does not justify this assumption or state how or why
higher levels of a hierarchy are able to make superior decisions to lower ones.
Temin postulated that individual doctors and patients select one of these modes of
behaviour according to the level of change they observe. Demarcation between these types of
behaviour is ill defined and the concepts used leave questions unanswered. Traditional
behaviour makes sense, but only if there is very little payoff for anyone to find and use
information themselves. This is not the case where health changes only slightly over time.
Traditional behaviour fares badly with the increasingly quick pace of change within
pharmaceuticals because it suggests that doctors are unlikely to use new treatments. Blockbuster
drugs appear not to abide by the pattern of behaviour a traditional model denotes. These drugs
represent a large improvement on current treatment options and tend to be accepted quickly by
the medical fraternity. Prozac represents an example of such a blockbuster. Doctors were
initially prevented from prescribing Prozac without a specialist's recommendation but desired the
10
ability to do SO.12 If doctors acted according to traditional behaviour Prozac, being new, would
not have been accepted by doctors let alone fought for.
Command behaviour requires very strong enforcement not seen in reality. While quackery
is likely to bring the wrath of a medical association down on a doctor it appears unlikely that an
association could successfully coerce doctors into set prescribing practices or prescriptions in
everyday matters.
It is valuable to consider the approaches of other disciplines when dealing with the
relationship between doctors and their patients. Unfortunately, because these disciplines do not
give a better approximation to real life than economics, it seems unwise to continue with them.
Rationality has the advantage that, if applied correctly to a problem, it allows ignorance to exist
as a rational response. Command behaviour is likely to face problems in the detection of those
attempting to discover the quality of drugs while under traditional behaviour it is questionable
whether any learning will ever occur.
1II . SEARCH METHOD
Economic literature has focused on three different types of search method being the fixed
sample, sequential and variable sample search methods. Under a fixed sample search strategy an
agent can collect only one sample of data, the size of which is determined by the agent. Under a
sequential search strategy the agent can collect multiple samples of data but each of these
samples can encompass only one observation. Finally, under a variable sample size strategy the
agent can collect multiple samples of data, the size of which are determined by the agent.
Since both the fixed sample and sequential search strategies are simply special cases of the
variable sample size strategy (VSS) it is expected that where this strategy is available it will be
used by agents. Harrison and Morgan (1990)13 analysed the three options above and found that
agents use a VSS strategy in preference to either fixed or sequential search strategies.
17
- The Press, 12 August 1996
13Harrison, G.W. and Morgan, P. (1990) Search intensity in experiments. The Economic Journal
100(40 I ):478-486.
11
The availability of an unrestricted VSS scheme in the case of pharmaceuticals is
questionable. In order to use either the fixed sample strategy or an unrestricted VSS strategy it
must be possible for patients to test multiple pharmaceuticals simultaneously. Interactions
between drugs are complex and so it is unlikely that doctors will be able to consistently ascertain
the effects of individual drugs when patients simultaneously test multiple drugs. This difficulty
is incorporated by restricting strategies so that only unit sample sizes are permitted. This
removes the fixed sample search from consideration and restricts the VSS to a simple sequential
search strategy. The sequential search strategy is thus adopted as the method of search here.
If, as is normally the case, doctors have superior information about the quality of drugs
then they will naturally take the primary role in prescribing. The doctor has a set estimation of
drug quality and will ask the patient about the specific side effects they observe from tested
drugs.!" Doctors rank relevant drugs according to their own estimation of drug quality in order to
maximise their estimation of expected utility for the patient. This estimation attempts to proxy
the trade off a doctor makes between the cost and likely effect of a drug when deciding on
treatment recommendations. Information can be passed to patients by outlining available
treatment options and making recommendations.
Once the doctor prescribes a particular drug the consumer can take a small test dose. This
sample is infinitesimal in size and serves only to inform the patient of the specific quality of that
particular drug. Patients decide whether to continue on their current choice of treatment or return
to the doctor (at a cost) in order to request a different drug.
14 This estimation is a function of the information doctors receive from their own experiences, as
well as from the drug companies, patients, Pharmac and health lobby groups.
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IV . DRUG CHOICE GIVEN ESTIMATES OF DRUG QUALITY
Utility is assumed to be a function of affordable goods. Illness is assumed to restrict the
ability of a patient to earn. The basic utility function used here is found below by substituting an
appropriate budget constraint into the utility function. IS
Vij =Yij
PjCfij+Yij = m-L(l-qJu.f};)-k,
Vij = m-Piqu-L(I-qJu.f};)-k.
Here CPij and % are the quality and quantity of drug i selected by patient j, and Yij is her
consumption of all other goods given a selection of drug i. The price of a full course of treatment
above appears as Pi' while m is the income of a patient. L is the potential loss in income from
illness, and k: the cost of searching. This search cost covers any charges borne by the patient
other than the direct cost of purchasing a filled prescription. The search cost includes the cost of
a doctor's appointment, any travel costs associated with treatment, the opportunity cost of the
time taken for the appointment, the filling of any prescriptions, and the opportunity cost of the
time to test the drug.
The quasi-linear representation for utility found above ignores income effects except where
treatment is particularly costly. In reality, income effects are likely to be of most importance in
the case where treatment is expensive. A quasi-linear utility function will still capture income
effects when they are likely to be significant.
The practicalities of this project required numerical approximations to some evaluations.i"
These approximations did not converge where treatment levels varied between zero and one.
This resulted in the necessary concession of restricting the choice of an individual to either zero
or full treatment. In favour of allowing only a simple binary choice as opposed to the full range
[0,1] is the reluctance of doctors to prescribe partial treatments. Patients must pay for
15 This utility function here may be misleading given that quantity is later restricted to the values 0
and I. The equation shown here is still the desired form and the restriction of quantity to the values of 0
and I is itself a result of the form used here.
16 The problem occurred when trying to numerically integrate to find the consumer surplus in the
marketplace.
13
pharmaceuticals before the commencement of treatment so consumption up to the purchased
level will take place whenever quality is positive.
Drug treatment is no longer continuous but instead is a senes of discrete jumps. The
number and frequency of jumps depends on the form of the prescription regarding repeats and
dosage. The restriction of quantity to the binary choice {O, I} may be reduced to assumptions
that full treatment is purchased in one transaction and that pharmaceuticals cannot be sold to
third parties. Displayed below are the utilities of both no and full treatment along with the
decision rule patients will use to choose whether or not to accept treatment. '7
U I m-pj-L(l-qJij)-k.
[/ If,,=/
u I m-r Lr--k.
[/ '1,;=0
From this expression we can derive the expected utility of drug i for consumers for whom
CPij is unknown. The largest of these expected utilities (which are conditional on expectations of
It and TJ) will be selected as the first drug for testing. The patient chooses the best available drug
given the information they either receive or research themselves. The patient, committed to the
choice of a particular drug, proceeds to take an infinitesimal test sample. The test sample reveals
the true value of CPu to the patient who then chooses whether to continue with this treatment, try a
different drug, or simply live with their illness. 18
Drug qualities are assumed to be uncorrelated across individuals so that a bad quality
observation for one drug gives no indication of the quality of any other drug." The only time a
consumer will choose to give up searching (other than to return to a drug already tested) is when
all drugs representing an increase in expected utility'" have been tried and rejected. If a drug
makes it to the market it is reasonable to assume that its expected utility for all patients is
superior to that of selecting to take no treatment.
17 See Appendix 2.1.
IS Given the information the doctor provides regarding the expected drug distributions. Patients
need not know the drug distributions, rather they need know only the observed qualities of tested drugs.
19 Generics, which are a general exception to this statement are covered in Chapter 8.
70 Th . d . h
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If a patient is unhappy with the level of quality observed in their current choice of drug they
have the option of returning to their doctor. A patient knows the qualities of the current and any
past discarded drugs so a decision of whether to continue searching will be based on the best
available alternative. Further search will occur only if the expected utility from searching
exceeds the utility of their next best option. The expected utilities for both searching and
accepting a previously rejected drug are shown below:
E[UI ]= max {E[U(cp. )]}} search iET\R /} E[UI ]=maX{U(({J)}
.I Jl() search iER U
where T is the set of all relevant pharmaceuticals and R is the set of all rejected pharmaceuticals
v . EXPECTED UTILITY
Before continuing further it is worthwhile to examine the general shape of the expected
utility function. Appendix 2.1 derives the following expression for expected utility:
The graphs below show changes in expected utility as the price charged for treatment
increases as well as where effectiveness ().,) and the compactness (1]) of the outcome distribution
are varied.
EU
7
7
6
6
6
6
i
. 1\ I
.k \
.S \ \
\
.4 I\.~
-. Price
2 4 6 8 10
Figure 2.3: Expected utility: 1l=1, 1]=1, m=10, L=4
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Increasing pnce also increases the level of quality required to make consumption
worthwhile and decreases utility where treatment occurs. These effects combine to produce an
expected utility function that decreases in price?'
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Figure 2.4: Expected utility: p=l, 1]=1, m=10, L=4
The more effective the drug is generally the better the results for a patient will be. The
value of the drug to a patient increases as does the likelihood of choosing to take the drug. These
effects correctly suggest that expected utility will increase in efficacy.
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Figure 2.5:Expected utility: p=l, 1L=1, m=10, L=4
The expected value of the exponential side effect distribution f e (£ ) = T/e - 1je is 1/1] while the
variance of the side effect is 1/1]2. The quality distribution then has a mean quality of }"-1/ 71 and
variance 1/1]2. A higher value of eta then corresponds to a higher average quality for drugs and a
smaller variance in outcomes which promotes greater utility. Alternatively, the proportion of
patients facing a negative drug quality is e-1jA so that the higher is TJ, the lower is the chance that
the patient faces a low drug quality.
21 Consumption occurs if <p > 'if.. If p> AL then <p:S; A < 'if. and no consumption occurs. Where
p> A L no treatment is ever selected and expected utility is III - L = 6.
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VI . INTERTEMPORAL ASSUMPTIONS
The aim of the patient model derived in this chapter is the creation of drug quantity
functions dependent only on the following: the price of all relevant pharmaceuticals, the quality
characteristics of these pharmaceuticals and the estimation of doctors regarding these quality
characteristics.
Where quantity is observed to change over time it is desirable that this change is a direct
result of changes in the above variables rather than any functional dependence of quantity on
time. To derive such quantity functions further restrictions must be made affecting both the
distribution of patients and the information patients hold at the beginning of each period.
(1) Period length
Choosing an appropriate period length is essential in correctly identifying the proportion of
users of each drug. The following information is necessary when attempting to find the
proportion of patients using each drug in the very short term:
(a) How many people have just found out they have an illness for the first time? These people
have no personal history regarding the quality of drugs used to treat this illness. This affects the actions
individuals are likely to undertake in future periods since they may still be searching rather than taking
treatment.
(b) How many people are testing the quality of drug i?
(c) How many people already know the quality of drug i?
(d) How many patients are suffering this illness for the first time? If a consumer is suffering a
reoccurrence of a previous illness they generally know which treatment is optimal and a successful
treatment is repeated. Exceptions to this rule can occur where their doctor's estimation of drug quality
has changed or new products have emerged.
These considerations overcomplicate the analysis of the model. The above concerns are
averted by examining only the final treatment choices so that intermediate actions taken by
consumers are ignored.
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(2) Removing intertemporal effects in the quality distribution
A further assumption is required to stabilise the distribution of outcomes. Both the
duration and chance of reoccurrence of an illness must be independent of the individual specific
quality of any drug. Suppose that this were not the case and that a large portion of those who
suffered negative side effects in the previous period would suffer a relapse. In the next period
there are two types of patients; those who manifest a new illness and those who have suffered a
relapse. Those suffering a new illness come from a distribution as defined earlier while those
suffering a relapse tend to lie in the tail of the distribution of quality. There is an overall bias
towards large negative side effects and the exponential distribution of quality is invalid when
used as the distribution of patients. Imposing independence of duration and quality alleviates
this potential problem.
(3) Removing intertemporal effects in patient choice
Two further assumptions are necessary in order to make certain that patients faced with the
same drugs, prices and information will make the same decisions. The major effect of these
assumptions is to restrict the information patients can transfer intertemporally. If patients in one
period have superior information to patients in another period (other than improvements in the
knowledge of doctors) it is possible that their choices may differ. One of the aims of the model
developed here is time-independence of choices which will be violated if intertemporal transfers
of patient specific knowledge are permitted. The assumptions required to avoid such transfers
are: that illnesses last only one period, that patients of different types fall ill with equal
probability, and that a fixed number of patients fall ill randomly within an infinite population.
The first of these assumptions restricts the most obvious of information transfers. If
patients are ill for multiple periods then they will carry pertinent information for several periods.
The second assumption implies that those who are ill are distributed according to an exponential
distribution. This assumption forces the side effect distribution of patients to equal the
distribution of side effects for the population at large.
The second method by which information may be transferred is where a patient suffers a
relapse. Where a fixed sample of patients are drawn from an infinite population the chance of
any particular individual being selected is zero, as is the chance of any individual suffering a
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relapse. Where illness does not reoccur it is possible to address each period in a one-off fashion
with no prior knowledge except that which doctors hold. This result is necessary due to the
effect of knowledge transferred by patients from one period to another where two or more
treatment options exist and where the patient faces at least two high individual qualities.
Suppose that between two periods the estimates a doctor has over drug characteristics
change. Suppose further that in the first period a particular patient may have tested drug A first
and selected it on the basis of expected utility without testing drug B. In the second period the
same consumer, without prior knowledge and with the doctor's new estimation of drug quality
would choose to test drug B first and, perceiving a high quality, would accept this drug for the
purposes of treatment. If, in this second period, the patient had known the quality of drug A she
may have chosen to use it in preference to drug B. The prior knowledge of the patient is
significant to her decision, suggesting that the proportion of patients using a particular drug is
dependant on the number and types of patients suffering a reoccurrence of illness. The infinite
population assumption prevents this complication to the model by forcing the chance of
reoccurrence to zero.
VII. THE PROPORTION OF PATIENTS USING A PARTICULAR DRUG
One of the advantages of using a binary choice in treatment is that it removes the necessity
of separate indices for both quantity and the proportion of patients using a drug. The expression
below is only an outline of the share of patients using each drug.22 Note that because some
patients will choose to use none of the available drugs the market share of a drug does not
accurately reflect the proportion of patients using that drug.
The proportion of patients using drug 1 (where drug 1 is superior in expected utility)
consists of two groups within a duopoly: those who sample only drug 1 and find it of sufficient
quality to continue without testing drug 2, and those who sample both drugs and find drug 1 to be
superior to both drug 2 and taking no drugs.
22 For a formal derivation of these terms see Appendix 2.3.
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Below are the aggregate quantities of each drug and the proportion of patients who choose
to take no treatmentr'"
Pr(D/) = Pr(U/ >EU2 -Ie) +Pr(U/>U2, cp/ >!i-)(I-Pr(U, > EU2 -Ie»
and Pr(D2) = Pr(U2>U/, CP2 > !f:)(l-Pr(U/ > EU2 -Ie»
Only two drugs are typically considered because of the algebraic complexity in evaluating
integrals contained in these expressions. An alternative expression for the likelihood of a
consumer using any particular drug appears below:
'1'/
PreD/) =(1- FJ (cp /»+ f f} (cp / )F2 (cp r: (flI~fI')dcp /
fl
L
/'/
T
where drug 1 is superior on the basis of expected utility and
FiC") is the CDP of the quality of drug i,
fiC") is the PDF of the quality of drug i, and
cP, is the minimum test value of cP / for which drug 1 IS selected without further
. 24testmg.
23 These proportions are derived in Appendix 3.1.
24 A more complete definition is given in Appendix 3.1. Note that this is the normal case only - for
the case where expectations are highly unrealistic see the appendix.
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CHAPTER 3
PRODUCER CHOICE
1. THE CHOICE OF MODEL CHARACTERISTICS
The assumption that drug companies are rational profit maximising entities reveals very
little about their choices and activities. In order to predict the actions of these firms a more
precise determination of their available choices and beliefs is necessary. For a model definition
to be complete it must define the strategic items of choice for the producer as well as the beliefs
held by producers over their competitor's reactions when making their choices. Discussion on
these points will focus around the Coumot and Bertrand models in addition to the issue of
whether quality is a strategic variable for pharmaceutical companies.
Before proceeding it is worthwhile to clarify the terminology used when referring to the
quality of drugs. If drug A is termed superior then for a consumer uninformed about the
individual qualities they face the expected utility of drug A exceeds that of its competitor. If a
drug is of a greater overall quality then its outcome distribution first order stochastically
dominates that of its competitor. I Where concepts other than those outline above are used in the
comparison of pharmaceuticals further explanation will be given.
(1) Coumot vs. Bertrand
The Cournot model of duopoly postulates that producers use quantity as a strategic variable
with price determined endogenously according to the inverse demand curve. Producers here
determine quantity based on an estimation of the other firm's output.
I Drug A first order stochastically dominates drug B if the distributions of the drugs differ and the
probability of an individual observing a quality above x is at least as great for drug A than drug B,
regardless of the x chosen.
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The Bertrand model of duopoly proposes that each producer sets its own price given an
estimation of the price of any other firm. The demand curve defines quantity endogenously in
the Bertrand Model.
Both the Bertrand and Cournot approaches have merit and will normally result in different
predictions even when used in the same context. As an example, in a differentiated product
model where demands are linear functions of price a Bertrand model will suggest lower prices
than its Cournot equivalent.' In a non-differentiated model where marginal costs are constant a
pronounced division exists between the models. Here the Cournot model predicts that the price
charged will lie below the price either firm would charge if they were the only firm in the market
but will still be in excess of marginal costs. The existence of a second firm has made the market
more competitive, but not perfectly so. The Bertrand model in this case predicts that price will
equal marginal cost and the competitive outcome will occur. The Bertrand model predicts that
with two or more firms competitive pricing will occur whereas the Cournot model requires an
infinite number of firms for this pricing result.
In the Economics of Industrial Organisation Davies and Lyons suggest that the decision
between the Cournot and Bertrand models hinges on the type of market and the process by which
equilibrium occurs?
Clearly, it makes a difference whether firms choose prices or quantities. What grounds do we
have for choosing between them? First, and perhaps most importantly, there is the question of
the type of the market. In some markets (for primary products, stocks and shares) the people
who set prices (brokers) are different to the producers. There exists what is essentially an
auction market: producers/suppliers release a certain quantity into the market, and then
brokers will sell this for the highest price possible (the market clearing price). The Cournot
framework would thus seem natural where there are auction markets. While there are auction
markets, there are also many industrial markets without 'brokers', where the 'typical' sort of
market which concerns industrial economists is not an auction market, but a market with
price-setting firms. How can the use of the Cournot framework be justified in markets with
price-setting firms?
It is often argued that the choice of Bertrand or Cournot competition rests on the relative
t1exibility of prices and output. In the Bertrand framework, firms set prices and then produce
to order. Thus once set, prices are fixed, while output is perfectly t1exible. In the Cournot
framework however, once chosen, outputs are fixed, while the price is t1exible in the sense
2 Davies, S. and Lyons, B.(l988) Economics of Industrial Organisation. Essex, Longman p 133,
135
3 Davies, S. and Lyons, B.(l988) pp 134-135.
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that it clears the market. Thus the choice between the two frameworks rests on the relative
flexibility of price and output. This is of course an empirical question, but many would argue
that prices are more flexible than quantities (e.g. Hart 1985), and hence the Cournot
equilibrium is more appropriate.
An argument of the type given above by Davies and Lyons requires that some uncertainty
exists in demand between periods. The concept of "relative flexibility of quantity and price"
attempts to ask whether firms set price and then allow quantities to equilibrate the market or
alternatively set quantities and leave price to equilibrate the market. The downside of the
equilibrium concept in a model encompassing uncertainty is that it complicates the idea of what
an equilibrium involves.
Q
Bayesian Equilibrium
in quantities
QD\p) DH(p)
Bayesian Equilibrium
in prices
p
An equilibrium in pure strategies within an uncertainty free game requires constant prices
and quantities. In an equilibrium where uncertainty exists either prices or quantities will
equilibrate the market in the sense that quantity supplied equals market demand at the final price
level. Below are demand and supply diagrams for a firm in each case.4
p
DL
Figure 3.1: Bayesian equilibria in prices and quantities.
Where, in reality, a Bayesian Equilibrium in prices exists a Bertrand model is valid when
modelling the market in an uncertainty free framework. Where the Bayesian Equilibrium is in
quantity a Cournot model is more appropriate in the simpler setting. The model used does not
attempt to take this uncertainty into account because of its inherent difficulty. Under uncertainty
it will be very difficult to predict the paths of prices, quantity and knowledge about drugs over
time.
4 Where Hand L refer to high and low levels of demand, respectively.
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In the market for pharmaceuticals, drug companies determine prices after consideration of
the regulatory framework they inhabit. Where an obvious regulatory framework exists it will
tend to target prices in some fashion. Internationally measures to limit prices fall into several
different categories:
(i) measures imposing greater costs on consumers for more expensive drugs (includes
proportional cost sharing and reference pricing),
(ii) product by product price controls, or
(iii) indirect controls on price through profit controls (where excess rents are not simply
dissipated).
One possible reason price, rather than quantity is targeted is that price is more predictable
in the marketplace. Greater variability in quantity infers that a Bayesian Equilibrium in prices
occurs and suggests a Bertrand rather than a Cournot model be used.
The market does not appear to fall in the general realm of auction markets because no
obvious auctioneer exists. The relative flexibility of prices and output is an interesting
comparison and should be considered in a small enough time frame to appreciate full volatility.
In order to determine the proportion of patients using each drug it was first necessary to abstract
from a sequential search process. This abstraction relied on increasing period lengths in order to
remove variation in quantities caused by patients being at intermediate stages in the search
process. This variation in quantity suggests the Bertrand model be used.
The final argument for the use of a Bertrand rather than a Cournot model lies in the
sequential search framework derived in Chapter 2. It is assumed that patients, when testing
drugs, face constant prices for drugs and have the ability to buy any quantity they desire. The
search framework introduces small variations in demand that a Bayesian Equilibrium in quantity
suggests would render price variable in the short term. Such a Bayesian Equilibrium would
violate the assumptions of the search model whereas a Bayesian Equilibrium in prices would not.
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(2) Product quality as a strategic variable
The essence of whether or not quality is a strategic variable relies on the process by which
new products enter the market. The Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand
(RMI) estimates that in a worldwide setting only one compound in 10,000 makes it to the
marketplace.:' The chance of any specific compound proving to be a marketable drug after
testing and a lengthy approval process is slim." The likelihood of a drug company being able to
significantly increase the quality of a marketable drug appears even more negligible as the
process of innovation is neither a predictable nor a deterministic one. The characteristics of
quality (Ai, rli) for a new chemical entity are assumed to be random while copycat drugs and
generics are predictable in terms of the quality of the chemical entity they mimic.
Drug companies appear to have insufficient control over quality for it to act as a strategic
variable so when modelling pharmaceutical companies the prices of drugs are the only relevant
strategic variables addressed.'
II. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
Pharmaceutical companies compete on the basis of price but do so in the knowledge that
their drugs differ from those of their competitors. In the literature on product differentiation
models fall into two distinct types; the representative consumer and the spatial model. Carlton
and Perloff define these types of models in the following way:"
5 Researched Medicines Industry Association of New Zealand. (1993) An agenda for medicines in
health: 1994 and beyond. Wellington, RMIANZ. p 8. The number of drugs required at the trial stage for
a single marketable drug will of course be much lower than 10,000. Even so, other than where the make
up of drugs is fine-tuned, quality is assumed to be random.
6 Although small changes to the makeup of an established drug may improve its quality. An
example of such a change is in Amoxycillin with Potassium Clavulanate which has a better side effect
profile than the original chemical entity of Amoxycillin.
7 There is also potential for advertising to act as a variable here since this may affect the estimation
of doctors over the quality and applicability of alternative treatments. Under the search model of Chapter
2 advertising was to be a strategic variable but after necessary modification of the model this will no
longer be possible. The rationale for the modification of the model will be explained later in this and
following chapters.
8 Carlton, D. and Perloff, J. (1994) Modern Industrial Organisation. 2nd edition, Harper Collins. p
282.
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[In the] representative consumer model, all firms compete equally for all consumers who
typically buy from each firm. This model might be used to study the restaurant market, in
which firms produce differentiated products (such as different ethnic cuisines), but all
compete for the same customers.
In the other, the spatial or location model, each consumer prefers products that have certain
characteristics or are sold by firms located near them and is willing to pay a premium for these
preferred products. Moreover, the consumer may not care greatly about the price of some
other goods in the market. For example, a consumer whose favorite cereal is Kellogg's corn
flakes is more sensitive to the relative price of Post's corn flakes that to the relative price of
Nabisco's sugar-coated shredded wheat. The other brand of corn flakes is a much better
substitute than other types of cereal.
The pharmaceutical model used here falls into the location class of model. Location
consists of the particular position each patient occupies in the quality distribution of each drug.
Different locations allow two patients to attain different utilities from the same drug, introducing
variation into decision making. In addition, patients use only one drug and not a portfolio of
drugs having the same pharmaceutical effect, as would be predicted under a representative
model. Finally the point made above with respect to consumers relative indifference over the
price of some commodities in the market holds. If a drug has a negative quality measure for a
patient then the actual price charged is irrelevant since that consumer will never select it in
preference to using no drugs at all where the consumer price is positive.
Before addressing the problem of product differentiation in the pharmaceutical market it is
worthwhile to first examine the Bertrand model without such differentiation. This exercise seeks
to highlight the standard results of product differentiation. Section 1 addresses the case of non-
differentiated models while 2 deals with the standard results of the heterogeneous model. The
sections beyond those concerning product differentiation seek to address the specific case of the
pharmaceutical market. Neither of the earlier sections completely covers the sequential search
model as both assume that consumers know their utility given consumption of different goods.
When patients make a final decision on treatment the costly nature of information may dictate
that some drug qualities might not be known.
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(l) General results of a Bertrand model with homogeneous products
Before looking at the behaviour a differentiated Bertrand model predicts for an actual
market it is worthwhile to first focus on a homogeneous product case. Future arguments will rely
on reasoning close to that given in this section.
The classical Bertrand model focuses on the pricing decisions of a duopoly where both
firms face constant returns to scale and have the same marginal cost (c). Each firm may
manipulate only the price of its own good, which it sets equal to marginal cost in equilibrium.
Where both firms charge at marginal cost the unique Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game
occurs.
In order to prove the above statement two propositions must be established; firstly that "the
strategies above promote a Nash equilibrium", and secondly that "there can be no other Nash
equilibrium in the game". The latter of these propositions is assessed first. Suppose an
equilibrium exists with each firm charging a different price so that the low price firm prices
above c and gains the entire market. The firm with the higher price has an incentive to match the
lower price and receive half the market. The lower priced firm has an incentive to increase its
price to just below the higher price. Any equilibrium with market price above c must therefore
involve both firms charging the same price or else at least one firm will have an incentive to
change the price it charges.
Any point where the common price is above c will be prone to undercutting as both firms
have an incentive to decrease their price. There can therefore be no equilibrium with price above
c. No equilibrium with price below c can exist since the low price firm has an incentive to
increase price to at least c. The latter proposition is therefore true.
The point at which both firms charge marginal cost is a Nash equilibrium since neither firm
has an incentive to change their price. A price decrease will not occur as this would result in a
loss as opposed to zero profits. A price increase would not affect profits as when p =c profits
are zero, the same profit obtained if a firm increased its price above marginal cost and faced zero
consumption.
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(2) General results of a Bertrand model with heterogeneous products
Product differentiation in a location model is dependant not only on the actual differences
between commodities but often purely on perceived differences. The best known example of this
is the difference between Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Before blind trials many people state a
preference between Coke and Pepsi but relatively few can identify the brands by taste." The
distinction between actual and perceived differences is especially important in a search theory
framework.
The most famous of all location models is Hotelling's 1929 model lo where sunbathers
occupy a beach served by two ice cream sellers. These vendors compete for their custom on the
basis of price and proximity. The model distributes consumers uniformly along a line segment
and queries where firms will choose to locate themselves and how they will choose to price. If
firms set a constant price then each firm, knowing the location of the other, will seek a new
location just on the larger side of the continuum from its opposition. The resulting equilibrium
will see both firms locate arbitrarily close to the centre of the beach.
If firms are unable to move then the standard Bertrand result no longer holds. Here two
firms are no longer sufficient to guarantee a perfectly competitive equilibrium. Take one firm
and hold its competitor's price constant at marginal cost. The other firm prices knowing that
even if it charges above marginal cost it will retain some of the customers located closer to it
than to its competitor. The outcome where both firms charge marginal cost will not be an
equilibrium as some profits (achieved where price is above marginal cost) will be preferable to
none.
The equilibrium where firms have pre-defined positions sees the firm closest to the largest
number of consumers charging a higher price. This is analogous to a firm producing a higher
quality good being able to charge above its competitor in equilibrium. There is therefore a
premium attached to the good with the superior location.
o Carlton, D. and Perloff, J. (1994) p 283.
10 Hotelling, H. (1929) Stability in competition. Economic JoumaIAI-57.
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A non-existence problem anses where both firms can freely choose both pnce and
location. Without modification the simple Hotelling model yields no further results. Since the
quality characteristics of a drug are constant and invariant over time this particular version of the
non-existence problem will not arise in the pharmaceutical model examined here.
III. EXPECTED UTILITY
The expected utility of a drug is vital because of the sequential search method employed by
patients in finding the correct course of treatment. The drug with the superior expected utility
has a natural advantage as patients test this drug before deciding whether to test the other drug
available. Suppose that drug 1 is the superior drug in an industry. Where drug 1 achieves utility
above that of the expected utility of drug 2 treatment occurs without further testing. Of those
testing drug 2 not all will select to use it, the others finding that drug I and/or no drugs at all
represent a better treatment option. The net result will be that drug 2 has a much lower
consumption than drug 1 even if the expected utilities are quite close. Figure 3.2 attempts to
illustrate the increased market share of a superior good (labelled as drug 1).
D No treatment chosen
Drug I chosen
Drug 2 chosen
Figure 3.2: Treatment choice.
Notice that the line representing marginal consumers (labelled as q> 2 =q> r: {f)/~[J2») extends
only to (p J". If patients knew the quality of both drugs there will be some who would choose to
use drug 2 who would not test drug 2 under a sequential search framework. The dark shaded
area in Figure 3.3 below represents these consumers.
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D No treatment chosen
Drug I chosen
Drug 2 chosen
Figure 3.3: Gains accruing to the drug with superior expected utility.
The dark shaded area is a transfer of patients from drug 2 to drug 1, and is due to the
superior search position of drug 1. These patients give an additional payoff to being the superior
drug.
By way of an example: Suppose both drug 1 and drug 2 have Ai=l andr]i=l with Pl=l and
P2=1.01, and that patients know this. The expected utility of drug 1 is 6.2466 and the expected
utility of drug 2 is 6.2411. The $0.01 difference in price translates to 19% more patients
choosing drug 1 than drug 2 (Pr(D J) = 0.4940, Pr(D2) = 0.3037). Where the characteristics of
drugs are similar, we can expect considerable competition between drugs in order to achieve the
highest expected utility level.
IV. THE COMPOSITION OF A REACTION CURVE
The model used here is that of a duopoly where each firm faces a constant marginal cost of
production Ci' Having only two firms is essentially a simplifying assumption that aids in a clear
exposition of the definition of the reaction curves and the properties any resulting equilibrium
will have.
(1) The reaction curve of a superior drug
Suppose that the price of a drug is such that it has a higher expected utility than its
alternative. It is free to price at any level so long as it is indeed superior at the price chosen.
Suppose also that the price of the other drug increased. Now the superior drug, being a substitute
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for the inferior, experiences an increase in demand which it accommodates by increasing the
price it charges slightly. The reaction curve of a drug over the range of prices where it is optimal
to act as a superior drug should therefore be upward sloping.
(2) The reaction curve of an inferior drug
Suppose that a drug has a lower expected utility than its alternative. Patients who use the
inferior drug are normally those for whom the superior drug is of poor quality while the inferior
drug is of a quality sufficient to prompt treatment. The majority of those using the inferior drug
face the decision of whether to use the inferior drug or to take no treatment. The firm producing
the inferior drug can take advantage of an effective lack of competition and charge a relatively
high price for its wares. Because it faces a much smaller demand the profits made by an inferior
firm are likely to be smaller than those made by a superior firm in the same market.
Suppose now that the price of the superior drug increases. The firm producing the inferior
drug faces a slightly increased number of patients for whom the superior drug is likely to be
worse than taking either the inferior drug or taking no treatment at all. The firm producing the
inferior drug is expected to increase its price very slightly to take advantage of this.
(3) The reaction curve of an undercutting drug
For some levels of prices it is unsurprising that a situation akin to the homogenous
Bertrand game evolves. Here the most important consideration in maximising profits is to be the
superior drug on the basis of expected utility. Accordingly a firm will decide to undercut the
expected utility of their competitor by an epsilon in order to obtain the status of superior drug.
Note that an equilibrium cannot occur where both firms are seeking to undercut since at least one
firm will have an incentive to cut price in order to become the superior drug.
(4) The composite reaction function
In order to combine the three types of status described in Sections 1-3 we must consider the
profit function. The correct case for profit maximisation is identified for every value of the
competitor's price and the reaction curve for a firm derived. Every firm will have a discontinuity
in its profit function at the level where price equalises the drugs' expected utilities. Prices below
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that level correspond to where the firm's drug is superior, while for prices above this level the
drug has an inferior status. Below is a sample diagram to illustrate this point:
Profit of Firm 1
A1=A2=1,11,=112= I, C,=C2= I, P2=3
0.6
0.5
0.4
Profit
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.5 1.5 2 2.5
Price
3.5 4 4.5
Figure 3.4: Sample profit function.
The general shape of the above diagram corresponds to that of an undercutting firm. Here
there is no local maximum where the drug has superior status and the local minimum (where it is
inferior on the basis of expected utility) promotes less profit than undercutting. The
determination of optimal pricing behaviour is simplified by relying on four generalised cases of
the profit function, Figure 3.5 analyses the first two of these cases while Figure 3.6 addresses the
latter two.
11.35
D.3
D.25
0.2
Profit
11.15
0.1
D.D5
Case (a)
)",=)",=1,T]l=T12=I, cl=e,=I, p,=1.5
2 Price 3 4
0.4
11.35
0.3
0.25
Profit 0.2
11.15
D.I
11.05
Case (b)
)",=)",=1,'11=11FI, c,=eFI, pFI.854
2 Price 3
Figure 3.5: Sample profit functions (a) and (b).
For low enough values of the competitor's price the profit function looks case (a). The
price charged by the other firm is so low as to prevent undercutting from being a serious option
for the firm. The profit maximising point is the local maximum where the price of the drug is
above the level that equalises expected utilities. As the price charged by the competing firm
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increases the firm becomes less eager to accept inferior status for its product. Case (b) represents
the threshold for the competitor's price where the firm is indifferent between undercutting and
accepting inferior status.
Case (c)
AI=A2= I,11 1=112=1. CFC2=1, P2=2.5
Case (d)
A,=A2=1,111=l1FI, c,=c2=1, pz=4
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Figure 3.6: Sample profit functions (c) and (d).
Case (c) above represents the range where undercutting the competition's expected utility
by an epsilon is a dominant strategy. The local minimum present when accepting inferior status
is itself inferior to that achieved when successfully undercutting. The final case addressed is that
where it is optimal to price below the level required to achieve superior status on the basis of
expected utility. Here a local maximum exists below the expected utility equalising price.
When identifying the profit maximising point a search is made for local maxima in the
profit function in both the inferior and superior ranges. I I A comparison is made between the
profit of any existing maximum and the profit obtained were the firm to undercut the expected
utility of its opposition by an epsilon.
If the profit associated with an existing local maximum is greater than profit gained with
undercutting the firm's profit function falls into either case (a) or case (d). Where the expected
utility equalising price promotes a profit at least as great as at the local maximum cases (b) and
II A local maximum in the profit function occurs for most values of a competitor's price but will
not always exist.
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(c) are possible. Where no local maximum exists the optimum price is simply an epsilon below
that which equalises expected utility and will be found in the search for a local maximum.
The optimum price referred to above constitutes one point on the reaction curve of the firm
when plotted in conjunction with the competitor's price. To derive other points on the firm's
reaction curve its competitor's price is varied and the procedure repeated.
V. SEARCH MODEL RESULTS
These examples all assume that the income loss due to illness (L) is half of income (m= 10),
search cost (k) is 0.1 and the shared marginal cost is 1. It is assumed that 1 million patients
suffer from the illness treated by the drugs in the subgroup addressed.
( 1) Two identically distributed drugs
Where AI = A2 = 1, T/ I = 1]2 = 1 the reaction function for firm 1 is given below.
The reaction curve of finn 1
3.5002.500 3.0002.0001.500
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Figure 3.7: Reaction curve of firm 1 (identically distributed drugs).
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For P2 below 1.854 the reaction function is vertical. This is a vagary of the exponential
function used for this model but is not particularly important. 12 Case (b) in Figure 3.5 displays
the transition at approximately P2 = 1.854 where the optimum decision for firm 1 changes from
accepting inferior status to undercutting. The straight line until P2 =3.15 corresponds to
undercutting behaviour. Where P2 ~ 3.15 it becomes optimal for firm 1 to price below the level
required to attain superior status.
Since the two firms are identical the reaction function of firm 2 is identical to that of firm 1
reflected through P 1=P2• Figure 3.8 displays both these curves together.
Reaction Curves
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Figure 3.8: Reaction curves (identically distributed drugs).
At first glance it appears that a multiplicity of Nash equilibria occur. The region along
which this the reaction curves appear to converge is however where both firms are attempting to
undercut. The two reaction curves are therefore 2 epsilons apart throughout the range where the
curves appear to touch. This non-intersection makes for an interesting dilemma as without a true
intersection of the reaction curves no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Before proceeding to attempt to circumvent this non-existence problem it is wise to first
examine how prevalently this phenomenon occurs. No equilibrium exists in this example
because of the value accruing to whomever holds superior status. Superior status is available to
both firms without either firm having to charge a large amount less than their competitor. The
12See Appendix 3.2 for an explanation of this phenomenon.
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following sections attempt to examine different cases and discover whether this phenomenon is
pervasive.
(2) A large difference in the efficacy of drugs
Here drug 1 is of a greater overall quality than drug 2 with 17i = 1 (i = 1,2) but ,11 = 1 and
,12 = 0.5. Obviously drug 1, with twice the efficacy of drug 2, is very likely to be superior once
pricing decisions are made. Since the two firms are no longer identical each firm's reaction
function is derived separately. Figure 3.9 displays the reaction curves for each firm.
Reaction Curves
~,- - .:
-R1(P2) , ,
-R2(P1)
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1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500 :\.000 J.500 4.000 4.500 5.000
Figure 3.9:Reaction curves (asymmetry in efficacy).
The reaction curve for drug 2 is similar to that seen in the previous section. The leftmost
portion corresponds to where the manufacturers of drug 2 present their drug as being inferior.
The noticeably upward sloping portion (above PI =3.94) corresponds to where drug 2 seeks to
undercut the expected utility of drug 1 while the portion where PI ;::: 4.27 corresponds to where
the profit function has a global maximum where drug 2 is superior.
Drug 1 is superior along all of the points on its reaction curve. For drug 2 to attract a
positive market share the price of drug 2 must be less than 2.5; otherwise no consumer would
ever rationally select it. The decision rule for drug selection states that if a patient is to select a
drug then I\. ~ qJ > ~ , or p < I\.L = 2.5. A summary of the unique sequential search Nash equilibrium
in prices appears in Table 3.1.
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Price (p) Quantity (u) Me (c) Profits (rt)
Firm 1 (superior) 3.1903 0.3046 m 1.0000 0.6672
Firm 2 (inferior) 1.7692 0.0937 m 1.0000 0.0721
No treatment 0.6016 m
Table 3.1: Nash Equilibrium (asymmetry in efficacy).
For smaller differences in efficacy (for example A2 = 0.9) no equilibrium in pure strategies
exists.l ' For an equilibrium to occur there must be a very large asymmetry in efficacy between
the firms.
(3) A large asymmetry in risk
This case involves a drug 1 with a greater overall quality than drug 2; A1= A. 2 =1 but
T7 I = 5 and T7 2 = I. The difference in risk renders the mean side effect from drug I only one fifth
as extreme as that of drug 2. Displayed in the below diagram are the reaction curves for this
case.
Reaction Curves
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Figure 3.10: Reaction curves (asymmetry in risk).
The manufacturer of drug 1 attempts to reach either a local maximum as a superior drug
(for P2 > 2.29) or chooses to undercut (for P2 ::; 2.29). Firm 2 accepts an inferior position for
PI < 3.05 and undercuts until PI reaches approximately 3.90. The two reaction curves do not
intersect and, as in the first case no equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
13 See Appendix 3.3 for alternative scenarios with smaller values for efficacy.
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(4) Balanced asymmetry
In this case the two drugs have similar expected utilities where they charge the same price.
Drug 1 is characterised by ),,/=0.85,TJ/=1.1 and drug 2 by ),,2 =0.90 and TJ2 = 1. Drug lis
therefore less effective but provides a more secure option than drug 2.
Reaction Curves
-R1(P2)
-R2(P1)
0.500 1.000 1.500 2.000 2.500
PI
3.000 3.500 4.000
Figure 3.11: Reaction curves (balanced asymmetry).
Unfortunately the problem of non-existence seen in the first example appears pervasive.
Since very little power can be attributed to any model where an equilibrium does not occur
further action must be taken. The following chapters explore the problem of non-existence in the
context of both historical modifications of the Hotelling model and a modification wherein the
search component of this model is removed.
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CHAPTER 4
RESOLVING THE NON-EXISTENCE PROBLEM
Where no equilibrium exists a model has very little predictive or explanatory power. In
order to predict the effects of different regulatory regimes in the pharmaceutical market it is
necessary to first resolve the problem of non-existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
In order to find a solution to the problem of non-existence three different methods are
available to resolve the problem. A previously used Hotelling remedy may be applied to the
problem, mixed strategies may be searched for or the model must have its search component
removed. Chapter 3 included references to a general non-existence problem common to spatial
models of Bertrand competition. This raises the possibility that a method previously used to
resolve the Hotelling non-existence problem may aid the resolution of the non-existence problem
faced in the pharmaceutical market model of Chapter 3. Krouse, in Theory of industrial
economics, I defines the essence of this problem as follows:
This failure of an equilibrium to exist is related directly to the abruptness of the demand
change with mill price undercutting and the associated discontinuities in price reaction
functions ... The non-existence problem can be "corrected" by alternative specifications
of the model.
The general problem of such discontinuities in the demand and reaction functions of firms
was observed to occur in the previous chapter. Alternative specifications of the Hotelling model
addressed in Krouse include: using transport costs that are strictly convex in distance, restricting
solution concepts to those where undercutting is impossible, allowing sequential entry into the
market, and making relocation costs prohibitive. Modifications analogous to those used for the
Hotelling model may prove effective in alleviating the non-existence problem in the
pharmaceutical market model.
I Krouse, C. (1990) Theory of industrial economics. Blackwell, Massachsetts USA. p146.
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1. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND HOTELLING MODELS
Firm two
The basic Hotelling model considers two vendors offering ice creams along a stretch of
beach. Each seller chooses both their location and price. The pharmaceutical model outlined in
Chapter 3 places two competing firms in a marketplace and allows them to set their prices. The
link between prices in both markets is obvious.
~f-ne--------I·I-----
Figure 4.1: The Hotelling location model.
The Hotelling model assumes that consumers lie evenly along the length of the beach. This
story of location is analogous to an assumption that the distribution of consumers is uniform
along a line of length L. In the first stage of the model firms locate themselves somewhere along
the line while in the second stage firms choose price. In the second stage of the game each
consumer faces two options; either purchase from firm one or firm two. The prices faced by a
consumer for the good produced by each firm are:
where c, is the cost of the good of firm i, Pi is the mill price of the good of firm i, t is the constant
transportation cost and Ii is the distance of the consumer from firm i.
Each consumer chooses the cheapest of the two goods available. The marginal consumer is
indifferent between the firms and so for this consumer Pi + t Ii = Pj + t Ii and lj = Ii + (Pr Pi)/t. The
following diagram displays the choice made by consumers based on the price and location
decisions of firms.
= l,+ Pi)/t
Good I chosen
Good 2 chosen
Figure 4.2: Choice in the Hotelling model.
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Firms, predicting consumer choice, determine their optimum pnce based on location.
Solving for the first stage of the game firms then select their location based on their beliefs about
their competitor.
The pharmaceutical model differs from this approach since there are not one but two forms
of location evident in the model through quality and expected utility. The characteristics a drug
has with respect to the efficacy and risk of treatment define the first of these location concepts.
The second form of location is the order of the firm in the search sequence, which is defined by
expected utility and hence price. The superior drug is selected for treatment (without testing the
inferior drug) for all patients for whom it promotes at least the expected utility of the inferior
drug. Testing of the second drug occurs only if the superior drug does not promote the expected
utility of drug 2. Where patients know the qualities of both drugs the treatment option selected
will be that promoting the greatest level of utility. In this model there will also be those
consumers who find that no drug is of sufficient quality to continue treatment.
Figure 4.3 highlights the decisions made by patients as to treatment under a sequential
search framework where drug I has superior expected utility. The final decision made by any
consumer is dependant on the values of quality faced.
.................... "' _-_ ..
.
D No treatment chosen
Drug 1 chosen
Drug 2 chosen
Figure 4.3: Choice in the pharmaceutical market model.
In the section where the patients ultimately discover the quality of both drugs (qJ 1 < qJ 1*) the
decision rule regarding drug choice has marginal consumers where qJ 2 =qJ r: (fI ' 2'2) (or alternatively
P2=Pl+(qJ2-qJj)IL). This is very close to the definition of the marginal consumer under the
Hotelling model. The closeness of definitions implicitly links the concepts of distance
(Hotelling) and drug quality (pharmaceutical model) for at least some consumers. Likewise
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transport cost corresponds to the loss due to an illness since they deflate the differences in
distance and drug quality respectively. There does not appear to be an equivalent for expected
utility in the Hotelling model as such an equivalent must depend on both the location and the
price charged of both firms.
II. APPLYING HOTELLING MODIFICATIONS TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL MODEL
(1) Strictly convex transport costs
One method of alleviating non-existence of equilibria in the Hotelling model is to impose
strictly increasing transport costs on the model? Transport costs in the Hotelling model are
analogous to the loss in income caused by illness in the no-treatment case. Where transport costs
are strictly convex the modified Hotelling model promotes an equilibrium where firms take
extreme positions on the line segment representing the market.
Unfortunately making the loss associated with no treatment dependant on product quality
causes major complications. The natural definition of the loss function in such a case will be as a
function of both drug qualities L =L (cp l' cp J '3
Previously the loss from illness and the individual qualities patients faced were unrelated.
With the addition of this relationship this is no longer the case. We know have a system of
equations with one equation and three variables. Once the loss and the quality of the first drug is
known the individual specific quality of the second drug can be derived. This eliminates both the
need for search and the independence between drug qualities.
Adding an error term to the relationship between individual qualities" and the loss function
prevents the derivation of one quality from the knowledge of the other. It does not however
2 Lane, W. (1980) Product differentiation in a model with endogenous sequential entry. Bell
Journal of Economics 11(1):237-60.
'3 Since this is analogous to making transport strictly convex in distance from the supplier.
4 So that L = L(CP1,CP2)+~ where ~ is a random variable uncorrelated with either quality.
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restore the independence of individual drug qualities since the knowledge of one quality still
provides some information about the unknown quality.'
Of additional concern is the question of why L, as a variable valid whether or not treatment
occurs should be related to a variable meaningful only if treatment occurs. If any relationship
were to exist it would seem more reasonable to have quality" be a function of loss rather than the
case necessary to apply this solution to the pharmaceutical market model. Even in such a case
the problem of dependence would still arise between the loss and qualities. This solution to the
Hotelling model does not appear to be a natural addition to the model and so is not an option to
alleviate the non-existence problem.
(2) No-undercutting solutions
This section is motivated by a section of Krouse (1990) where he summarises the general
results of Eaton and Lipsey (1978), Novshek (1980) and Carruthers (1981).7 The basis of these
results is an argument that price strategies should dismiss undercutting when firms have perfect
foresight and constant marginal costs. The justification of this proposition appeals to the notion
that neither firm can price their competitor out of the market For some region close to each
firm's location it can charge a profitable price regardless of whatever cost covering price its
. h 8competitor c arges.
The model presumes that firms, seeing this to be true, will never choose to undercut their
competitors since they know they will not drive them from the market. Now for undercutting to
be an optimal strategy all that is required is that expected profits are higher than when pricing at
a local maximum. The modification of the normal Hotelling model adclressed here uses modified
zero conjectural variations in order to prevent undercutting on the part of firms. These
conjectures postulate that undercutting will never be successful because any attempt to undercut
by a firm provokes an equivalent change in the price of its competitor.
S Since the relationship allows for the derivation of a distribution for the second quality.
6 Which is the proportional decrease in lost income in income due to treatment.
7 For references to Eaton and Lipsey (1978), Novshek (1980) and Carruthers (1981) see the
bibliography.
8 See Appendix 4.1 for proof of this proposition.
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This conjectural variation model, as with all models of its type, attempts to model quasi-
dynamic behaviour by introducing a limited form of reaction into a static model. By modifying
the normal Nash equilibrium concept these models attempt to integrate the immediate reaction of
a firm to the actions taken by their competitor. The problem with this form of model is that it
only takes two stages into account; it provides no reason why the original mover would not move
in response to the reaction of their competitor. In this modified model there is no reason why the
original mover is unable to undercut the lower price charged by their competitor in the second
stage and gain an increased portion of the market.
By restricting quasi-dynamic behaviour introduced into the model to only two stages any
power the model may have to predict outcomes will necessarily suffer from less than true
dynamic outcomes. This modification has very little relevance in the Hotelling model and no
more in resolving the problems of non-existence in the pharmaceutical model explored here.
(3) Sequential location and immobility
One major problem associated with the classical Hotelling model is that it assumes that
firms can freely adjust their location. In product differentiation models this assumption is often
highly unrealistic as changing the essential characteristics of a brand is difficult and in the case of
pharmaceuticals effectively impossible. The costs of relocation are many and varied and include
research and development, advertising, changes in the way goods are produced, and the cost of
redesigning a product. For markets where these costs are likely to be large enough to pose a
serious impediment to moving it seems reasonable to make location a once-and-for-all decision.
In the pharmaceutical market model the decision of drug characteristics is left to nature.
Firms acknowledge the permanence of their location when entering the market. Decisions
on location consider the positions of both current firms and likely entrants. This type of
modification to the general framework is of little use when applied to the pharmaceutical market
model. The pharmaceutical model already incorporates immobility of firms concerning the
characteristics of drug quality. The alternative location concept in the pharmaceutical model is
that of the position in the search sequence which unfortunately is itself a function of price. Any
restrictions on expected utility also restricts the ability of firms to choose their price. No further
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restrictions on the choice of location are possible in the pharmaceutical model and so this
solution to the non-existence problem is not relevant here.
Examples of this modification in the Hotelling model quoted in Krouse (1990) include
Hay, D (Sequential entry and entry deterring strategies in spatial competition. Oxford Economic
Papers 1976:240-57.) and Lane, W (Product differentiation in a model with endogenous
sequential entry. Bell Journal of Economics 1980:237-60).
(4) The Salop circle model
One of the most important modifications of the Hotelling model is the circle model
developed by Salop (1979)9. Instead of considering firms who locate along a line segment the
Salop model has ice-cream sellers locating along a circle. This circle is formed by joining the
endpoints of the line segment in the Hotelling model. The Salop model also incorporates an
outside option into the market. Such an option is already a feature of the pharmaceutical market
model here as patients face a choice not only of which drug they prefer for use in treatment but
also whether or not to accept treatment.
Before proceeding in the definition of the Salop model it is pertinent to pause and examine
what a circular model would imply about the market for pharmaceuticals. Recall that consumers
are located in two quality dimensions. Where location is represented by the pair (cp /.cpz) the
extreme points of the plane in which patients lie are at {(_oo,-oo),(-oo,Az),(A/,-oo),(A/,Az)}. An
approximation of this plane is given in Figure 4.4. In order to form a circle the Salop model
joins the endpoints of the normal Hotelling line segment. In order to form an equivalent to the
circle of the Salop model here the endpoints of the patient plane have to be joined. Three options
are available to do this: pairs of corners could be joined and a hollow cylinder formed or all four
corners of the patient plane could be joined. Where all four corners are joined either a sphere or
a torus is formed.
9 Salop, S. Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods. (1979) Bell Journal of Economics
1O( I ): 141-156.
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(- =,- =)
Plane
Figure 4.4: The patient plane.
In order to join points it must hold that consumers at the joined points exhibit the
characteristics of both all the combined points. In the case of the cylindrical view in Figure 4.4
the patient plane has been joined along the top and bottom edges. This join implies an implicit
assumption that, for drug 2, consumers facing a quality of the drug so poor as to cause
instantaneous death are also those that face no side effects from treatment. As death can be
construed as a considerable side effect this is obviously not the case. 10
Figure 4.5: Cylindrical modification of the patient plane
Figure 4.6 considers both the cases where all four corners are joined at one point. Here an
implicit assumption is made that consumers who face a quality of a drug poor enough to cause
10 Had the join in the model been made along the left and right edges of the plane the same
problem would occur but this time for drug 1.
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instantaneous death are also those that face no side effects from that drug. This assumption again
is trivially false.
Figure 4.6: Sphere and torus versions of the patient plane.
While it is a reasonably innocuous assumption to say that the preferences of the two
extreme consumers with respect to ice cream are equivalent this will not be the case for the
individual specific qualities of pharmaceuticals. The modifications made to the Hotelling model
in order to form the Salop circle model work well in that setting but can not be applied to the
pharmaceutical market model in order to alleviate the non-existence problem.
III. THE NON-EXISTENCE PROBLEM
Non-existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies occurs 111 this game because of a
discontinuity in the reaction function of each firm. The discontinuity occurs where the profit
associated with a successful undercutting of a competitor's expected utility coincides with the
profit associated with accepting the status of an inferior drug. The interruption in the reaction
curve thus occurs at the point where the optimal mode of behaviour of a firm changes. The level
of prices corresponding to undercutting and inferior pricing will differ. Undercutting behaviour
promotes a drug to superior status while if a drug is inferior its price must be in excess of the
level that equalises expected utility. With these prices falling either side of the price equalising
expected utility the two must be different.
47
The problem of non-existence is then inexorably tied into the sequential search character of
the model. It is this facet of the pharmaceutical model that requires different modes of behaviour
to occur for firms.
Although much has been done here to attempt to circumvent the problem of non-existence
the problem nevertheless appears intractable. In order to force equilibria to exist in this market
either the search component of the model must be removed or a search must take place for mixed
strategy equilibria. The difficulty of establishing the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and
the likely complexity in calculation for mixed strategies make this an awkward choice; either to
greatly complicate the model or remove possibly important behaviour. If the no-search model
produces pricing outcomes not too dissimilar from prices (or price ranges, in the case of non-
existent equilibria) predicted by the search model then the risk of removing important behaviour
appears low. Chapter 5 addresses the model without search behaviour and attempts to evaluate
how close the prediction of each scenario is to the original model. I I
II While it is hoped that mixed strategies exist in the pharmaceutical market model this by no
means certain. The problems of a non upper semi-continuous profit function (effectively a profit
function which takes a downward jump) are well known (see Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1992) Game
Theory. MIT Press. pA85). In this case the assumptions of most general existence proofs fail to hold.
Existence proofs that do not require upper semi-continuity (for example Dasgupta, P and Maskin, E.
(1986) The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games. I: Theory. Review of Economic
Studies 53:27-42.) rely on results being established as to the actual properties of the profit function.
Proving that, as would be required, the sum of payoffs is upper semi-continuous is likely to be time
consuming (given that numerical calculations appear to be required to find mixed strategies in games
approximating the main game).
Upper semi-continuity of the sum of payoffs does hold for the Hotelling model but the
non-uniform nature of probability in the pharmaceutical market model means that this result does not
automatically hold here. Recall that the problem in the pharmaceutical market model was not with a
firm's location in the sense of a point on the patient plane but rather with its place in the search order.
These factors necessitate a large amount of work in simply proving the existence of a mixed
strategy equilibrium without consideration of the costs of calculating equilibria once the model becomes
more complex under reference pricing and alternative subsidisation schemes.
In addition to the problem of defining Nash equilibria over mixed strategies is the debate over their
practical application. An example of this is in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) where each takes an
opposing position on whether or not mixed strategies are used in reality.
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CHAPTERS
THE NO SEARCH MODEL OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
In recreating the pharmaceutical market model without search behaviour the assumptions
adopted correspond closely to those outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. The basic framework of drug
quality, quantity and price remain similar when considering both patient and producer choice.
1. PATIENT CHOICE IN A NO SEARCH SETTING
Patient choice in the no search setting may differ from the earlier setting in two ways;
different assumptions are made regarding consumers and the decision process of patients has
changed. Sections 1 and 2 outline these changes.
(l) Changes in the assumptions regarding patients
After the removal of sequential search many assumptions of Chapter 2 may either no
longer be necessary or may require modification. Fortunately the majority of the assumptions
adopted in Chapter 2 are retained without change. The individual specific quality of a drug is
once more assumed to follow an exponential distribution. Individual specific qualities are again
assumed to be independent. The form of the budget equation changes slightly with search costs
no longer featuring in the model while utility remains a function of available consumption.
m-L(l-cp" rq;;),1J v'tij
m-i p.q .. -L(l-cp ~).
, 1J ijv'tij
The decision rule between drugs where their qualities are known by an individual remains
the same, as does the restriction of quantity to a binary choice.
_ {o if cP ij :::; Ii
qij -1 if Pi
I CPij>T
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The restrictive intertemporal assumptions made in the sequential search case may now be
substantially relaxed. Each individual knows the qualities they face of each drug in each period.
As long as those suffering both new or recurring illnesses are distributed independently along the
side effects distribution an exponential distribution may be used to represent the population of all
patients. Information in the modified framework is perfect so there is no possibility for two
identical patients I to choose different drugs because no patient has superior information. This
possibility, which will now not occur, was a potential source of bias in the sequential search
framework. The possibility of bias necessitated assumption of an infinite population and that no
illness could last longer than a single period. These assumptions are discarded since they
represent restrictions that are no longer necessary.
Where searching forms an important part of a model the expectations parties have over the
characteristics of different products are important. In the pharmaceutical market model once
search is removed the expectations of both doctors and patients become irrelevant as perfect and
costless information is available.
(2) Changes in patient choice
It is now assumed that every patient either knows the qualities of each drug option they
face." The precise mechanics of how drug quality is discovered is no longer of any significance
as far as influencing consumption is concerned. The diagram below was used to display the
decisions made in the sequential search framework where drug 1 is superior.
.... .1 _.. _, .. .
. . .
D No treatment chosen
Drug 1 chosen
Drug 2 chosen
Figure 5.1: Choice in the pharmaceutical market model.
I Patients facing identical side effects.
2 Alternatively it could be assumed that drugs may be sampled costlessly and simultaneously.
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The search component of the model is represented in the above diagram by the change in
consumer behaviour around <p /. Where drug I has a quality above <P 1* it will be selected
regardless of the actual quality of drug 2. For values of quality below the search threshold the
patient tests the quality of drug 2 and makes her decision based on the true qualities of each drug.
The threshold value of quality, <p / is used to determine whether or not a patient will choose to
discover the value of <p z-
In the no search setting the value of <pz is costlessly available and so will be known by all
patients when making their final treatment decision. The line representing marginal consumers
((P 1 - <Pc = (J!/~J!2)) is continued through <p / until it reaches the edge of the box to create a Figure
5.2.
D No treatment chosen
Drug I chosen
Drug 2 chosen
Figure 5.2: Choice in the pharmaceutical market model (full information).
The decision each consumer makes is given in a tabular form below.
m >.!.'.L
'rl L
m <!'1..
'l"'Z - L
No drugs are purchased
Drug 1 is purchased
Drug 2 is purchased
D 1 · hosen if (p]-pz)rug 1S C osen 1 <p]> <pz+ L
Drug 2 is chosen if <pz?, rp r: (p I~PZ)
Table 5.1: Choice in the pharmaceutical market model.
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The market share of each drug is derived in Appendix 5.1 and is displayed below:
AI
ffl(q>J)F2(q>J-(PJ~P2\Iq>J if A J (PJ~P2):S;;A2
1'1
TP, := A
2
+ (/'I~/")
I_FI(A2+(PJ~P2))+ f fl(q>J)F2(q>J-(PJ~P2))dq>J if AJ-(PJ~P2»A2
1'1
T
b
1'2
T
", c 1[- F, (Je,- (I', ~ p,ll+"T'''' f 2(o/, )F,(o/, . (p'?')jd'p,
where fi ( · ) and F i ( · ) are the probability and cumulative density function for the distribution of the
quality for drug i.
The number of patients selecting to take no treatment has not changed from that observed
uncler the search framework. In the search framework all patients selecting no treatment had
previously explored all drug options and so had full information in the search case when making
their final decision. Not surprisingly those choosing not to take any treatment in the search case
will clo so in the non-search case also. Those choosing to take some treatment under the search
case will again have at least one available option better than no treatment.
II. PRODUCER CHOICE UNDER THE NO SEARCH FRAMEWORK
As with patient choice the majority of the assumptions used in Chapter 3 continue to hold
in the absence of sequential search. Producers are assumed to be rational profit maximisers who
compete on the basis of price alone. As with the previous framework quality competition does
not occur and product differentiation naturally results from the framework for patient choice.
Constant marginal costs are adopted once more in order to maintain consistency with the earlier
framework and to aid computation. The total number of patients is again assumed to be one
million.
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The choices made by firms no longer hinge on whether a price accords them superior status
and so the profit function of firms is now a continuous function, an example of which is given in
Figure 5.3.
Profit of firm 1
AI=~=l.l1l=l1:r=l, cl=c:r=l, P2=3
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
Protit (m)
0.2
0.1
1.5 2 2.5 3.5 4 4.5
Figure 5.3: Sample profit function.
With this continuous profit function the local maximum is the only point of interest when
deriving the reaction function of the firm in question. By Rolle's Theorem3 a local maximum
must exist for some price greater than marginal cost since:
(1) profit where Pi=c, is zero (zero profit per unit)
(2) profit at Pi =AL is zero (zero consumption)
(3) the profit function is continuous and differentiable.
The reaction function of each firm can therefore be found by searching for this local
maximum for varying values of the competitor's price.
III. COMPARISONS BETWEEN SEARCH AND NO SEARCH RESULTS
The no search framework will be used in the remainder of this thesis only if the results it
obtains are not too dissimilar to those predicted by the search model. Comparing the results
3 Rolle's theorem is a generalisation of the Mean Value Theorem which states that "If f is
continuous on [a , b] and differentiable on (a, b), and f(a)=f(b), then there is a number x in (a, b) such
that f(x)=O". Spivak, M. (1980) Calculus. Houston TX, Publish or Perish, Inc. 2nd edition. p.I78.
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obtained by both the search and no search models is complicated by the frequent non-existence
of equilibria in the former. As a result of this difficulty the comparison breaks down to a
comparison of the predicted prices of each model. Where the predicted prices are similar the
allocative efficiency and profits of the firms should be approximately equal.
When comparing the following cases the values m = 10, L =5, k: =0.1 and c/ = C2 = 1 are
used for income, loss and marginal costs respectively.
(1) Two identically distributed drugs
Here the assumptions 11../ = It 2 =1, T) / = TJ 2 =1 are carried over from the search case. The
search case predicts that no equilibrium will exist but that prices will generally lie where
undercutting is the dominant behaviour for each firm. The joint undercutting section is
represented by a shaded area in Figure 5.1. The no search reaction curves and the resulting
equilibrium are also displayed.
,"-""""---"~---------------------------
Reaction curves
S.OOO ,,--------r------,----------,
,"",",",,,,w'Search Range
4.000 --R1 (P2)
-R2(P1)
3.000
2.000 -
1.000 "
S.OOO4.0003.0002.0001.000
0.000 -I-----+-----+------+-----+--------j
0.000
PI
----------~-------~
Figure 5.4: The search and no search models (identically distributed drugs).
The equilibrium resulting from two identically characterised drugs falls in the general area
predicted by the search model. Not surprisingly this equilibrium involves each firm charging an
identical price (at 2.95). That the equilibrium lies in the area predicted by the search model
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suggests that in this case transferring to a no search model will not be too costly in terms of lost
accuracy.
(2) A large difference in the efficacy of drugs
As with the earlier analogue to this case u, = 1, Ai = 1, and A2 = 0.5. The search model
promoted a unique Nash equilibrium in prices for this case. The reaction curves in the no search
case are plotted below in addition to the point suggested by the search equilibrium.
Reaction curves
e Search Prediction :I
-R1(P2)
-R2(P1)
2.500
2.000
1.500
N
~
1.000
0.500
0.000
0.000 1.000 2.000
PI
]()OO 4.00() 5.000
Figure 5.5: The search and no search models (asymmetry in efficacy).
In the case of a large difference in the efficacy of drugs the search model predicts an
outcome where PJ=3.19 and P2=1.76. The no search model predicts a unique equilibrium in
prices will exist where PI=3.15 and P2=1.74. The two predictions are very close suggesting that
the two models provide nearly equivalent results.
(3) A large difference in the risk of drugs
This case assumes that A..] =A2 =1 but T)] =5 and T)2 = 1 so that drug I has on average only
20% of the side effect of drug 2. In this case the search model predicts that no equilibrium will
exist in pure strategies. The range of prices suggested by undercutting is again represented on the
diagram below by the shaded area. The reaction curves of each firm under the no search case are
also displayed.
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Reaction curves
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Figure 5.6: The search and no search models (asymmetry in risk).
The shaded region is a reasonable distance from the outcome predicted by the search model
and involves higher prices for both firms. The predictions of the two models although in the
same vicinity, are not as close as other cases. This may be a result of the very large nature of this
asymmetry in this case.
(4) Balanced asymmetries between drugs
In this case the two drugs have similar expected utilities where the same price is charged.
Drug I is characterised by A.] =0.85,1]] =1.1 and drug 2 by A. 2 = 0.90 and TJ 2 = 1. The sequential
search framework predicts that, as with the majority of cases, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
exists. The no search framework again predicts that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in the
pharmaceutical market. Figure 5.7 below displays the reaction curves under the no search
framework while the shaded area represents the range predicted by the pharmaceutical market
model.
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Reaction curves
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Figure 5.7: The search and no search models (balanced asymmetry).
The unique Nash equilibrium here falls very close to the predictions of the search based
model.
In general there appears to be little lost 10 transferring from a search to a non-search
framework. The non-search framework IS sufficiently complex to give a reasonable
approximation to real life while giving results that can be interpreted. Now that the
pharmaceutical market model has been modified it now has a pure strategy equilibrium. With
the removal of the search from the decision making process profit functions no longer suffer
from a violation of upper semi-continuity and so pure strategy equilibria are guaranteed." The
modified model now allows for investigation of issues relevant to reference pricing. The
following chapter examines reference pricing and compares the outcomes found there to those
found under the unregulated duopoly case explored here. Chapter 7 compares reference pricing
to an alternative scheme that is possibly superior to both an unregulated duopoly and reference
pricing in a perfect information framework. Chapter 10 extends this comparison into a world
where marginal costs are unknown.
4 Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. (1986) The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic
games. I: Theory. Review ofEconomic Studies 53. pp 27-42.
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CHAPTER 6
REFERENCE PRICING
Reference pricing is used internationally to limit the cost of pharmaceuticals. A reference
price is an upper limit on the amount an insurer or a governmental agency will pay for a group of
drugs deemed to be equivalent. 1 Where firms charge at or below the reference price patients pay
nothing towards the cost of the drugs except the fees intermediate agents may charge.' If a price
is set above the reference price patients will incur the difference between the price received by
the drug company and reference price.' Prices above the reference price are restricted by
consumer demand since the higher is the producer price the larger is price a patient must pay."
Prices below the reimbursement level are lightly restricted by demand since an increased price
for a drug priced below the reference price will generally result in an increased reference price
and a corresponding decrease in the patient price of all other substitute drugs.
Pharmac, the agency given the responsibility for setting drug subsidies in New Zealand,
explains reference pricing in the following wayr'
Reference pricing is based on the classification of pharmaceuticals into different therapeutic
groups and further into subgroups. The classifications are defined as:
• A therapeutic group - a set of pharmaceuticals which are used to treat the same or
similar condition(s)
CD A subgroup - a set of pharmaceuticals which produce the same or similar therapeutic
effect in treating the same or similar condition(s)
In New Zealand the reference price is set at the level of the lowest priced good. Overseas
the reference price is set in many different ways. Germany's reference price is computed as the
average of the prices of that drug and similar products. In Sweden, the reference price is set at
I The strength of 'equivalence' varies between countries with some countries categorising groups
of drugs that have the same or similar therapeutic effect and some restricting groups to all drugs with the
same active ingredients.
2 Drug wholesalers, pharmacists and the government are the most likely intermediaries. The
charges these parties place on pharmaceuticals are generally ignored in this analysis.
3 Minus any additional margins and taxes applied to these drugs.
4 Since the patient pays the difference between the producer price and the reimbursement level.
5 Kletchko S.L. and others. (1995) Targeting Medicines, Rationalising Resources in New Zealand;
A preliminary paper. Wellington, Pharmac. 26p.
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10% above the price of the least expensive generic equivalent to the drug. The situations where a
reference price exist differ in all three countries: New Zealand has a reference price in most
therapeutic subgroups, in Germany several drugs are necessary in any subgroup for a reference
price to be used and lastly, in Sweden a generic equivalent must be available in the market for
reference pricing to be applied. Where reference prices do not exist either the manufacturer's
price is paid by the sickness fund (Germany), or the government negotiates prices with the
manufacturers (Sweden)."
1. THE INTERNATIONAL SUCCESS OF REFERENCE PRICING
The majority of the evidence presented here is sourced from a 1995 report by Joseph
Zammit-Lucia and Rana Dasgupta (RD). Titled Reference Pricing: The European Experience'
this report attempted to analyse the effects of European reference pricing systems in light of a
decision by the Italian Government to adopt a reference pricing framework. They found that
price controls in their various guises do not generally achieve their aim of restricting the growth
in pharmaceutical expenditure.f
With the exception of Greece, ZD found that every country considered saw their
pharmaceutical expenditures grow more quickly than the general price level. This is
unsurprising since the quality of available pharmaceuticals has increased over time. Increased
quality drugs are likely to attract higher prices and be suitable for more patients, forcing
expenditures to grow faster than inflation. Demographic factors are also likely to bias this
comparison with an ageing population demanding increased medical care.
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta examined the more interesting comparison of the relative
rates of growth of pharmaceutical and total healthcare expenditures. Because the growth in total
health expenditures includes both inflationary, demographic, and general health quality measures
6 International Pharmaceutical Spending Controls: France, Germany, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Health Care Financing Review, Spring, 1994
7 Zammit-Lucia, J and Dasgupta, R. Reference Pricing: The European Experience. 1995, 31p. (St.
Mary's Hospital Medical School, University of London, Health Policy Review no. 10)
8 Forms of price controls include those allowing firms to price a certain level above marginal costs,
and those using international price comparisons to limit reimbursement, in addition to reference pricing,
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it IS likely to provide a better measure of the relative rate of growth of pharmaceutical
expenditures. ZD conclude that countries with price controls tend to have had less success in
controlling the relative growth in pharmaceutical expenditures than those who do not have such
controls. The relative ineffectiveness of schemes concentrating on supply-side measures are
isolated and this difference was attributed to demand-side factors including:
(i) Increasing prices: price increases occur even in schemes specifically targeting such
increases.
(ii) Substitution towards newer, more expensive therapies: it is inevitable that patients will
be drawn to higher quality treatments (which tend to be more expensive to the taxpayer) if the
prices to the patient of both treatments are similar. Where the aim of a regulatory system is to
keep consumer prices low for all treatments it is unsurprising that this becomes an imposing
problem.
(iii) Increased overall demand: with an ageing and/or growing population the call for
pharmaceuticals priced at constant levels will inevitably rise.
Price controls fail to influence the factors driving the increase in overall demand.
Countries adopting demand-side measures (in favour of the supply-side) were said to have
enjoyed a greater degree of success.
Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta were critical of reference pricing since it is claimed that it
discriminates against poorer patients. Those patients responding adversely against reference
priced products but not to their alternatives may have to pay a premium for treatment.
Limitations in income may be a decisive factor in the final determination of medical treatment.
Patients who would otherwise have gained the same benefit from treatment are unable to do so
because of a lack of access to the treatment that best suits them.
The German experience, where reference pricing scheme was introduced on 1 September
1989, attracts the most attention from Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta. From 1987-1988
pharmaceutical expenditures grew by 7.7%. With the threat and subsequent introduction of
reference pricing expenditures grew only by 0.9% in the year to December 1989. This rate of
growth did not continue in the years following with rates of 7.8%, 11.8% and 7.2% observed in
the years to 1990,1991 and 1992 respectively. It was concluded that reference pricing has, at
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best, only a short term effect and in the longer term is completely ineffective.9 This
ineffectiveness was attributed to the relatively minor role price plays in the increase of
pharmaceutical expenditure. Without consideration of volume and prescribing structure
expenditures will continue to grow at a brisk rate.
ZD claimed that substitution took place towards products not covered by the reference
pricing system. The reason for this is unclear and appears to be based on promotional changes
on the part of the pharmaceutical companies. It was observed that reference pricing led firms to
switch promotional effort to non-reference priced drugs which in turn led to large changes in
consumption patterns. This appears rational only if the non-referenced priced subgroups were
heavily subsidised by the government.
In Sweden the introduction of reference pricing does not appear to have had a noticeable
effect. In the year following introduction growth fell by 1.6% and in the year following that
increased 2.1% to reach its highest ever growth level at 15.8%.
Denmark introduced reference pncmg after a period of reform in the pharmaceutical
industry. An exemption system differentiates Denmark from most schemes with doctors able to
apply for their patients to be made exempt from reference pricing provisions. The year reference
pricing was introduced the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures fell. Whether this was due to
reference pricing or a complementary ban on non-reference priced products is uncertain. As
observed in other countries growth began to increase to former levels after the initial introduction
of reference pricing.
The Netherlands introduced a reference pricing system that has substantial differences from
the standard scheme. Reference pricing is generally applied where two or more 'therapeutically
equivalent' treatments exist. This naturally limits the number of markets in which reference
pricing is applicable. The Netherlands attempted to circumvent this problem by defining
subgroups not as therapeutically equivalent drugs but as wider 'clusters'. Although attempts
were made to avoid problems inherent in the German scheme the results achieved were just as
unspectacular.
l) Available and relevant data is no longer available on the German pharmaceutical market since,
post-unification, the characteristics of the country have changed markedly.
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Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta were highly critical of reference pricing, basing their beliefs
on its failure to contain costs in the medium and long terms, its discriminatory nature, its sphere
of influence and its potential to encourage inefficiencies.
II. THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW ZEALAND SYSTEM
As with all forms of regulation there are divergent opinions about the success of reference
pricing in New Zealand. The following subsections explore the claims made by Pharmac as well
as other interested parties in New Zealand.
(1) Claims made by Pharmac
In Pharmac: the first 20 months Pharmac claims that: 10
"Reference pricing is highly effective. It reduces the excessive market segmentation based on
brand marketing that allowed suppliers to establish markets that were free from price
competition."
Pharmac does not identify this 'excessive market segmentation' or the way in which
reference pricing alleviates this problem. This phrase appears to suggest that Pharmac believes
different drugs are close to identical in all respects but differentiated only by the expectation of
doctors. It is difficult to comprehend how imposing a pricing scheme on to the pharmaceutical
market will alleviate such a problem. The formation of brand loyalty for doctors is rationally a
result of the information they have, which is largely provided by experience, their peers and the
drug companies. There does not appear to be any reason why drug companies will generally
change the information they give to doctors as a result of reference pricing. II Indeed the only
reason this information will change is if a firm exits the market as a result of reference pricing.
An exit would be detrimental to patient welfare if the drug represented a significant alternative to
other drugs for even a few patients.
10 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited. Pharmac: the first 20 months, Wellington,
Pharmac 1995. p 10.
J I The phenomenon observed by Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta is a possibility but not one that helps
Pharmac's case here. Where drug companies decide to transfer advertising into non-reference priced
groups 'excessive market segmentation'based on brand marketing' will still exist, albeit in a different
location.
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The only source of new information implicitly provided by the reference pricing scheme is
the composition of therapeutic subgroups. If Pharmac is to be believed there is little or no
difference between the drugs comprising each subgroup. If this was the case then no pervasive
differences in price would be observed and the reference priced drug would typically be the only
treatment taken. In actuality large differences in price can, and do exist within subgroups of
drugs that are supposed to be interchangeable. In the antihistamines group for the active
ingredient Ketotifen there are two alternative drugs, Zasten and Asmafen. These drugs are
considered to be interchangeable multi-source medicines (IMM) so that no difference is expected
for any patient if they were switched from one to the other. For such identical drugs it is
expected that they will both have the same supplier price. For the I mg per 5 ml oral liquid
preparation Asmafen costs $5.55 for a 200 ml bottle. For exactly the same sized bottle at exactly
the same preparation Zasten costs $15.68. The price of Zasten is 283% of the price of
Asmafen.l ' The conclusion that drugs within subgroups may be differentiated in some form
appears to be clear CUt. 13 Non IMM drugs can also differences in price; in the "Infections -
Agents for Systemic Use/Antibacterials/Macrolides and Aminoglycosides" both Erythromycin
Ethyl Succinate and Erythromycin Stearate have treatments subsidised at $22.29. 100
Erythromycin Stearate (brand name ERA, 250 mg) tablets cost $25.20 while 100 tablets of
Erythromycin Ethyl Succinate (brand name E-mycin, 400 mg) tablets cost $22.29.
The only alternative explanation for pnce differences is that doctors continue to be
convinced of differences where none in fact occur. This possibility, while not impossible,
appears unlikely given that doctors will know the quality of least some of the alternatives
available to patients within a subgroup. Although small price differentials may have their origins
in reputation only it stretches credibility to claim that differences in prices of over 150% have no
basis in fact.
Pharmac appears to expect prices within subgroups to fall to the level of the reference
priced product. This occurs naturally where two drugs have exactly the same pharmacological
12 Source: December 1997 Pharmaceutical Schedule as listed on Pharmac website
(http.z/www.pharmac.govt.nz/).
13 Either as independently distributed drugs or as drugs with the types of asymmetries covered in
the Chapter 8.
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effect for all patients. In this case the firms have identical products and if both firms have the
same marginal cost, reference pricing will result in both firms charging at marginal cost." At
first glance this appears to be a consequence of reference pricing. An unregulated situation
would also predict exactly the same outcome as reference pricing here. The favourable outcome
is not a result of reference pricing but is instead a result of Bertrand competition (over producer
prices) with homogenous products. Any system where reducing price below that of all
competitors gives a firm the lowest consumer price (and the entire quantity demanded at that
price) will result in exactly the same behaviour. In this case reference pricing will promote an
outcome where price is shared and driven to marginal cost because only here will doctors
perform as Pharmac desires and prescribe only the cheapest drug in every therapeutic subgroup.
Pharmac expects prices to tend to fall to match the reference price since it expects that all
drugs in a therapeutic subgroup are the same or similar for patients. If differences in quality do
exist then Pharmac appears to believe that drugs should still match the reference price. If one
drug has a greater overall quality to another it is expected that it will gain a greater price which
reflects its superior nature. For a superior drug to be denied a premium price appears to damage
a firm's incentive to produce a higher quality product.
In a Parliamentary question of 10 June 1997 it was claimed that Pharmac had saved $78 m
to July 1996. It was stated that a further $100 m was expected in savings by June 1997. 15 This
claim is based on an extrapolation of past trends in pharmaceutical consumption in New Zealand.
The savings were claimed to have come from encouraging price competition and through a
review of the terms and conditions of subsidy of products already on the Pharmaceutical
Schedule.
Pharmac has also claimed that from 1993-1995 they reduced the rate of growth in
pharmaceutical expenditure to around 7% per year down from the 11%. Pharmac appears to
give very sketchy details of the origin of this 11% figure but it is likely that this comes from
14 Both firms play the simple Bertrand game outlined in Chapter 4 here.
15 http://www.newsroom.co.nz/stories/HL9706/S00021.htm
64
Ministry of Health forecasts.i" Whether there was, and is, room for further improvement is one of
the major questions addressed by this thesis.
Pharmac claim that from 1993 to 1995 the number of subsidised prescriptions increased by
eight per cent. Pharmac also claim that in some areas, such as epilepsy, herpes, and asthma,
reference pricing has allowed for the treatment of many more people because of more liberal
access to some drugs. It is uncertain whether the composition of drugs consumed have changed;
a drastic change may indicate the introduction of lower quality drugs. Pharmac appear to believe
that drugs in a therapeutic sub-group are the same or similar and so that the actual quantity use of
each drug will have bearing on health effects. Consistent with this view Pharmac does not
appear to consider any possible health effects from the system of reference pricing in its
published results." Unfortunately where the effects of changes in the health regime are not
studied a vital facet of the efficacy of the health system is completely ignored. Studies on the
effects reference pricing on patients may be worthwhile in confirming Pharmac' s hypothesis that
the drugs are similar. Conversely Pharmac may consider that it is better not to know what the
health effects of its policies are. If drugs within the same sub-group are found to be significantly
different Pharmac will face significant pressure to re-list many expensive drugs in separate
SUb-groups.
Pharmac appears to discount published reports on the efficacy of new drugs to a degree.
The reasons for this are stated in the following quote by David Moore: rs
Much of the trial research for new drugs is financed by the manufacturer. If the results are not
favourable to the drug, chances are the trial results do not see the light of day. The corollary is
that often only favourable results get published. An American study in 1994 of published
results of trials on nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) in the treatment of arthritis
concluded: "The manufacturer-associated NSAID is almost always reported as being equal or
superior in efficacy and toxicity to the comparison drug. These claims of superiority,
16 A diagram on page seven of Pharmac: the first 20 months displays historical costs and forecasts
of pharmaceutical expenditure. The sources for this graph are given as Health Benefits Ltd data and
Ministry of Health forecasts.
17 It is not clear what information Pharmac receives with regard to usage of different drugs or,
indeed what information they seek. It may be that Pharmac is not in a position to report changes in
quantities but this does not necessarily restrict them. The health effects of reference pricing on health
outcomes can be judged, in part, by the costs imposed on services dependant on failures in medication.
For example cholesterol lowering agents may be judged, in part, by the level of heart attacks of patients
using drugs in the relevant sub-group.
IK
C http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/drugscene/ds_corol.htm
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especially in regard to side effect profiles, are often not supported by trial data. These data
raise concerns about selective publication or biased interpretation of results in manufacturer-
associated trials.
Pharmac is likely to be correct in being cautious about the validity of figures quoted by
drug companies but must be careful to still consider all available evidence. The drug trials are
both costly and time consuming and if Pharmac chooses not to accept data provided by drug
companies it must rely on either experience from other countries regarding drugs (which may
also be 'tainted' by drug companies) or must run its own studies. The alternative is that Pharmac
makes decisions without the benefit of information over the relative effectiveness and safety of
drugs. Deciding whether a drug represents a therapeutically equivalent or superior option to
existing treatments is likely to be at the very least a challenging proposition with very little
information to base the decision on.
Pharrnac has been vocal on the subject of its relationship with the drug companies. As a
small agency it claims that it needs to be tough to compete with the lobbyists of the
pharmaceutical giants. This relationship was characterised as "healthy tension" by Mr Moore. 19
In the appearance of David Moore before the health select committee he claimed that such
tension is still necessary on the basis that some medicines are available in New Zealand at a
higher price than in either Australia or Britain.2o
In summary Pharmac has claimed that:
In an environment of capped health care budgets, Pharmac has done well for the health care of
New Zealanders. It is an achievement that many countries with health care systems partly- or
wholly-funded from the public purse would like to ernulater"
The early success so far of Pharmac's regime has seen several countries, including
Australia research the reference pricing scheme adopted here. The limited adoption of a
reference pricing scheme was announced in the last Australian Budget. This is puzzling given
Pharmac's statements that prices in New Zealand are greater than those observed under the
19 Hunt, G National Business Review 30/5/97 p9
20 Hunt, G National Business Review 30/5/97 p9
7)
- http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/page_2.htm
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current Australian scheme.
(2) Woodfield, Fountain and Borren (1997)
Woodfield, Fountain and Borrenv' provide examples of where the actions of Pharmac do
not necessarily reflect their stated decision criteria. They also criticise the system of reference
pricing, finding that it has several qualities that promote undesirable outcomes in the
pharmaceutical market. The following quote reflects the former of these criticisms:
In practice, however, Pharmac also apparently engages in the following policy, provision for
which is not explicitly covered in its Operating Policies and Procedures Manual. This policy
appears to involve refusing to list a new drug in a therapeutic sub-group unless its price is
reduced to that of the currently reference -priced product. It also appears that Pharmac may
permit a new drug to enter at the reference pricing (although no higher than this) if the
supplier is willing to make other concessions such as reducing its price of one or more of its
other lines. In the latter case, this may have the implication of reducing the subsidy paid to
all drugs in a particular therapeutic SUb-group.
The case of Naprosyn, which will be addressed later (p 72) was also cited as a possible
example of Pharmac's actual procedures differing from those published at Pharmac's inception.
Pharmac is criticised for labelling as inappropriate the targeting methods of restrictions by
outlet, cost and quantity. A section of the report from Kletchko, Moore and Jones is reproduced
below in order give an accurate view ofPharmac's policies."
Influencing user behaviour
Users can be influenced by price signals such as:
• a percentage co-payment system - rejected in New Zealand in the past because of concerns
about patient access
• non-price barriers - those currently in place in New Zealand are:
«I restriction by outlet (e.g. pharmaceutical must be dispensed at hospital pharmacy)
It restriction by cost (e.g. the patient must pay extra for the drug)
@ restriction by quantity (e.g. maximum of one month's supply)
22 Woodfield, A. and others. (1997) Money & Medicines: An Economic Analysis of Reference
Pricing and Related Public-sector Cost-containment Systems for Pharmaceuticals with Special Reference
to New Zealand. Auckland, Merck Sharp & Dohme (New Zealand)Limited. 271 p.
n Kletcho, S.L. and others. (1995) p.24.
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These are very blunt targeting tools but they do fulfil the technical efficiency criteria very
well. For example, hospital pharmacy dispensing usually lowers demand, but it is unclear
whether or not patients receiving treatment should be doing so and vice versa.
Restriction by cost is particularly poor in terms of the equity criteria, as patients receive
treatment according to their ability to pay, rather than clinical benefit.
Given the problems facing the Pharmac it is curious that the above avenues should be
discounted. The percentage co-payment system may have been rejected in the past but that does
not necessarily make it an inferior scheme to reference pricing which may itself be rejected in the
future. The essence of an effective co-payment scheme is that it must levy greater costs to a
patient for more expensive treatments. A capped limit on co-payments may achieve a greater
level of patient access (while reducing the effectiveness of the scheme) but this does not appear
to have been considered.
While scorn is poured on any scheme that imposes a positive price for pharmaceuticals on
the grounds of equity and patient access there is little mention of positive prices under reference
pncing. Positive prices with their origins in quality differences may exist and, as with the
co-payment scheme and restriction by cost it may well be the case that patients may receive
higher quality drugs according to their ability to pay.
The non-pnce barriers listed above as 'currently in place' are strangely incomplete.
Missing from their number are some of Pharmac's tactics which appear a little more arbitrary
than those named by KMJ. Given that cosr" is not to be a consideration for doctors any
meaningful restriction of pharmaceutical costs must necessarily use quantity restrictions. These
'appropriate' quantity restrictions are highlighted by the comments of Dr Paul Shillito. Dr
Shillito is a pediatric neurologist who publicly complained at the restrictions he faced when
treating children with epilepsy in the Christchurch Press of 2 September 1995:
New anti-epilepsy drugs were available that could help those children but they were expensive
and pediatricians were not able to use them enough. The Government restrictions on the two
most commonly used of the new drugs meant Dr Shillito could only prescribe them to 13 of
his patients.
'One-third of the children I see have epilepsy, and in 15 per cent of those it is intractable and I
can only prescribe to 13 children.' Dr Shillito said.
24 By which Pharmac appears to mean the price to the taxpayer rather than the marginal cost of
production.
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Dr Shill ito continued, stating that doctors knew which drugs could help children but were
not able to prescribe them. Alternative drugs for these children had been tried but had either not
worked or had intolerable side effects. Pharmac' s actions in restricting subsidies by setting
quantity at a level below required treatments appears a little more blunt than setting, for example,
a restriction on the number of pills that be placed in a bottle. For Pharmac's treatment quotas to
be effective in reducing subsidisation there is no alternative but to set these quotas below the
number of people who potentially could benefit from the use of the drug. On equity grounds this
appears more worrying than any of the measures listed above.
(a) Substitution towards expensive alternatives:
An interesting case highlighted by Woodfield et al outlines a possible problem with
reference pricing. Suppose drugs A, Band C can all be used to treat a particular illness. Drug A
is both more costly and more effective than drugs Band C in terms of its side effect profile.
Drug A is assumed to fall into a different therapeutic subgroup where it is the only drug (and so
also the reference priced drug). Drugs Band C occupy the same therapeutic subgroup with drug
B dominating the cheaper drug C. Drugs A and C, being reference drugs, attract either low or
zero prices while the price of drug B is higher. Some patients, suffering an adverse side effect
from both A and C, will choose to use drug B. The majority of patients, facing a choice of two
low priced drugs will select drug A. Some of these patients would no doubt have chosen either
drugs B or C had the true cost of the drugs been levied directly. This represents a source of
inefficiency in decision making which directly increases the cost of pharmaceuticals. There is no
incentive for patients to select the cheaper option when drug A is available at a low (or zero)
pnce.
Suppose otherwise that drug A is not listed on the pharmaceutical benefits schedule.
Patients then face a heavily subsidised drug C, a drug B which attracts a small part charge, and an
expensive drug A. Patients suffering from adverse reactions from drugs Band C face a large
price for treatment (through drug A) for no other reason than their reactions to the listed drugs.
This appears to be a significant penalty to patients for no reason other than the quirk of fate
determining that they face a large side effect. In either of these cases those facing an adverse
reaction to drugs A and C are likewise disadvantaged
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Suppose that Pharmac faces a situation where drugs Band C are established in the
marketplace within the same therapeutic subgroup and A is a drug applying for listing on the
Pharmaceutical Schedule. Woodfield et al propose that Pharmac then have the option of either
listing drug A in a separate subgroup or rejecting an application for its listing. If the listing takes
place drug A will attract a large portion of the market and, being expensive, cost the taxpayer a
large sum of money. Unless the company producing drug A makes hefty concessions to
Pharrnac it is likely that drug A will not be listed in its own subgroup.
If drug A was listed it would have the same patient price as drug C, giving no incentive to
patients to choose the cheaper of the drugs. There are no significant incentives produced by
reference pricing in this case to suggest that patients will select the cheaper drug. If nothing is
done to counter this problem Woodfield et al correctly suggest that patients will be selectively
discriminated against for no reason but their misfortune to not to react favourably to the cheapest
drugs on offer. Patients who react favourably to the cheapest drugs do however benefit from the
public provision of drugs. As both types of patients pay for treatment indirectly this generates a
transfer of wealth from those who react unfavourably with inexpensive drugs to those who do
not.
Pharmac may recognise that drug A is an important treatment option for patients and wish
to see it subsidised. If it was to list drug A in the same subgroup as drugs Band C it would
secure a superior budgetary outcome. In listing drug A along with drugs Band C Pharmac
inherently claims that there is no significant therapeutic difference between the three. Drug A is
available to patients at a cheaper rate than would have occurred had it not been listed. With the
addition of drug A into the subgroup it is reasonable to assume that the prices of Band C will not
rise. Pharmac will have to pay (at most) the same amount as before per treatment. Treatment
levels may rise slightly with an extra subsidised alternative available to patients but costs are
unlikely to blowout to the degree seen in the case where drug A is subsidised in its own
subgroup. This option appears to be, at least in the short term, a better avenue for Pharmac than
either listing drug A in its own subgroup or refusing to list it at all. For this reason this thesis
allows drugs that are essentially different25 to exist in the same therapeutic subgroup for the
purposes of reference pricing.
25 'Essentially different' is taken to mean that the outcomes of at least some drugs are independent.
While in reality complete independence will not occur it is simpler for modelling purposes to address
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If Pharmac chooses to list innovative pharmaceuticals along with lesser, pre-existing
options it does so at the peril of losing credibility. Pharmac, in listing drugs this way, would
make a statement that the drugs are equivalent. Where physicians and the public perceive that
drugs are different Pharmac runs the risk of being seen to be uncaring. The difficulty in this is
that drugs that are in fact equivalent may still be seen to be different by the public and physicians
due to the reputational effects. Even if physicians do not believe Pharrnac' s assertions that the
drugs are equivalent the same subsidy is paid by the BFA for these pharmaceuticals. Unless
public disenchantment with Pharmac grows to the level where government intervention is likely
Pharmac does not unduly suffer even if it loses credibility.
In addition to the possible tactic identified above of listing superior drugs in subgroups
along with lower quality drugs there is the potential that an inferior drug may be inserted into a
subgroup in order to reduce subsidy payments.
(b) Reference pricing and the integrity of the patent system
The claim that reference pricing represents a de facto attack on the patent system is
examined by Woodfield et at. The patent system attempts to provide the correct incentives for
innovators by making sure that innovation is a profitable activity. For the required level of profit
to occur the innovating firm must be in a position to charge substantially above marginal cost.
Where low priced rival drugs are already in the marketplace firms may be forced to price at or
below the reference price in order to obtain a place on the Pharmaceutical Schedule. At such low
prices it may not be possible to make the requisite profits to make innovation an optimal choice
if a sufficient portion of the international community regulates their pharmaceutical markets
using reference pricing.
The problem of blockbuster drugs was also addressed. In the cases where drugs represent
sufficient progress to warrant a separate subgroup it is not at all certain that listing will take
place. Such a drug will be free to charge a very high price in the knowledge that its patient price
only complete independence and dependence between drugs. The alternative is to generalise to the full
spectrum between total dependence (the quality of drugs are related by a one-to-one function) and total
independence. The model used is already complex and the addition of varying degrees of dependence
would pose a considerable hurdle. See Chapter 8 for an illustration of the difficulty of incorporating a
pair of perfectly dependant options with one independent option.
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will be low and a large volume will be sought. Pharmac, given the choice of whether or not to
list this drug may decide not to on the basis of this large COSt.26 Particularly beneficial treatments
might not reach the public of New Zealand as a direct consequence of the scheme of reference
pricing.
(c) The problem ofsymmetric drugs
Woodfield et al identify a serious problem with the incentives of producers where both
firms have identical demand and cost functions. If both firms receive the same subsidy and
charge the same price it is possible that there will always be an incentive for either firm to
increase price if it expects the other firm to join it. Suppose the firms initially charge equal prices
and one firm increases its price. The firm that remains reference priced faces the choice of where
to set its price in response. If it does not react it achieves a higher quantity given that its
competitor now charges a higher patient price. Profits would thus increase in the case where it
does not change its price.
If the firm increases its price to the level of its competitor's price it has the same patient
price as it did earlier. As the firm increased its price the reference price (as the price of the
lowest price drug in the subgroup) increased also. The firms have returned to the original
situation but now make increased profits. The taxpayer must ultimately pay for the increased
profits of the drug companies here. As long as each firm's own-price elasticity is less than unity
it does not pay to undercut the current reference price." Woodfield et al claim that, where the
temporary change in price is discounted, the level of prices observed will continue to climb
without bound. Here firms tacitly collude on the understanding that their competitor will always
choose to match a higher price.
Pharmac must respond to this problem in some way. The method employed by Pharmac
appears to be that it will relax the HFA's policy of having one fully subsidised drug in every
26 Although there are good examples of the entry of such drugs. Prozac is clearly a blockbuster
drug and Pharmac listed it, albeit with heavy restrictions. Initially only specialists could prescribe Prozac
but it was released to general practitioners only after Eli Lilly agreed to reimburse the RHAs for Prozac
prescriptions above $13.2 million from mid-1996 to mid1997. In more marginal cases Pharmac may
either decide not to list for purely budgetary reasons or to list the drug in an existing subgroup.
27 Inelastic demand is a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for unprofitable undercutting.
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therapeutic subgroup when the reference priced drug attempts to increase its price. Woodfield et
al attribute this behaviour as a possible explanation for the actions of Pharmac in its dealings
with Roche. Roche attempted to increase the price of one of its lines of Naprosyn, a reference
priced product. Pharmac (at least initially) declined to adjust its subsidy rate in line with the
increased price of Naprosyn. Where the reference price is set below the level of the lowest priced
drugs all drugs must have a positive patient price.
The problems of high subsidy payments under reference pricing are not restricted to cases
where tacit collusion or oligopolistic interdependence promote a series of price increases. If
firms are able to achieve high initial rates of subsidisation we may never see price increases just
firms matching a high reference price.
Where products with non-symmetric linear demands were considered by Woodfield et al a
similar, although bounded result was obtained. It was postulated that a reason for any high
producer prices (and subsidy rates) was that the agency may have been wasting some of its
strategic advantage by failing to force firms to compete for the right to be subsidised.
Woodfield et al proceed to criticise Pharmac on the following grounds:
(i) That its (unofficial) policy of demanding generic firms agree to generate a sequence of
30%,20% and 10% reductions in scheduled prices may constitute a legal barrier to entry.
(ii) Because of the nature of reference pricing firms entering the pharmaceutical markets
may decline to apply for listing on the Pharmaceutical Schedule.
(iii) Reference pricing may see the reintroduction of older drugs which have disappeared
from the market due to obsolescence, having lower efficacy, or having more pronounced side
effects.
(iv) Criticism over the characterisation of drugs into therapeutic groups and subgroups.
This criticism was linked to the fact that drugs in different subgroups may be used to treat the
same illness.
(v) Pharmac's reference pricing policy may itself be a deterrent to generic entry.
(vi) An alternative scheme, used by Australia in the 1980s, may be superior to reference
pricing since it forces producers to compete for subsidies. Whether or not this scheme costs less
while still promoting high levels of treatment is the major thrust of this thesis.
73
(3) The views of the pharmaceutical industry
The relationship between the pharmaceutical companies and Pharmac has not been an
amicable one. There is naturally tension between Pharmac, whose task is to keep pharmaceutical
spending to a minimumt'' and the drug companies, who naturally wish to see large volumes of
drugs purchased at high producer prices. The animosity between these parties is best displayed
by the volume of litigation before the courts. These cases prompted comments by David Moore
before the health select committee that the drug companies were 'trigger happy' and 'sued on
, 29
rumour.
The Chief Executive of the Researched Medicines Industry Association (RMI), Kim Miles
has publicly stated his views on the way the pharmaceutical budget is prepared. In a September
1997 press statement he states:"
It is time to review Pharmac's decision-making processes, to ensure patients are its main focus
and an adequate budget is available.
Pharmac prides itself in its role as cost-cutter and we entirely agree it should be looking at all
of its options. However, it is first and foremost an agency of the Transitional Health
Authority, the body charged with ensuring the nation's health. It must be time for its focus to
be changed to patient welfare.
Pharmac currently exceeds its budget when primarily acting as a cost-containing agency. It
appears reasonable to assume it would do so also as a welfare focused agency. Costs are likely to
grow as currently marginal decisions are likely to lead to subsidisation if welfare rather than cost
is targeted. For Pharmac to act as a more welfare orientated agency it must have a greater
budget. Pharmac, with an increased budget is likely to allow greater use of expensive treatments
currently available only from specialists. Loosening such restrictions would allow a greater
quantity of high value drugs to be used, benefiting the companies producing these drugs. A
greater budget is also likely to mean greater profits for the drug companies as Pharmac may not
need to be as forceful in negotiations. The concern shown by the HFA over the budget deficits of
Pharmac makes a greater budget (and so a greater welfare focus) unlikely.
28 Subject to the reasonable pharmaceutical needs of New Zealanders being met.
29 See NZPA 29 May 1997 Pharmac Grilled on Confrontational Stance.
30 Researched Medicines Industry Association; What is behind the latest prophecy of doom from
Pharmac? Press release of 2 September 1997. See http://www.nzhealth.co.nz/rmi/presslre12sep.html
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In a release coinciding with the 1996 election the RMI detailed an 'industry perspective'.
In this the need to contain public expenditure on pharmaceuticals is acknowledged but it is
claimed that there must be greater recognition of the benefits and value of modern medicines.
The salient points the RMI wished to see in health policy included were the following.:"
1II The pivotal role medicines have in achieving high-quality, cost-effective care for all
New Zealanders
1II Greater focus on the good health outcomes pharmaceuticals can deliver, as against the
current emphasis on cost containment
1II The role of research and development in producing innovative medicines that improve
health outcomes, and the impact this has on the price of medicines
II The shift away from secondary towards primary care health services and the resultant
increased prescribing of pharmaceuticals
II The right of New Zealanders to have access to new, innovative medicines that improve
health and can save costs in other parts of the health system like hospitals
II The impact of targeting and risk-sharing policies on the right to medicines access
1II The impact of Pharmac's reference pricing policies on the ability of pharmaceutical
companies to gain fair prices in New Zealand.
The RMI propose that a Pharmaceutical Advisory Group be established whose task would
be to contribute towards the development of national strategies for the purchase and provision of
h . I 37 h'p armaceutica s.: - The advantage of sue a group, 10 the view of the RMI, is that it would
'assist in forging a greater synthesis and unity amongst the many participants in the
pharmaceutical and wider health sector in the pursuit of agreed upon common goals.' This
would be in direct comparison to the 'exclusive, divisive and combative' approach of Pharmac.
(4) The views of the wider medical community
Understandably, as with the drug companies, the wider medical community wishes to see
the widest range of drugs available to treat illnesses. Predictably the majority of claims by the
wider medical community are generally negative for this reason. Lobbyists of several medical
groups including the AIDS Foundation, the Schizophrenia Fellowship and the Asthma
Foundation have all attacked Pharmac at varying times, complaining about the lack of
availability of drugs they see as vital to the health and well-being of New Zealanders.I'
31 Researched Medicines Industry; The Political Parties and Pharmaceuticals - A Critical
Analysis. Pharmissues October 1996. See http://www.nzhealth.co.nz/rmi/press/issoct96.html
32 Researched Medicines Industry Association; Pharmaceutical advisory group proposed.
Pharmissues September 1997. See http://www.nzhealth.co.nz/rmi/press/isssep97.html
33 See The Press of 21 December 1996(p4), 29 September 1995 (p21), 25 April 1995 (p21)
75
The Medical Association also expressed concern that some patients may be denied the use
of life-saving drugs because of budgetary constraints. Dr Brian Lineham, the chairman of the
Association expressed concern that Pharmac may promote the use of cheaper, generic brands
which may not be as safe or effective as other makes. Dr Lineham also stated that the blow-out
observed in the pharmaceutical budget is the inevitable result of the expansion in new drugs
which can tackle formerly untreatable diseases?4
There is no denying the difficult role Pharmac have to play in the subsidisation of drugs.
However it appears that very few non-Pharrnac sources are in agreement that the reference
pricing system we have in place provides New Zealanders with appropriate pharmaceutical
choices.
(5) Evidence from New Zealand's pharmaceutical industry
Pharmac inherited an industry where, they claim, the underlying growth in pharmaceutical
subsidies averaged 11% per annum. From its formation in July 1993 Pharmac has attempted to
greatly reduce the growth rate. The objective originally adopted by for Pharmac was to reduce
growth in the level of drug spending to zero. While Pharmac appears happy with the savings
accomplished in New Zealand doubts were raised in its 1996 report over the sustainability of the
current rate of growth."
At present our drug subsidy bill is about $700 million a year - a small fraction of the $30
billion the government redistributes each year. The problem is that this fraction grows
relentlessly despite efforts to contain it. Prior to PHARMAC the fraction was doubling about
every seven years. PHARMAC has managed - not without controversy - to slow that down to
a growth rate that would double the cost about every 10-12 years. Even at this rate of growth,
by the time a baby born today reaches the end of an average life, the bill will rise to about $25
billion. Even after adjusting for inflation it is clear that the conflict we now have between
taxpayers and health care consumers will, at some point in the future, escalate.
34 Cited from TVNZ webpage http://www.tvone.co.nz/newsMon. Sep 1507:05 1997
35 Pharmaceutical Management Agency Limited (1996) Annual Report /996. Wellington, Pharmac.
p.ll.
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Predictably the Researched Medicines Industry Association (RMI) perceive the statistics
iff 1 16ell terent s:
According to data from the Ministry of Health, Pharmac and Statistics New Zealand, nominal
government expenditure from 1987 to 1996 has grown by 57 percent - or at an average rate of
4.7 percent per year. However once the data are adjusted for inflation, the growth has been
7.1 per cent - or an average rate of only 0.7 percent per annum. Once the effects of population
growth have been taken into account, it is apparent that real government expenditure on
pharmaceuticals has actually declined.
In 1987 real government expenditure on pharmaceuticals per capita was $197.42. In 1996 this
had fallen to $193.32 - a fall of 2.1 percent, or an average decline of 0.2 percent per annum.
Pharmac perceives the level of pharmaceutical subsidisation as a worldwide problem
ballooning beyond the ability of governments to contain it in the long term. Pharmac appears
further to believe that it has been able to restrain growth to a more manageable level in New
Zealand. The RMI believe Pharmac has restricted the pharmaceutical industry to the point that
the government's provision for pharmaceuticals has fallen in general. Each of these analyses has
its limits. Pharmac is extrapolating from current growth rates into the future but if, as they claim,
conflict is likely to increase between taxpayers and patients pressure will increase and, as more
restrictions are placed on the pharmaceutical industry, the growth rate will fall. The choice of
years from the RMI is curious as Pharmac came into existence in 1993. The level of change in
real government expenditure over this period may be significantly different than the figure
quoted above.
It was revealed in Parliament on 10 June 1997 that the accumulated savings made by
Pharrnac since it's establishment were expected to exceed $100 million by June 1997.37 This
represents a slowing of the rate of growth of pharmaceutical expenditure to around 6 per cent per
annum. This rate is far larger than the 1.3 per cent increase attributable to demographic changes.
The additional 4.7 percent may represent either increased room for savings on the part of
Pharrnac or a premium paid for an increased quality of drugs.
Unfortunately not all has gone to plan for Pharmac. It has been estimated that Pharmac
could exceed its budget for 1997 by up to 78 million dollars. The responses to the overspending
"6 Originally from The Pharmaceutical Industry In New Zealand - RMI Annual Review 1996-97.
Source: www.nzhealth.co.nz/rmi/press/factmar97.html.
"7 Parliamentary Question 8, Tuesday 10 June 1997
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of Pharrnacs notional budget have been relatively predictable. Pharrnacs response was to blame
GPs, claiming that they were being captured by drug companies' sustained and slick marketing
approaches. Pharmac appear to suggest in The National Business Review of September 19, 1997
that they may use pharmacists to monitor the prescribing habits of doctors.
The RMI, through its Chief Executive Kim Miles, stated that it considered it was
unreasonable to blame anyone but Pharmac. The following is a portion of a September 1997
press release from the RMI. 38
Pharmac needs to assure the public that there is a solid basis for its stated concern about
pharmaceutical cost blowouts when it predicts expenditure could exceed budget by $78
million this year than thereby threaten treatment for many thousands of patients
Pharmac's concession that year after year its budget in insufficient to meet the nation's
forecast medicine bill is a telling admission, and is especially bad news for patients...
...Why isn't the budget being set to meet the forecast? Few people could believe that these
massive increases in medicine use come out of the blue. Either there needs to be a radical
change to the budget-setting process, or Pharmac needs to explain why there is such a big gap
between budgeted and actual pharmaceutical expenditure.
If, as the RMI claim, Pharmac knew of the problems it is strange that budgets were not
correctly assigned. Pharmac's explanation for the overspend was, primarily, that doctors were
prescribing more expensive drugs ahead of cheaper alternatives. This was said to hold most
strongly for in the area of heart, gastro-intestinal and hypertension treatments. Presumably the
more expensive drugs Pharmac refers to were in different subgroups than the cheaper alternative
drugs. Were this not the case Pharmac's budget would be the same regardless of which drug was
selected for treatment. Pharmac faces a serious problem here as doctors whose patients face two
options with the same price to the patient will naturally tend to select the better option for the
patient rather than the taxpayer. David Moore, the general manager of Pharmac, intimated that
unless the budget could be controlled "it could get to the stage where we might have to get quite
Draconian".39
The relationship between Pharmac and the drug companies can be described as at least
tumultuous in nature. Over the course of Pharmac's history several lawsuits have been
]8 See the RMI website at http://www.nzhealth.co.nz/rmi/press/reI2sep.html.
]l) Sunday Star Times, September 14 1997 p.1-2
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exchanged between the parties. The health select committee was informed by David Moore that
the cost of this litigation could reach $6.3 million by the end of next year if all current cases
proceeded to court.40
A large amount has written on the efficacy of reference pncmg, much of it highly
contradictory. Now that the claims made elsewhere have been outlined, the model developed
here is used to attempt to discover which claims are more accurate.
III. MODEL PREDICTIONS
Before identifying the outcomes in the cases addressed in earlier chapters it is worthwhile
to look at the properties of the profit function under reference pricing. This analysis allows for
more precise interpretation of the cases in question. For simplicity reasons the chain of
distribution for pharmaceuticals is ignored with the consequence that, in an unregulated model,
the consumer price charged by the firm equals the price the patient actually faces.
(I) Continuous profit function
The variant of reference pricing addressed here IS of a more general setting than the
reference pricing system used in New Zealand. The patient price of the pharmaceutical is
assumed to be a minimum charge k in addition to any existing price differentia1.41 This allows
the properties of the profit function to be derived not only for New Zealand's system but also for
alternatives that may be used when comparing the current system of reference pricing to systems
that impose positive charges on patients.
Where reference pricing exists the profit function of firm j remains continuous. Suppose
that the pricing decisions for all other drugs in a given subgroup have been made. The reference
price amongst these drugs is referred to as a de facto reference price, r' and the prevailing
40 NZPA-PoliticaI29/05/1997
41 For simplicity reasons it is assumed throughout this thesis that the chain of distribution from the
producer to the patient is costless. Manufacturers receive the pertinent subsidy plus whatever sum the
patient contributes towards their treatment. It is acknowledged that this is does not actually occur in New
Zealand - the true scheme is analysed in Appendix 6.4.
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reference price is denoted by the letter r. This prevailing reference price is set only after the
pricing decision of the drug in question.
Suppose that a firm decides to set price above the de facto reference price so that the de
facto reference price coincides with the actual reference price. The prices observed by patients
are P; = k + Pi rr F = k + Pi <r, When varying the price of the subject drug the consumer prices of
other drugs are not affected because it is not the reference priced drug. As the price of the
subject drug approaches the de facto reference price (from above) the prices observed by patients
are:
subject drug: Pi ~ k
de facto reference price drug: k
other drugs: k + Pi <r'
Suppose that a firm decides to set price below the de facto reference price so that the
subject drug becomes the reference priced drug. The consumer prices observed for all other
drugs will be P; = Pi - Pi' As the price of the subject drug increases towards the value of the de
facto reference price the consumer prices for all other drugs fall. These consumer prices are:
subject drug: k
de facto reference price drug: k+,.'-Pj ~ k
other drugs: k+ Pi - Pi ~ k+ Pi <r'
And so from above and below the consumer prices observed are identical where the price
of drug j equals the de facto reference price. Since every patient has the same information
regardless of how Pi approaches r' the choice made by patients is the same in either case and the
quantities are identical. At r' the limits of the profit function from above and below are equal and
so the profit function is continuous.
(2) Discontinuous first derivative of the profit function
While the profit function is continuous under reference pricing, its first derivative is not.
At ,.' the effect of a price change differs. Where the price of the drug in question is below the de
facto reference price (r") an increase in price is analogous to a decrease in the consumer price of
all other drugs. For prices above ,.' an increase in the price of a drug is perceived by consumers
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as an equally sized increase in price. Since own price sensitivity should outweigh the cross price
sensitivity the profit function will have a kink at r, This raises the possibility of three distinct
types of outcome in the model: pricing at a premium, matching price and pricing to become the
reference priced drug. Sample profit functions associated with each type of behaviour are given
below.
Where firms have an incentive to price above the de facto reference price there is a single
local maximum of the profit function. An example of this lies in the diagram below where the
profit function has a unique maximum to the right of the de facto reference price (see inset).42
This form of behaviour is expected where a competitor sets price at a particularly low level. In
this case the cost of matching the reference price exceeds that of attracting a part charge for
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Figure 6.1: Premium pricing.l"
Firms will choose for their drugs to be reference priced where a local maximum both exists
and promotes a price below that of the de facto reference price. The below diagram displays an
example of the profit function where the price corresponding to the unique local maximum is to
42 All diagrams in this section implicitly set the universal drug charge (k) to zero. This is not
significant however since the results here rely on the differing effects of price changes above and below
the de facto reference price. This behaviour does not depend on the universal drug charge.
43 Above any charge k, that is levied regardless of drug.
44 Profits in millions of dollars.
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the left of the competitor's price. The inset displays an expanded view of the profit function
displaying both the local maximum and the competitor's price.
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Figure 6.2: Undercutting. 45
The final form of behaviour under reference pricing is to match prices. Firms will match
prices where there is no local maximum in the profit function46 but rather a pronounced kink at
the de facto reference price. The general appearance of the profit function when firms choose to
match the de facto reference price is given below.
Price matching
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Figure 6.3: Matching reference price. 47
45 Profits in millions of dollars.
46 . . d lim d2 lim d 2In the sense of a point with dJr = 0, -f = -f < O.
p (IJ-tr')+ dp <p-tr'f dp
47 Profits in millions of dollars.
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By searching for a local maximum any existing premium or reference price outcomes can
be found. Where no local maximum exists the estimate of the profit maximising price will
automatically converge to the reference price. Using Microsoft Excel's goal seek function the
value of a firm's reaction function at a point may be found. By varying the price of the
competing firm the entire reaction function can be derived.
(3) Model results
The cases explored in previous chapters were reviewed under reference pricing and the
outcomes obtained compared with those seen under an unregulated duopoly framework and with
those under marginal cost provision of pharmaceuticals. Reference pricing is examined under
two differing schemes: RP (zero charge) examines the system where a reference priced drug
attracts a zero patient price while RP (MC charge) assigns a charge of marginal cost to each drug
in addition to any positive price differential. The alternative system considered in the following
chapter is assigned the abbreviation JZ48 and also has two variants of interest corresponding to
those pertinent for reference pricing: JZ (zero charge) and JZ (MC charge). These schemes, as
with the reference pricing variants, assign zero and marginal cost patient charges respectively.
These four variants allow the schemes to be compared in a sensible fashion. Each type of charge
allows comparison of the subsidies required for each scheme while keeping patient prices as
close as possible. Since no framework has yet been defined for the JZ scheme little can be said
regarding its cost.
One important consideration enters when we refer to efficiency. Efficiency measures the
difference between the total willingness to pay of consumers who choose to undertake treatment
and the aggregate costs borne by all parties. As transfer payments subsidies paid by the
government to drug companies do not affect efficiency in a world where raising taxes does not
change the choices of individuals and firms. This situation corresponds to the first 'total surplus'
column in the summary table of each case. The second 'total surplus' column refers to the case
where the raising of $1 in taxes effectively costs $1.10 to taxpayers because of the distortions
taxes cause in the economy. This figure has been used due to an unfruitful search for a generally
48 In deference to Johnston and Zeckhauser who proposed the scheme that will be used In
comparison to reference pricing in a static, perfect information case.
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accepted level of the marginal deadweight loss from taxation. Every report appears to state how
not to calculate the figure but very few actually attempt the estimation.49
(a) Identically distributed drugs
Appendix 6.2 considers the type of equilibria we expect in the situation where we have two
drugs with qualities that are distributed identically and independently. The results suggest that
we expect that there will be a range of shared prices over which equilibria occur.i'' This
complicates the analysis of the case of identically distributed drugs somewhat as there is no
unique reference pricing outcome that may be compared with the outcomes of other systems.
The reaction curves for each firm (where reference priced drugs attract a zero patient price) the
scenario where Ai = TJ; =C j =lare given below.
Identically distributed drugs
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Figure 6.4: Identically distributed drugs
The range of prices over which the multiplicity of equilibria occur are from
PI =P2 =4.8080to PI =P2 =6.0000. The following tables attempt to summarise this scenario and
compare it to that observed under the unregulated model of the previous chapter, in addition to
49 The case of a distortionary tax was included only to show how sensitive the result that reference
pricing was superior to the unregulated position actually was. Beyond this very little can be taken from
this figure.
50 Unless initial prices are low and firms are reluctant to signal high prices the high price outcome
may be more realistic in the absence of restrictions on how firms may set their price.
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marginal cost provision of pharmaceuticals. Two rows have been allocated for reference pricing,
giving the extreme points of the range of equilibria.
Where marginal cost is charged for each drug under reference pricing a range of equilibria
also exist. Shared prices between 4.32 and 6.00 promote the situation where both firms charge
marginal cost to patients and receive the appropriate subsidy (Pi - cJ from the government. This
case is also analysed using two rows of the following tables outlining the results under the
extreme points of this range.
p/ P2 c' [' fl/ (rn) fl2 (rn) fiN 7[/ 7[2PI P2
Unregulated duopoly 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 0.28 0.28 0.44 0.55 0.55
RP (zero charge - high) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14 2.16 2.16
RP (zero charge - low) 4.81 4.81 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14 1.64 1.64
JZ (zero charge) 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14
RP (MC charge - high) 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.20 2.00 2.00
RP (MC charge - low) 4.32 4.32 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.20 1.32 1.32
.rz (MC charge) 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.20
Table 6.1: Identically distributed drugs (1 of 2).
The above table gives predictable results. Producer prices are highest under reference
pricing because of the subsidies on offer. Predictably consumption is highest under the zero
price schemes, followed by the schemes providing drugs at the shared marginal cost and the
unregulated case respectively. Profits are highest in the reference pricing cases since both
producer prices and quantities are at their highest levels here.
The table below completes the summary of the case of identically distributed drugs.
Consumer surplus is understandably highest under the zero price outcomes, followed by the MC
and the unregulated duopoly scenarios, reflecting the relationship between consumer prices and
consumer surplus. The subsidy cost shows (trivially) that the cost of a subsidised scheme is
greater than where no subsidies exist. Because at this time no framework has been analysed with
respect to the JZ scheme nothing more can be said about this at this time. As would be expected
reference pricing is cheaper to the subsidising agency when a part charge (in this case marginal
cost) is levied on patients.
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PI P2 c c consumer subsidy cost total totalPI P2
surplus surplus surplus
(10% DWL)
Unregulated duopoly 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 $0.6534 In $0.0000 In $1.7437 In $1.7437 In
RP (zero charge - high) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 $2.8383 In $5.1880 In $1.9737 m $1.4549 ill
RP (zero charge - low) 4.81 4.81 0.00 0.00 $2.8383 In $3.2926 In $1.9737 ill $1.6444 ill
JZ (zero charge) 0.00 0.00 $2.8383 111 $1.9737 m
RP (MC charge - high) 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 $2.0047 111 $3.9905 m $2.0047 111 $1.6057 ill
RP (MC charge - low) 4.32 4.32 1.00 1.00 $2.0047 In $2.6499 In $2.0047 111 $1.7397 In
JZ (MC charge) 1.00 1.00 $2.0047 In $2.0047 m
Table 6.2: Identically distributed drugs (2 of 2).
As far as efficiency is concerned where taxes are non-distortionary the reference pricing
outcomes are superior to those of an unregulated position in terms of efficiency. Reference
pricing however involves a large transfer from the government to the drug companies which may
make it unpalatable as a choice of regulatory regime. The major component behind the relative
efficiency of reference pricing here is the low consumer cost it promotes. The highest efficiency
predictably arises where price equals marginal cost.
Where the distortionary effects of taxation are taken into account the results obtained
change markedly. Even at a relatively small distortionary cost to taxation (10% DWL) the
unregulated position becomes more efficient as the increase in consumer surplus resulting from
reference pricing becomes too costly in terms of efficiency.
(b) Large asymmetry in efficacy
As in previous chapters this scenario assumes two drugs exist in a subgroup with side
effects that are independently and identically distributed. There is however a large difference in
efficacy between the drugs with drug 1 having twice the efficacy of its competitor
(17; ==Ci == I,A I == I,Az ==0.5). The following diagram displays the reaction curves for each drug
under the RP (zero charge) case.
,
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Asymmetry in efficacy
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Figure 6.5: Asymmetry in efficacy
The unique Nash equilibrium under reference pncmg predictably involves the higher
quality drug charging a higher price and obtaining a higher proportion of the market." The
reference pricing outcome with marginal cost charged to patients also has a unique Nash
equilibrium in this case which is quite close to that of the zero charge case.
PI P2 c p~ III (m) J..L2 (m) J..LN n, n2PI
Unregulated duopoly 3.15 1.75 3.15 1.75 0.30 0.10 0.59 0.65 0.08
RP (zero charge) 6.63 6.00 0.63 0.00 0.53 0.22 0.25 2.98 1.09
JZ (zero charge) 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.19 0.22
RP (MC charge) 6.21 6.00 1.21 LOa 0.53 0.14 0.33 2.65 0.71
JZ (MC charge) 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.14 0.33
Table 6.3: Asymmetry in efficacy (1 of 2).
The above table outlines the prices and quantities associated with reference pricing in
addition to that of the unregulated duopoly and JZ cases. This table provides the same general
conclusions as did the corresponding table in the case of identically distributed drugs. Reference
pricing is associated with the highest level of producer prices followed by the unregulated
distribution. Although the patient price for drug 1 under reference pricing is positive in both
cases the level of consumer prices is still lower under the reference pricing framework than the
unregulated duopoly case. The JZ (zero charge) case does however promote lower prices than its
51 See Appendix 6.3 for the case where equilibria switch from a range of shared prices to a single
point..
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reference pricing alternative. With high producer prices and a large quantity corresponding to
low consumer prices the reference pricing outcomes again involves higher profits for both firms
than the unregulated case. Reference pricing is again failing in its bid to keep subsidy payments
low as the profits accruing to the producers of the inferior drug are ten times that expected in an
unregulated case.
Table 6.4 further analyses this case and compares reference pricing with its alternatives.
The conclusion of the previous case holds again as reference pricing is again more efficient than
an unregulated duopoly where taxes are non-distortionary but not so when such distortions are
taken into account.
p, P2 c c consumer subsidy total total surplusPI P2
surplus cost surplus (10% DWL)
Unregulated duopoly 3.15 1.75 3.15 1.75 $0.3420 m $0.0000 m $1.0681 In $1.0681 m
RP (zero charge) 6.63 6.00 0.63 0.00 $1.7233 m $4.4818 In $1.3093 In $0.8612m
JZ (zero charge) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 $2.0742 m $2.0742 In
RP (MC charge) 6.21 6.00 1.21 1.00 $1.2397 m $3.2646 In $1.2397 In $0.9132 In
JZ (MC charge) 1.00 1.00 $1.3485 In $1.3485 m
Table 6.4: Asymmetry in efficacy (2 of 2).
(c) Large asymmetry in risk
This scenario addresses the case of two firms where both share a common efficacy (A. i = I)
but the risk of drug 1 is far lower than its alternative (71, =5, Tl2 = I). Marginal costs are again
constant and equal to 1. With a large asymmetry between the firms it is expected that there is
only one Nash equilibrium in prices. This is confirmed by the diagram below which displays the
reaction curves of each firm under RP (zero charge) and shows a single intersection at
n, = 5.59, P2 = 4.10.
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Figure 6.6: Asymmetry in risk.
The table associated with this case is given below.
PI pz c p~ {L] (m) {Lz (m) {iN n, TrzPI
Unregulated duopoly 3.42 2.71 3.42 2.71 0.61 0.26 0.13 1.49 0.44
RP (zero charge) 5.59 4.10 1.48 0.00 0.61 0.38 0.01 2.80 1.l8
JZ (zero charge) 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00
RP (MC charge) 5.05 3.79 2.26 1.00 0.62 0.35 0.03 2.53 0.97
JZ (MC charge) 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.17 0.01
Table 6.5: Asymmetry in risk (1 of 2).
The same conclusions as found previously apply here almost universally. The ordering of
producer prices is identical to previous cases, as are quantities and prices. The large difference in
risk promotes a large price differential between the two drugs in excess of the $1.00 that would
be charged for drug 1 under JZ (Me charge). Here the average level of patient charges under
reference pricing is lower than under marginal cost pricing but the 61% of patients using drug 1
face more expensive treatment.
PI pz c c consumer subsidy total total surplusPI pz
surplus cost surplus (lO%DWL)
Unregulated duopoly 3.42 2.71 3.42 2.71 $1.0114m $0.0000 ill $2.9362 m $2.9362 m
RP (zero charge) 5.59 4.10 1.48 0.00 $3.1056 m $4.0597 m $3.0222 m $2.6162 ill
JZ (zero charge) - 0.000.00 $4.1687 m $4.1687 ill
RP (MC charge) 5.05 3.79 2.26 1.00 $2.2610 m $2.7097 m $2.2610 ill $1.9900 m
JZ (MC charge) 1.00 1.00 $3.1735 m $3.1735 m
Table 6.6: Asymmetry in risk (2 of 2).
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The above table preserves the efficiency orderings found earlier. Reference pricing is again
more efficient than an unregulated duopoly where taxes can be raised in a non-distortionary
fashion but not when subsidies place an additional 10% burden on society. Marginal cost
provision is again superior in the initial comparison but nothing more may be said in the
distortionary case since the financing costs of this option are unknown.
(d) Balanced asymmetry
The final case explored IS that of a situation where the supenor safety of drug 1
approximately balances the superior efficacy of drug 2. Here A, I =0.85, 17 I =1.10, A,2 =0.90, TJ 2 =1.00
and Ci = I. Appendix 6.2 suggests that these two drugs, being generally balanced, will have a
range of prices where it pays each to match the price of the other. The reaction curves below
confirm that this is indeed the case and that at all shared prices between 4.5127 and 6.0000 there
is a Nash equilibrium.
Balanced asymmetry
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Figure 6.7: Balanced asymmetry.
The problems of analysis where there are a range of Nash equilibria arise here again.
Fortunately the results found once more do not depend on which Nash equilibrium is chosen.
Reference pricing under a marginal cost charge also promotes a range of shared price Nash
equilibria. For both cases the high and low extrema of the ranges are examined in the tables
below.
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PI pz p~ p~ III (m) fLZ (m) IlN 1[, 1[z
Unregulated duopoly 2.61 2.73 2.61 2.73 0.25 0.26 0.49 0.41 0.44
RP (zero charge - high) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.16 2.07 2.13
RP (zero charge - low) 4.5 I 4.51 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.16 1.46 1.50
JZ (zero charge) 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.16
RP (MC charge - high) 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.39 0.24 1.86 1.93
RP (MC charge - low) 3.91 3.91 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.39 0.24 1.08 1.12
MC provision 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.39 0.24
Table 6.7: Balanced asymmetry (1 of 2).
Once more the general conclusions of the other cases hold here. Producer prices are
highest and consumer prices lowest under reference pricing. Profits for both drugs are higher
under the reference pricing framework than the unregulated case. Where the firms charge at
marginal cost the slightly superior drug 2 obtains a greater share of the market and consumption
is lower than under reference pricing.
Unregulated duopoly
RP (zero charge - high)
RP (zero charge - low)
JZ (zero charge)
RP (MC charge - high)
RP (MC charge - low)
JZ (MC charge)
PI pz p~' P; consumer
surplus
2.61 2.73 2.61 2.73 $0.4883 m
6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 $2.3714 m
4.5 I 4.5 I 0.00 0.00 $2.3714 m
0.00 0.00 $2.3714 m
6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 $1.5697 m
3.91 3.91 1.00 1.00 $1.5697 m
1.00 1.00 $1.5697 m
subsidy
cost
$0.0000 m
$5.0423 m
$2.9520 rn
$3.7854 rn
$2.2005 m
total
surplus
$1.3408 m
$1.5310 m
$1.5310m
$1.5310m
$1.5697 III
$1.5697 m
$1.5697 m
total surplus
(10% DWL)
$1.3408 m
$1.0267 m
$1.2358 m
$1.1912 m
$1.3497 m
Table 6.8: Balanced asymmetry (2 of 2).
The conclusions of the other cases once more hold almost perfectly here with reference
pricing superior on efficiency grounds where taxes are assumed to cause no distortions in the
economy. Where distortions exist this result is reversed where the reference pricing scheme
assigns zero patient cost to reference priced drugs. Where reference pricing assigns a marginal
cost levy to drugs it is possible that the scheme may be more efficient than the unregulated case
at relatively low levels of distortion.
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IV. EVALUATION OF RESULTS
The results of the scenarios examined are clear and consistent between the cases. The
reference pricing scheme is far superior to an unregulated duopoly as far as consumers are
concerned. The economy is however worse off than in an unregulated market where taxes are
distortionary. The cases addressed considered where drugs were distributed identically, had a
roughly balanced quality distributions, and where large differences existed between the
distributions individual specific qualities were drawn from. Small differences between
distributions were assessed in the balanced asymmetry case, as if there was a disparity of the
effects of small differences in risk and efficacy it would have appeared in the results of this case.
The residual difference between the drugs after offsetting the advantages of each (drug 2 is
marginally superior) did not have a major impact on the results. It is therefore unlikely that small
differences in either efficacy or risk will change the outcomes significantly from that of the
identically distributed drugs case.
The most interesting result from this analysis is the level of pnces observed where
reference pricing is applied to the market. As a subsidisation scheme it is not surprising that the
prices of each good increase as a result of reference pricing but the magnitude of these increases
is extreme. Prices are ineffectively constrained by reference pricing where firms may freely enter
into a subgroup adjust prices to reach the Nash Equilibrium. In many cases equilibrium prices
may occur above the level that, if the cost of pharmaceuticals were to be levied directly on to
consumers, the last consumer would have long left the market.r' This is not the behaviour
expected of a scheme that is supposed to restrict prices and force firms to compete vigorously on
pnce.
That Pharmac has managed to keep prices at the level it has appears to be more to do with
the restrictions it places on entry into subgroups than reference pricing itself. More will be said
of these restrictions in Chapter 10 where a more comprehensive analysis of the pharmaceutical
52 Recall that patients will undertake a course of treatment only if cp < ';{. The quality (cp) of any
drug has a value of at most Aso that the final consumer will decline treatment by this drug when price
exceeds A L. Since A is constrained to be at most 1 and L is assumed to equal 5 throughout this thesis
the max imum value A L can take is 5. For any value of the producer price above 5 it is certain that no
one would ever choose to undertake treatment were the producer price directly levied.
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market takes place. The question then remains of Pharmac, why use a system that at least in an
unrestricted form fails to contain both producer prices and quantity when other systems may be
available to provide pharmaceuticals at a more reasonable price? One potential scheme,
identified by Woodfield, Fountain and Borren, is evaluated in the following chapter to ascertain
whether it provides a better method for the subsidisation of pharmaceuticals.
Although efficiency is used to evaluate alternative schemes here it must be noted that
efficiency is unlikely to ever be the government's primary aim when addressing the area of
health. While efficiency is something that is aimed for the primary aim is normally the provision
of health services at a cost effective level. Those who would otherwise be unable to undertake
treatment attract special attention from the government. The use of reference pricing fails when
dealing with these patients since it does not necessarily provide pharmaceuticals to patients at a
price at or below marginal COSt.53 Additionally, since reference pricing (in the absence of
marginal cost differences) may result in less efficacious and/or more risky drugs being fully
subsidised, reference pricing may encourage the use of lesser treatment alternatives.
Whether a government considers that pharmaceuticals should be provided below marginal
cost is an ethical question rather than an economic one but the economics involved are
nonetheless significant. The increased cost of the scheme must be compared with the welfare
gains to society obtained by reducing the uncertainty citizens face regarding illness. With a wide
variety of treatments available for a myriad of illnesses it is unlikely that all pharmaceuticals will
ever be free to consumers since this would imply a massive cost to the government in the form of
subsidy payments. Where prices are positive the simplest way to keep expenditure at an
acceptable level is to use prices to accurately convey the relative costs of pharmaceuticals and
allow patients to observe the true cost of pharmaceuticals.
The pros and cons of pricing pharmaceuticals at marginal cost are covered in the following
chapter which outlines a possible alternative to the reference pricing scheme used in New
Zealand.
53 See Table 6.5 where for the zero fixed charge reference pricing scheme p~ =1.48 > 1=Ct-
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V. CAVEATS
The removal of the search component of the model weakens the results obtained here but is
unlikely to reverse the evidence presented. The search model implicitly places the firms in any
subgroup on a more combative footing and opens up new avenues for competition between them.
It has not been possible to explore these avenues because of the non-existence problem
encountered. The search model would have expanded the analysis of reference pricing in the
following ways:
(i) The search model is based on imperfect information since patients are unsure of the
precise effect any particular pharmaceutical will have on them. The repercussions of such
uncertainty are important in the decisions they make. With costly information it is not
necessarily the case that patients make the final choice of treatment with all relevant information.
As doctors are the agents most likely to provide information over both which drugs are
worthwhile to test and the likely quality of treatments, drug companies may compete for custom
by competing for the attention of doctors.
(ii) When dealing with generic drugs the estimation of doctors over the quality of drugs is
vital in the probability of a generic drug successfully obtaining a significant share of the market.
Lobby groups representing the companies responsible for researching new medicines may be able
to convince doctors of differences between drugs and their generic copies where no such
differences exist. If this occurs it is likely that generic firms will be unable to make significant
penetration into the marketplace.
(iii) With a more competitive environment it may be possible that reference pricing would
have fared better than at present since the drug companies may have competed more vigorously.
Alternatively prices may have been even higher under reference pricing within a search
framework if the drug companies choose to compete more strenuously on the basis of doctor's
loyalties than 0,11 price. Very little can be said on this topic and it seems likely that the search
model would not have overturned the large prices observed.
The numerical analysis in this chapter does not necessarily reflect the method Pharmac uses
when determining pharmaceutical subsidies because it implicitly assumes that firms are placed
on an even footing by being allowed to compete in the marketplace. In reality there is no
guarantee that any firm will be given entry to a therapeutic subgroup and Pharmac does appear to
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attempt to utilise its strategic advantage to force firms to agree to concessions before it will
permit entry. This may reduce the cost of pharmaceuticals but may lead to non-subsidisation of
pharmaceuticals. Pharmac is not aided in this strategic behaviour by using reference pricing
however since reference pricing does not appear to promote low producer prices which in turn
increases the cost of accepting a bid for listing on the Pharmaceutical Schedule. A regulatory
system promoting lower producer prices may allow Pharmac to achieve subsidisation at lower
prices rather than face a situation where drugs representing an advances in treatment are left
unsubsidised.
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CHAPTER 7
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
The reference pricing system used in New Zealand and overseas has corne under attack
because it is suggested that it does not fully utilise the government's strategic advantage in
negotiations. The 1997 report by Woodfield, Fountain and Borren suggested that alternative
schemes for subsidising pharmaceuticals could allow the government to exploit its strategic
position by forcing the firms to compete for subsidisation. In the purest forms of reference
pricing this competition is not evident.
The system used by the Australian Government in the 1980's demands examination in
order to ascertain whether it promotes a superior outcome to that observed under reference
pricing. When comparing the two systems both efficiency and the price of subsidisation should
be considered. Additionally, consideration may be given to the level of patient care provided in
equilibrium and the informational requirements of each scheme. The Australian scheme imposes
much greater informational demands on the agency negotiating subsidisation of pharmaceuticals.
While it may be the case that the 1980's Australian scheme is superior to that of reference pricing
in a world of perfect information, it is not necessarily the case when the pharmaceutical agency is
faced with realistic constraints on their information. This chapter compares the schemes in a
world of perfect information while Chapter 10 explores the comparison under imperfect
information.
1. WOODFIELD, FOUNTAIN AND BORREN'S EXAMINATION OF 1980'S SCHEME
In Woodfield et al analysis of the Australian scheme was based on standard textbook
model of duopoly examined by Johnston and Zeckhauser (1991) which was expanded to
encompass cases beyond that of identically characterised firms. Each firm was initially given a
linear demand function and an identical marginal cost under constant returns to scale. The
products were differentiated, allowing firms to charge above the level of their competitor and
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retain a positive share of the market. The benchmark against which the scheme was compared
was the Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand pricing game.
The numerical example given by Johnston and Zeckhauser issued both firms with a
demand function
Xi = 10-Pi +0.25Pj
and a cost function
C(X j ) = 2X j ,
where the Xi'S are in millions of patients
i = 1,2.
Under these assumptions the Nash equilibrium results in each firm charging a price of
$6.86 and receiving $23.6 million in profit.
The first option put forward by Johnston and Zeckhauser was to subsidise only one of the
firms. The assumption made earlier in this thesis is made here also, that the distributor of drugs
bears no costs in transferring products to consumers. Under this assumption the price of
medication to the patient equals the marginal cost of the producer. The minimum subsidy
required for either firm to join the scheme gives the firm only the profits it would otherwise
forego by charging at marginal cost. The response of the unsubsidised firm is not ignored as the
lowering of the price of the unsubsidised drug shifts the demand curve the subsidised drug faces
and so affects the per-unit subsidy required. In the above example the price of the unsubsidised
drug falls to $6.25, requiring the producer to receive a unit price of $4.47 to compensate for the
loss of $23.6 million in profits. A producer price of $4.47 implies a unit subsidy of $2.47 since
$2 per unit is alreacly received by the producer in the form of consumer payments. The
unsubsidised firm faces profits of only $18.1 million after the introduction of the subsidy.
In this initial option the subsidised firm is incited to move off its reaction function by the
offer of subsidisation, leading to a decrease in its price while holding its profits constant. The
unsubsidised firm, facing a lower price from its subsidised competitor, responds with a lower
price and faces decreased quantity and profits. While the subsidised firm observes no difference
in its profits as a result of subsidisation the unsubsidised firm is greatly affected. If both firms
are to be subsidised there are two options facing the government: either subsidise them both to
compensate for the $23.6 million lost when pricing at marginal cost, or alternatively, use the fact
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that being unsubsidised represents a large decrease in profits if a competitor is subsidised to its
own budgetary advantage.
If the government was to subsidise both firms for the loss of $23.6 million dollars it would
lead to consumer prices of $2, producer prices of $4.8 and a unit subsidy of $2.8. The total cost
to the government of such a scheme is $47.2 million dollars. l This subsidisation scheme was
earmarked option two by Johnston and Zeckhauser.
Johnston and Zeckhauser's option three used the government's strategic advantage to better
effect. One firm was approached with the offer of subsidisation from the original Nash
equilibrium level. If the first firm accepted the offer of subsidisation the second firm was
approached but only after sufficient time had elapsed for the full effects of subsidisation to
become evident. When approached the second firm needs not be compensated by the full
amount of its benchmark profits since it no longer makes profits of the same magnitude. In the
numerical example the second firm needs to be compensated by $18.1 million dollars, not the
full $23.8 million. The adoption of option three in preference to option two would result in $5.5
million dollars less in subsidy payments to the firms. Firm one receives a per-unit subsidy of
$2.8 (as calculated above) while the second firm needs to be compensated by only $2.1 per unit.
An interesting point is made here by Woodfield et al, the increased profit of $5.5 million
accruing to the first firm joining the subsidy may be dissipated by the firms in attempts to be the
first invited to join. The potential for such rent seeking need not exist, as evidenced by the fourth
, option.
Option four uses the strategic position of the government to its best advantage. The agency
here offers to subsidise either firm to the level of its equilibrium profits, if it is the only firm to
join. If the other firm joins it is offered a subsidy sufficient to give it only the level of profits it
would experience if it remain unsubsidised. The fundamental difference between schemes three
and four is that under scheme three a piecewise approach is taken where firms are approached in
turn with the invitation to join the subsidy scheme. Under option four offers are made
simultaneously to both firms which in equilibrium allows neither firm to receive the profits they
I As it compensates each firm by $23.6 million.
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would have made had no subsidisation been possible. The prisoners' dilemma game defined by
this subsidy scheme is given in Table 7.1 below.
Firm 2
join scheme stay out
Firm 1 join scheme $18.1 m, $18.1 m $23.6 m, $18.1 m
"~t'~y"~;:;t""""""" ······$·i·8·.··i··;;;j·2·i·6··~~·····I····$2i·6··;;;:·$2·3:'6"~'"
Figure 7.1: The subsidy game.
Suppose that a firm expects its competitor to join the subsidy scheme. Whether or not the
firm joins it expects to make 18.1 million dollars. An epsilon can be added to the profits
accruing to the firm in the case where it joins the subsidisation scheme in order to make joining
optimal. Suppose now that the firm expects its competitor not to join the scheme. An epsilon
can again be added to the payoff of the firm in the case where it joins the scheme in order to
make joining the optimum strategy. As joining is now optimal for a firm regardless of the
actions of the other firm a dominant strategy equilibrium exists at {join, join}.
Here we get the interesting result that each firm is fundamentally indifferent to whether it
joins or not but has strict preferences over whether it's competitor does. In order to remove the
indifference highlighted above it is possible to offer profits under subsidy of an epsilon above the
unsubsidised equivalent. As with all prisoners' dilemma games the (static) dominant strategy
equilibrium involves both players playing against their corporate self interest in playing {join,
join}. The profits earned by each firm in equilibrium will be $18.1 million.
The fourth option is the most cost-effective of the three schemes where both firms are
subsidised. In making the decision of whether or not to subsidise two firms it is necessary for the
government to take several factors into account. Where both firms are subsidised a favourable
aspect of consumer prices is that they reflect the marginal cost of each type of output, giving
superior cost information than that which would otherwise have been observed. Where both
firms are subsidised patients have the full raft of options available to them at a smaller price than
would be observed under an unregulated outcome. The availability of all relevant drugs allows
consumers to choose the drug that suits them best. The downside to subsidising a large number
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of firms IS the obvious increase in cost as well as the cost of increased informational
requirements where information is available but costly.
In order to subsidise a firm under any of the four JZ options the cost structure and the
characteristics of all relevant drug options must be known for an accurate assessment of the
profits and the subsidies necessary under each case. Fixed and marginal costs of a firm must be
known under the JZ scheme. Marginal costs must be known since these constitute the post
subsidisation price of each drug. If fixed costs are large there is no guarantee that a firm can
cover costs when its opposition charges at its marginal cost. If fixed costs are sufficient to
prevent profits options three and four involve a choice of whether to remain in the industry and
make a loss or to exit and make zero profits. In this case the per-unit subsidy must be large
enough to allow the firm to cover costs. This problem is not explicitly referred to in analysis
below as fixed costs are set at zero. It is not seriously suggested that firms face no fixed costs but
rather that they face fixed costs below the level of profits available to the firm where all other
firms are subsidised. Where firms face these moderate fixed costs a zero fixed cost can be
assumed without a loss of generality.
Under imperfect information where firms face large enough fixed costs so as to make exit
optimal it is likely a very complex signalling mechanism will be required to guarantee
subsidisation. The nature of such signalling mechanisms is not addressed in this thesis but is left
for future research?
The characteristics of the distributions'' of all relevant drugs firms are required to find
subsidies under the JZ scheme. These characteristics affect the best response functions of firms
and the equilibrium quantities required when defining the per-unit subsidy needed to promote the
non-subsidisation profits in equilibrium.
2 Such a mechanism is likely to be two dimensional in that two different signals must be offered.
A delay signal gives only one piece of information and so allows the determination of either fixed or
marginal costs but not both (unless fixed and marginal costs are related). A voluntary restriction of
quantity may possibly act as a signal of marginal cost in equilibrium and fixed costs may be signalled by
delay. A two dimensional signalling equilibrium is likely to be highly complex and is suggested as an
avenue for future research.
:I Drug characteristics are the A. and T]for the distributions of each drug.
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Woodfield, Fountain and Borren analyse a further case where there is an asymmetry
between the firms in an industry. Firm one is given a greater share of the market at each shared
price level. The demand functions for each firm are
XI = 12-PI +0.25P2
X 2 = 8- P2 +0.25PI
In this case the unsubsidised Nash equilibrium has Pj =$7.75 and P2 =$5.97 with profits of
33 and L5.76 million dollars accruing to firms one and two, respectively. The following table
outlines the results obtained where, in turn, no subsidies are offered, subsidies are offered to one
firm only and where both firms are subsidised up to their original levels of profit.
No
subsidies
Firm 1 Firm 2 Both firms
subsidised subsidised subsidised
Firm 1
PI
Firm 2
P2
P~
cost of scheme
$ 7.75 $ 4.92 $ 7.25 $ 5.14
$ 7.75 $ 2.00 $ 7.25 $ 2.00
5.75 m 11.30 m 5.25 m 10.50m
$ 33.00 m $ 33.00 m $ 27.56 m $ 33.00 m
$ 5.97 $ 5.25 $ 4.00 $ 4.42
$ 5.97 $ 5.25 $ 2.00 $ 2.00
3.97 m 3.25 m 7.81 m 6.50 m
$ 15.76 m $ 10.56 m $ 15.76m $ 15.76 m
$ 0.00 m $ 33.00m $ 17.56 m $ 48.76 m
Table 7.1: Results of the subsidy game.
It was observed that, as a cost-containing agency, Pharmac is likely to opt for offering a
subsidy only to firm two in the above example. Here the agency can limit the cost of providing
pharmaceuticals in this group to only $15.76 million by intentionally bypassing the higher quality
option. Option four gives a better outcome again with a cost tag of $38.12 million to the
taxpayer. Under option four PI =P2 =$2, Sl =$2.62,S2 =$1.62, 1[1 =$27.56m,1[2 =$10.56m. The
government gains over $10 m when it utilises its strategic advantage.
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Woodfield et al extend this example to outline the costs of providing pharmaceuticals at
zero cost where marginal costs are significant. The $48.76 million dollars option four costs is
vastly outweighed by the $124 million dollars a zero price scheme would involve.
II. RESULTS UNDER THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET MODEL
The application of the general framework defined in the report of Johnston and Zeckhauser
to the pharmaceutical market model is a relatively simple matter. Four cases need to be isolated
to determine the payoff matrix in the game where each firm decides whether or not to accept an
offer of subsidisation. The benchmark case of an unregulated duopoly where no subsidies are
offered is the first of the four cases required. The profits of each firm under the unregulated
duopoly are labelled n~s,1lS and n~\,I1\ for firms land 2 respectively.
The next two cases identified are where only one of the firms is subsidised. The profits of
firm i in the situation where firm I is subsidised are labelled ni'"s. The corresponding profits
where firm 2 is the only subsidised firm are labelled as Jr;'s,s.
Using option four of the Johnston and Zeckhauser report each firm is offered the profits
that would accrue to it if it were not to join the scheme (plus an epsilon), conditional on the
choice of their competitor.
Firm 2
Firm 1
join scheme stay out
join scheme nils,s +£1' ns,JlS +£2 nlls.fl.\, +£" reS,fl.\'1 2 , 2
................................ ..........................................................................................................
stay out rcns,s n ll S,I1S +£2 rem,ll\ , n lls,ns1 ' 2 1 2
Figure 7.2: General form of the subsidy game.
As observed earlier the subsidy game is a prisoners' dilemma problem with the dominant
strategy equilibrium {join, join}. Under marginal cost pricing firms will be paid a per-unit
subsidy for participation that recoups the profits they would otherwise have made, with a small
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epsilon possibly added. Consumer prices in this variant of the scheme equal marginal cost and
producer prices are found by calculation where:
p, = c, +n';·"·'!p ,(c"c2)
+ S,IIS IlL ( )P2 =c2 n 2 t- 2 CI,c2
Producer prices equal marginal cost plus the per-unit premium required to provide them
with their non-participation profits.
The zero price variant of the JZ scheme was found in a like manner in that consumer prices
are zero and producer prices are just sufficient to allow a recouping of non-participation profits.
P, = CI +n~,··r/P/(O,O)
P2 = C2 + n;,JlI Ip 2 (0,0)
Note that producer prices under the zero price variant of the JZ scheme are expected to be
lower for two reasons. The non-participation profits of firms will differ in each case with smaller
profits being available under the zero price case because an unsubsidised firm generally faces a
lower consumer price. Quantities consumed in equilibrium in the zero price case will also be
higher, leading to a lower premium being required under the zero price outcome than marginal
cost pricing and lower producer prices generally.
The zero price and marginal cost price outcomes for the JZ scheme have been calculated
for each of the cases explored in chapter 6 and tables updating those found in the previous
chapter are displayed in the following sections.
(1) Identically distributed drugs
The previous chapter found that reference pricing was superior to an unregulated duopoly
where taxes are non-distortionary. In each of the four cases examined marginal cost provision
was more efficient than either reference pricing or the unsubsidised framework in the
non-distortionary case but not necessarily cheaper. Since the costs of provision of this scheme
were not known nothing could be said regarding its suitability in terms of efficiency or expense
when taxes are distortionary.
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For the case of identically distributed drugs the above framework has allowed for
examination of both zero and marginal cost provision of pharmaceuticals. The results are
summarised in the following tables reproduced from the previous chapter with the additional
information in bold type.
PI P2 p; c III (m) J.12 (m) ~IN Tfl Tf2P2
Unregulated duopoly 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 0.28 0.28 0.44 0.55 0.55
RP (zero charge - high) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14 2.16 2.16
RP (zero charge low) 4.81 4.81 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14 1.64 1.64
.TZ (zero charge) 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.43 0.14 0.30 0.30
RP (MC charge - high) 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.20 2.00 2.00
RP (MC charge - low) 4.32 4.32 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.20 1.32 1.32
JZ (MC charge) 1.93 1.93 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.37 0.37
PI P2 c c consumer subsidy cost total totalPI pz
surplus surplus surplus
(10% DWL)
Unregulated duopoly 2.95 2.95 2.95 2.95 $0.6534 m $0.0000 m $1.7437 m $1.7437 m
RP (zero charge - high) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 $2.8383 m $5.1880m $1.9737 m $1.4549 m
RP (zero charge - low) 4.81 4.81 0.00 0.00 $2.8383 m $3.2926 m $1.9737 ill $1.6444 ill
JZ (zero charge) 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 $2.8383 m $1.4695 m $1.9737 ill $1.8268 m
RP (MC charge - high) 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 $2.0047 ill $3.9905 ill $2.0047 ill $1.6057 ill
RP (MC charge - low) 4.32 4.32 1.00 1.00 $2.0047 ill $2.6499 ill $2.0047 ill $1.7397 ill
JZ (MC charge) 1.93 1.93 1.00 1.00 $2.0047 m $0.7338 m $2.0047 ill $1.9313 m
Table 7.2: Identically distributed drugs.
Where the quality of two drugs are distributed independently along identical distributions
the JZ schemes are far superior to reference pricing. The marginal cost of provision of a drug
under reference pricing may be up to 350% of the figure predicted from the JZ scheme. The
superiority holds both where zero and marginal cost prices are charged to patients. This
difference is more emphatic under zero pricing, where the predicted range of shared prices
encompasses a higher range and the JZ scheme demands a smaller price. With far lower
payments necessary to firms under the JZ scheme the distortionary effects of raising subsidies be
smaller. Either Johnston and Zeckhauser variant is more efficient than the unregulated duopoly
situation under comparisons where distortions of 10% are accounted for.
Marginal cost pricing is a superior option for the government in this case because it gives a
better outcome for both the taxpayer and the economy at large. When comparing the variants of
the JZ scheme differences in both the volume of treatment and the cost of subsidisation must be
taken into account. Total treatment under zero pricing would see 60,000 more people treated
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(6% of total) but would see the profits of each firm fal1. 4 The cost of the zero price scheme is
$1.47 m to the taxpayer of which of $0.86 m is compensation to producers for production costs
and $0.60 m in profits. Consumer surplus and efficiency would be as for the reference pricing
case in a world with non-distortionary taxes.
The following diagram illustrates the difference in producer prices between the schemes.
The range of equilibria expected under the reference pricing variants is graphed along with the
expected points under both the unregulated case and JZ outcomes. The prices under reference
pricing are demonstrably larger than under its alternatives. The large reduction in producer
prices when moving from an unregulated position to the JZ can also be seen.
;K Unregu lated
D JZ (ZC)
- RP (MC)
f::,. JZ (MC)
Figure 7.3: Comparison of producer prices (identically distributed drugs).
(2) Large asymmetry in efficacy
Where a large difference exists in the efficacy of two independent drugs the JZ schemes are
once more superior to both reference pricing and the unregulated duopoly case. Producer prices
and profits are again lowest under the marginal cost scheme.
4 Since their non-participation profits would have also fallen since when not participating in the
scheme they face a competitor with a price of $0.00 rather than $1.00.
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PI P2 c: P~ j../I (m) j../2 (m) ~lN it, Tf2PI
Unregulated duopoly 3.15 1.75 3.15 1.75 0.30 0.10 0.59 0.65 0.08
RP (zero charge) 6.63 6.00 0.63 0.00 0.53 0.22 0.25 2.98 1.09
JZ (zero charge) 1.85 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.19 0.22 0.50 0.04
RP (MC charge) 6.21 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.14 0.33 2.65 0.71
JZ (MC charge) 2.06 1.87 1.00 1.00 0.53 0.14 0.33 0.49 0.20
PI P2 c c consumer subsidy toted total surplusPI P2
surplus cost surplus (10% DWL)
Unregulated duopoly 3.15 1.75 3.15 1.75 $0.3420 m $0.0000 m $1.0681 m $1.0681 m
RP (zero charge) 6.63 6.00 0.63 0.00 $1.7233 m $4.4818111 $1.3093 m $0.8612 m
JZ (zero charge) 1.85 1.22 0.00 0.00 $2.0742 m $1.3170 m $2.0742 m $1.9425 m
RP (MC charge) 6.21 6.00 1.21 1.00 $1.2397 m $3.2646 m $1.2397 m $0.9132 m
JZ (MC charge) 2.06 1.87 1.00 1.00 $1.3485 m $0.6956m $1.3485 m $1.2789 m
Table 7.3: Asymmetry in efficacy.
Efficiency is once more highest under the JZ marginal cost scheme whether distortions are
assumed to be zero or 10%. Where patients are charged at marginal reference pricing costs over
four and a half times as much as the JZ scheme. Since firm one decides to charge at a premium
in this case the nomenclature of the RP schemes is slightly misleading since patients purchasing
drug 1 face the set charge (0 or 1) plus a differential (0.63 or 0.21 for the zero or marginal cost
charge schemes respectively). The lower prices of the JZ scheme lead to higher levels of
consumer surplus while costing only a third as much as the reference pricing scheme.
Implementation of the JZ scheme as opposed to reference pricing would appear to ultimately
lower the pharmaceutical bill.
As with the previous case the producer prices of the firms under the reference pricing (RP)
and JZ schemes have been plotted below. The reaction curves of both firms in the unregulated
position are also given in Figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4: Comparison of producer prices (asymmetry in efficacy).
Note that the producer price of firm two in JZ (Me) is higher than under the unregulated
case. This is not a result of the marginal cost scheme providing little impetus to keep prices low
but rather it reflects the very low quantity of the low quality drug used when firms price at
marginal cost. In order to compensate firm 2 for even the low level of profits it attains the per
unit subsidy must be high.
(3) Large asymmetry in risk
The case where drug 1 has an average side effect of only 20% of that of drug 2 promotes
the lowest priced RP outcome of the four cases considered. Accordingly it would seem that it
has the best chance of gaining a superior outcome to the JZ scheme. Unfortunately for
proponents of reference pricing it fares no better under this scheme in comparison to the JZ
scheme than did any other case. The summary table is given below.
PI pz " p~ PI (m) pz (m) PN it, JrzPI
Unregulated duopoly 3.42 2.71 3.42 2.71 0.61 0.26 0.13 1.49 0.44
RP (zero charge) 5.59 4.10 1.48 0.00 0.61 0.38 0.01 2.80 U8
JZ (zero charge) 2.04 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.86 0.02
RP (MC charge) 5.05 3.79 2.26 1.00 0.62 0.35 0.03 2.53 0.97
JZ (MC charge) 2.28 1.29 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.17 0.01 1.06 0.05
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Pi PZ c p~ consumer subsidy total total surplusPi
surplus cost surplus (10% DWL)
Unregulated duopoly 3.42 2.71 3.42 2.71 $1.0114 ill $0.0000 ill $2.9362 ill $2.9362 ill
RP (zero charge) 5.594.10 1.480.00 $3.1056 ill $4.0597 ill $3.0222 ill $2.6162 ill
JZ (zero charge) 2.04 1.13 0.00 0.00 $4.1687 ill $1.8843 m $4.1687 ill $3.9803 m
RP (MC charge) 5.05 3.79 2.26 1.00 $2.2610 ill $2.7097 ill $2.2610 ill $1.9900 ill
JZ (MC charge) 2.28 1.29 1.00 1.00 $3.1735 ill $1.1044 m $3.1735 ill $3.0631 m
Table 7.4: Asymmetry in risk.
Producer prices are again lowest under both JZ schemes leading to a far smaller subsidy
cost. Once more the superior firm chooses to price at a premium under reference pricing
imposing a large cost on consumers under each variant. Efficiency is once more higher under the
JZ scheme than its alternatives at 0 and 10% levels of DWL resulting from taxation. Figure 7.5,
as with its predecessors, presents the prices of the alternative schemes in a graphical form,
showing that the marginal cost pricing scheme results in producer prices far smaller than the
other options addressed.
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Figure 7.5: Comparison of producer prices (asymmetry in risk).
(4) Balanced asymmetry
The final case addressed deals with a situation where two drugs are generally balanced in
their qualities. Drug 1 has a lower efficacy than drug 2 but a higher degree of predictability. The
amended results table for this scenario is given below.
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c: p~ f-ll (m) f-l2 (m)PI P2 PI f-lN nl n2
U;;egulated duopoly 2.61 2.73 2.61 2.73 0.25 0.26 0.49 0.41 0.44
RP (zero charge - high) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.16 2.07 2.13
RP (zero charge - low) 4.51 4.51 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.16 1.46 1.50
JZ (zero charge) 1.57 1.59 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.43 0.16 0.24 0.25
RP (MC charge - high) 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.39 0.24 1.86 1.93
RP (MC charge - low) 3.91 3.91 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.39 0.24 1.08 1.12
JZ (MC charge) 1.78 1.81 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.39 0.24 0.29 0.31
PI P2 c p~ consumer subsidy total total surplusPI
surplus cost surplus (10% DWL)
Unregulated duopoly 2.61 2.73 2.61 2.73 $0.4883 In $0.0000 m $1.3408 In $1.3408 In
RP (zero charge - high) 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 $2.3714 In $5.0423 m $1.5310 m $1.0267 In
RP (zero charge - low) 4.51 4.51 0.00 0.00 $2.3714 In $2.9520 rn $1.5310 In $1.2358 In
JZ (zero charge) 1.57 1.59 0.00 0.00 $2.3714 In $1.3278 ill $1.5310m $1.3982 ill
RP (MC charge - high) 6.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 $1.5697 In $3.7854 In $1.5697 m $1.1912 In
RP (MC charge - low) 3.91 3.91 1.00 1.00 $1.5697 In $2.2005 m $1.5697 In $1.3497 In
JZ (MC charge) 1.78 1.81 1.00 1.00 $1.5697 In $0.6014 ill $1.5697 m $2.1047 ill
Table 7.5: Balanced asymmetry.
As with the previous three cases this example supports the JZ scheme as a cheaper and
more efficient method of subsidisation than reference pricing. Figure 7.6 visually compares the
prices expected under each scheme. Table 7.5 suggests that the price of marginal cost provision
is at best 26%, and at worst only 47%, of the cost of reference pricing.
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Figure 7.6: Comparison of producer prices (balanced asymmetry).
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As with previous diagrams Figure 7.6 shows the gulf between the alternative schemes. In
all four cases reference pricing has ineffectively contained prices compared with the alternative
JZ scheme.
(5) Conclusions
Marginal cost pricing appears to be a superior form of subsidisation than reference pricing
where all relevant information is known by the funding agency. The alternative scheme is less
costly than reference pricing while efficiency considerations favour the former scheme at both
addressed levels of tax distortion.i' Given the availability of the JZ scheme the use of reference
pricing is inefficient if information is freely available.
In reality commercially sensitive information such as the cost structure of a firm is not
freely available. For an accurate comparison between different schemes the information that
firms have is highly important. The pertinent items of information that Pharmac would require,
if marginal cost pricing is to be used are as follows: For every firm in the target subgroup
Pharrnac must know the characteristics of all drugs (A,;, 77;) and the cost function of the firm with
respect to the target drug."
Of these two items of information the former is possibly easier to find since every drug
applying for listing on the Pharmaceutical Schedule must include data as to its efficacy and side
effects.
Information regarding the cost functions of drug companies is unlikely to be freely given.
Drug companies, if given a choice of the price they receive will naturally choose the highest
possible price and would manipulate the information they report to Pharmac in order to make
5 Since it is superior at zero distortion and costs less than reference pricing.
6 The characteristics of drug quality distributions define the demand functions for each firm. The
alternative for Pharmac would be to either estimate the cost function or to use average marginal cost in
order to find the relevant JZ subsidy. Either approach would be troublesome. As the JZ scheme only just
promotes enough profit to make a firm indifferent over participating in the scheme, any underestimation
of the marginal cost of the firm, regardless of how small, will result in no subsidisation. Where the
estimated cost is an unbiased estimator of true marginal cost subsidisation will fail to be achieved
approximately half the time. Where average cost is used the same problem will occur, here occurring
exactly half the time.
- --- - - - ----- - ---------------------------------
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sure they receive it. The discovery of information of this type has been addressed by literature on
delays in bargaining and is summarised in Chapter 9. In these models of information discovery
the future profit stream of each firm is taken into account. The profits accruing to a firm occur
both during and after patent protection. The expiration of patent protection and, more
specifically the effect of the introduction of generics into the market must be addressed. Unless
the effects of generics are known the multi-period profit function remains unknown and nothing
can be said about models promising to reveal information. For this reason the following chapter
addresses the issue of generics.
III
CHAPTER 8
GENERIC ENTRY INTO A DIFFERENTIATED MARKET
A patent is issued for 20 years in New Zealand. When determining the multi period profit
merion required in the following chapter the effects on a firm of the expiration of patent
rotection must first be known. This chapter attempts to introduce what is meant by a generic
rug in the context of the pharmaceutical market model and what it means for the profits
chieved for the formerly protected firm. Since pharmaceuticals do not enter the market at the
me of patenting Section IV addresses the delays to market and the effective patent life of
harmaceuticals in New Zealand.
The problems associated with the removal of the search component of the pharmaceutical
narket model are strongest when dealing with generic drugs. Established drugs, by nature of
heir longer time in the market, may have accumulated a substantial reputation by the time
iatents expire. The reputation of the generic must likewise be built over time as its true quality is
liseovered slowly. The assumption that individual qualities are known by all patients leads to a
~reater share of the market going to generic drugs than is likely under a search framework. This
lifference in market share between new and existing drugs will occur irrespective of whether any
lifferences exist between any drug and its generic copies.
:. DEFINITIONS
In the pharmaceutical market model the quality of drugs have been assumed to fall
mdependently along predefined distributions. This assumption is modified in the case of generic
drugs. Generic drugs are taken to be pharmaceuticals for which quality is a deterministic
function of the quality of another drug. For an individual, knowledge of the original drug's
quality (drug i) also gives the knowledge of the quality of the copy/generic drug (drug k).
qJkj = H(qJi)
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It is envisaged that generic drugs will include the same active ingredient(s) as the original
ug but may differ in efficacy and/or the level of side effects. I Generic drugs are expected to be
wrmaceutically equivalent' but not necessarily bioequivalent' to their innovative cousins.
The natural way to relate the quality distribution of the original drug with the quality
stribution of the generic is through the cumulative distribution of each drug. An drug is said to
~ a generic copy if individuals fall in the same position along the cumulative distributions of
ich drug." For individual) facing drug i and its generic copy k:
Fj (qJij ) = Fk (qJ~j )
rJ j ( qJij - A j ) = rJk (qJkj - A k )
rJjqJij -T/jA j = rJkqJkj -T/kAk
rJ;CPij -rJjA j + rJkAk = T/kqJkj
rJ;qJij - rJjA; +T/kAk =T/kqJkj
So that the quality of drug k is a deterministic function of the quality of drug i. The
elationship between two drugs connected by an equality of positions in the cumulative density
unction of each drug is displayed graphically below.
I This difference may be due to manufacturing standards or differences in inactive ingredients.
2 Pharmaceutically equivalent drugs must meet the same standards of quality as well as contain the
arne active ingredients in the same form and the same dosage. (Source: Therapeutics Section, Ministry
if Health. (1994) Interchangeable Multi-source Medicines. Ministry of Health. p.vii)
:; Bioequivalence requires pharmaceutical equivalence in addition to the following:
.. bioavailabilities are administration in the same molar dose are similar to such a degree that
their effects with respect to both efficacy and safety will essentially be the same
.. they present no known or potential problems of bio-inequivalence and they meet a relevant in-
vitro standard.
(Source: Therapeutics Section, Ministry of Health. (1994) Interchangeable Multi-source
Medicines. Ministry of Health p.vii)
4 As the quality of the generic is perfectly predictable given the quality of the initial drug, the
effects of switching between drugs is known. This may not be particularly realistic but, given that partial
dependence would be very challenging algebraically, it appears to be the best available assumption.
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Figure 8.1: Graphical representation of generic relationship
These diagrams represent the cumulative density functions of an innovative drug and its
eneric copy. A patient here is identified as occupying a position on the innovative drug's CDF
) that the individual specific quality faced for the generic drug is simply the quality at which the
rnctions take the same value.
Differences between drugs can occur in both differences in efficacy and risk. The
.illowing sections describe the effects on the decisions of firms in each case and the potential for
rcorporating this type of difference into the pharmaceutical market model.
L DIFFERENCES IN EFFICACY
The following sections describe the effects on the decisions of firms in each case and the
iotential for incorporating this type of difference into the pharmaceutical market model.
(1) A two firm example
Of the types of potential differences between generic drugs and their original counterparts a
:lifference in efficacy is the conceptually simpler option since here every patient faces the same
:lifference in quality between treatment options. It was previously shown that the relationship
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tween the qualities of two generically related drugs IS assumed to satisfy the following
uation:
F,(q; i] ) = Fk (q; k] )
17;q;k.,· =Ak--(A;-q;i;)
17k .
q; k; = q; ii + (A k - Ai)
A difference in efficacy between two drugs is perceived by patients as a fixed difference in
e quality of the drugs. Drug 2 will be chosen in preference to drug 1 by all consumers if:
U,reatment/ > Utrellfme1l12
Lq;2 - P2 > Lc:/ - P/
L(q; / + A2 - AJ) - P2 > Lq;/ - P/
Lq; / + LA2 - LA J - P2 > Lrp J - P/
LA2-LA/>P2-P/
P2<PJ+ LA2- LA/
Likewise drug I will be chosen 111 preference to drug 2 by all consumers when
If each drug is to have a positive share of the market then neither of the above propositions
an be true and so:
PI P2=LA/-LA 2
!p,-p,) - A -A
L - I 2
If an equilibrium exists with both firms charging above marginal cost then (J1'~J12) = AJ - A2 •5
n this situation each firm would have an incentive to decrease price by an epsilon and gain the
ntire market. Prices would be driven down through this mechanism until one or both of the
irms no longer have an incentive to undercut. The final situation is sensitive to the relative sizes
if the cost asymmetry between firms and the asymmetry in efficacy between each of the drugs.
Laking drug 1 to be the incumbent pharmaceutical and drug 2 to be its generic copy it is expected
hat the generic drug will have a cost advantage over the incumbent and that the efficacy of firm
l is at least as great as that of drug 2.
5 The value of the asymmetry is the differential L(A 2 - A/) it allows the superior firm to charge.
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The contributions that the incumbent firm must make to its parent company to assist in the
osts of research and development will increase the costs of the drug to the firm. 6 The generic
rm will bear no such cost and so the generic is expected to have a cost advantage over the firm
The drug of the incumbent firm is expected to have efficacy at least as great as that of the
eneric copy. Through years of experience in researching, developing and producing the drug
re incumbent is likely to have gained greater knowledge of the properties in the active
rgredients of the pharmaceutical. With greater experience may well come greater expertise and
o a superior level of efficacy is expected in the incumbent firm's drug (A"I > A2)'
If the cost disadvantage of firm 1 equals the value of the incumbent's advantage in efficacy
is expected that both firms will produce at marginal cost and both firms will take a positive
hare of the market. Here L(A I-A2)=c l-c2 , PI =C I and
P2 = PI + LA 2 - LA I
=cI- L(A I-A 2 )
=CI (c l-c2 )
Where the cost disadvantage of firm 1 outweighs the value of the incumbent's advantage in
.fficacy firm 1 cannot compete in equilibrium. The unique pure strategy equilibrium in this case
ees firm 1 pricing at marginal cost and firm 2 undercutting by an epsilon (once the value of the
:fficacy differential has been removed). Here PJ = CI' L(A I -A 2 ) < C1- C2 so that
P2 =c,-L(A I-A 2 )
>cI-(cl- c2)
Firm two charges above marginal cost and takes the entire market. Neither firm has an
ncentive to change its price, making this outcome an equilibrium. This outcome is the only
6 It appears reasonable that the parent company will charge larger users of their patented drug a
arger charge than smaller users. The larger is the market share of the drug, the more of the drug is used
md the greater are the contributions that the New Zealand subsidiary must pay towards the parent's
'esearch. That these contributions increase in quantity leads to an increase in the incremental cost of
Irug production.
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ash equilibrium because where firm 1 prices above CI firm 2 has an incentive to increase its
.ice to just over this level and firm 1 will never price below C I'
Where the efficacy advantage of drug 1 outweighs its cost disadvantage the opposite
.enario to the above is expected. Firm 2 will price its product at marginal cost with drug 1
riced at an epsilon below the efficacy adjusted price. Drug 1, as shown below, will price above
s marginal cost and attract the entire market. Here P2 = C2 and L(A 1- A2 ) > C j - C2 so that
PI =c2 + L(A I - A2 )
>c2+(cl- c2)
The outcome of a two drug subgroup involving both a drug and it's generic clone depends
rimarily on the relative sizes of the differences in cost and quality between the drugs. The firm
1 the more advantageous position obtains the entire market.'
(2) Incorporation into the standard pharmaceutical market model
The incorporation of the third (generic) firm into the pharmaceutical market model is a
elatively simple process. The game between the firm with the copied drug and its generic
ompetitor leads to very low prices that will remain optimal even with the addition of another
urn. The price of the second firm will simply be their optimal reaction to the firm(s) surviving
re game between the other two firms.
The effect of competition between the original drug and its generic equivalent is unchanged
nder the addition of another firm. s The price of these two drugs in competition will fall until
either firms has an incentive to decrease its price. Taking drugs 1 and 2 to be the incumbents
nd drug 3 to be a generic copy of drug 1 the possible equilibrium situations can be identified.
7 Since L(A j-A 2 ) = C j =C2 will not generally hold one firm will limit price in equilibrium and
1US take the entire market.
S The only possible exception to this would be where the addition of another firm promotes an
.utcorne where either the generic firm or the firm making the copied drug wishes to price substantially
.elow the level required to defeat its closest competitor. Since the prices observed under generic
ompetition are far lower than those expected under the normal pharmaceutical market model it is very
mlikely that this will take place. The superior firm (given cost and quality differences) thus charges the
naximum price it can while obtaining the entire market.
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ote that drug 3, re-priced to remove the efficacy difference, is effectively identical to drug 1.9
tis allows the cases in Table 8.1 to be derived without reference to quantity functions different
those of the two drug case:
.enano Prices
PI =C.1+ L(I\,I-;t,)
P2 = R2(c.1 + L(I\, 1- k;))
P.1 =C,
PI = ci
P2=R2(c / )
P.1 = c3
Pl = ci
P2=R2(C/)
P3 = C1 - L( I\, I - I\,3 )
Quantities
f.11 = c , + L(I\, 1- kJ
f.12 = ~L 2(C, + L(I\, I - I\,3), R2(c, + L(I\, I - I\,3))
f.13 =0
f.11 = /i f.11 (c I, R2 (CI))
f.12 = f.12(CI,R2(C/))
f.13 =/if.1l(CI,R2(C/))
~L 1 = 0
~L2 = f.12(CI,R2(c / ))
~L3 =~LI(cI,R2(Cl))
able 8.1: Observed outcomes under the PMM with a difference in generic efflcacy.i''
The above table allows for a simple analysis of the market after the entry of a generic firm.
he simplicity of this model must be weighed against its unrealistic predictions. In reality we
xpect that both the original drug and the generic will gain a positive market share in
quilibrium. Where the original and generic drugs are differentiated only by a difference in
fficacy the general outcomes of the pharmaceutical market model will see only one firm
rrviving.!' The following section addresses the case of generics under the more realistic
ssurnption that allows for a difference in the safety of the generic drug. This difference in risk is
onsidered in the following section.
[I. DIFFERENCES IN RISK
9 ~L.,(P2' P.1) = f.1l(P3 + L(A1 - 1\,2)'P2) for cases where only firms 2 and 3 sell positive quantities.
10 The shared market case assumes a 50% split of demand between the original and generic drugs.
'he table uses f.1l(Pl,P2) and f.12(PI,P2), the pre-generic demand functions and R2(Pl), the reaction
unction of firm 2.
II Note that this result is highly sensitive to the assumption that individuals know the qualities they
ace from every treatment option. Where drug qualities must be discovered both firms are expected to
urvive in the market for a considerable time, even where drugs are differentiated an asymmetry in
fficacy.
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In the pharmaceutical market model quality is the difference between efficacy and an
jividual specific side effect. Drugs that generally have a smaller individual specific side effect
e characterised by a larger coefficient for 1] , the parameter of the exponential distribution side
fects are drawn from. It is assumed that the original drug has a side effect profile at least as
.od as that of the generic drug. Where a difference in efficacy exists between drugs 1] j > 1]2
here drug I is the original drug and drug 2 its generic competitor. 12
Where drugs are perfectly correlated according to the cumulative density rule.':' and have a
fference in risk the following is true
CfJj==A-Cj
CfJ2 == A- c 2
F\(CfJj)==eT1J('P/-A) ==eT)/(A-£/-A) ==e-T)/£/
F2(CfJ2) == e-T)2£2
id at an equivalent position in the CDF
F1(CfJ I ) == F2 ((P 2 )
The side effect for drug I is a constant fraction of that of drug 2. From this result general
redictions on the type of patients choosing each drug can be ascertained. Since the original drug
superior to its generic alternative it will charge a higher price in equilibrium.
For low side effects there will be very little difference between the quality of the drugs.
atients facing a low side effect for both drugs will not choose drug 1 if they must pay a
.ibstantial premium for it. Patients facing a reasonably high side effects perceive a large
ifference between the drugs and are likely to choose the original drug as the difference in quality
utweighs the extra charge it attracts.
12 The case where the two drugs have an identical side effect structure is relatively simple to
nalyse. Such a case is equivalent to a simple Bertrand game which has the result of the lower cost
rovider of the good servicing the entire market at a level of price slightly below the cost the next-best
.roducer can produce at. If both firms have the same cost structure the Bertrand game predicts that each
vill charge at marginal cost and share the market.
13
Fj(CfJij)==Fk(CfJkj) Vi,j,k'
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If the side effect of drug 2 is E then the quality of drug 1 is cP I = A - ~~ E and the quality of
'ug 2 is cP 2 = A - E. For patients at the margin the gain in utility over the no treatment level 14
om using each treatment is equal. For these patients:
LIfJ I - PI = LIfJ 2 P2
L(A-~~E)-PI L(A-E)-P2
U- L ~~ E PI = LA-LE- P2
L L I),E- ry;E=PI-P2
1)/-1)2 _ (PI-Jl,)
-1JI- E - - L-
E = _1JI_ (PI-Jl2)
1)1-1), L
Patients facing a side effect of below T)I~T), (JI/~Jl2) for drug 2 will choose to use this drug
rhereas patients facing E> ))1~1)2 (Jl/~Jl2) will choose the superior drug 1. Where these firms
rovide the only treatment options available the choices of each firm can be derived by appealing
) their profit functions. The continuation of this analysis is undertaken in Chapter 11, which
riefly deals with an alternative view of the market for pharmaceuticals.
Figure 8.2: Gains from treatment (T] I > T] 2 ).
(1) Incorporation into the standard pharmaceutical market model
The introduction of a generic drug into the pharmaceutical market model is not a simple
ask in the case where drugs are differentiated with a difference in risk rather than efficacy. The
.ase of a difference in efficacy can be compressed into two dimensions through appealing to the
14 That : Lat IS, m- .
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arne between the original drug and its generic copy. The decisions made in the risk-based case
J not simplify in the same way so a more intensive analysis must be undertaken.
In Chapter 3 the pricing decision of a producer was analysed with the aid of a diagram
lowing the location of patients and the choices they make. Previously patients were located
ccording to the qualities they faced of each drug. Geometrically location consisted of a vector
1 ':)\2. The diagram below was used to give an explanation of which patients use each drug.
. . . . .1. . .........•...•....•............
. '
D No treatment chosen
Drug I chosen
Drug 2 chosen
Figure 8.3: Treatment choice in a 2 drug setting
With the addition of another firm the vector of qualities a patient faces is now includes
rree qualities and so must be plotted in ':)\3. As with the previous case the entire case cannot be
onsidered so instead the area <p = (fIJ; > v:Vi = I ,2,3} is addressed graphically. 15 Figure 8.4 displays
re locations where consumers find that all three options are superior to taking no treatment.
15 The decision between drugs outside of <p is considered once the treatment decisions of patients
nside <p have been discussed.
CfJ3
...............•
(A] , A] ,~./) .
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(J>;{ fJ~ A )
.,' L, L, 3
( I' l l 1 Il,I; ....IL , f\, ]' IL
H ••• (A], fJ~, A3)
(P2
(A],A]/~) •
. :.
Figure 8.4: Patient locations.16
The above diagram does not include consideration of the relationship between drugs 1 and
(the original and generic drugs respectively). It has already been established that where two
rugs are perfectly predictable in terms of each other and differentiated only by a difference in
de effects then e, = ~~ £2' This restricts the locations of the drugs 1 and 2 so that they must lie
long the line displayed in the diagram below.
Figure 8.5: Related drugs (71] > 772).
Note that one point on the above line must be at (A],A]) where no side effects occur. The
econd point above takes £2 =A], so that e, = ~~ £2 = ~~ A] and the location is (1)1;11)2 A],O). When
16 Recall A] = A2 for drugs differentiated by risk alone.
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otted in the three dimensional space of Figure 8.4 this line becomes the vertical plane as
splayed on the following diagram. 17
•
CfJ 3 (1IrI12 ;( " JI~. A )
.........~ /' L, 3
.' · ··i..· ..
(P2
CfJj
( l1r112 A ~ 1'2/ 1'2/ 1'3/)III / + III 'IL, 'IL, 'IL
Figure 8.6: The f{Jr({>2 plane.
Section III established that drug 1 is preferred where the side effect of drug 2 is at least as
reat as 1111~)12 (1'1~1'2). This result segments the above plane into the two regions where each drug
r used. A side effect of drug 2 of 1111~112 (1'1~1'2) implies that these patients face a side effect for
rug 1 of .!J.l.£ = .!J.l._7]I_ (1'1-1'2) = 7]J~7]2 (PI-LP2). This preference relation is incorporated into the7]1 7]1 7]1-7]2 L
bove plane in Figure 8.7.
17 Note that instead of zero as the value for the ongm py:.. IS again used. The point
7]1;;12 AJ + ~~ ";,{,";,{,";I,) was found through the relationship £J = ~~ £2' The diagram assumes that
J7~;12 A/+ ~~ ,,;,{ > %. The counter assumption promotes a diagram where the plane cuts the qJ2 axis.
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({J3
Drugl
preferred (Je I' Je I' I'3;{J
Figure 8.7: Preference relation (drug 1 - drug 2)
Drug i is preferred to drug j if the gain in utility from using drug i is greater than that
btained from using drug i. The line representing marginal consumers between drugs i and j has
Iready been established for the case of two independent variables. IS Marginal consumers are
db he ecuati (p-pJepresente y t e equation CfJi - CfJ j ~~. In the two drug case this was represented by a line
nd but the three drug case will be a plane parallel to the axis of the drug not considered in the
airwise comparison. Using this equation the marginal consumers between firstly drugs 1 and 3,
nd then drugs 2 and 3 can be derived and displayed. Taking the case of the preference
elationship between drugs 1 and 3 we can obtain the following diagram.
IS From Chapter 5.
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({J3
·············DruK3················~·
preferred ~
Drug 1
preferred
: ; -",. .
Figure 8.8: Marginal consumers and the location plane.
Where both drugs are only just of a high enough quality to justify treatment a patient must
e indifferent between treatments. The origin of the above diagram must therefore constitute one
oint on the darker shaded plane of marginal consumers above. Assuming that A3 -AI> ([J3~[Jf),
'hen the quality of drug 1 equals A1 all patients facing a quality for drug 3 above A1 + (P3~Pf) will
hoose the latter treatment option. The contrary assumption that A3 -AI s; ([J3~[JI) would instead see
plane which cuts the top of the set <p.
The above diagram displays both the plane of marginal consumers and the plane on which
atients are located. The line in the centre of the darker (marginal consumer) plane shows the
itersection between the planes. This line is used in the following diagram to display the
references of patients over drugs 1 and 3.
( 1)/-1)2 A, +!!!.- 1'2/ 1'2/ 1'3/)11/ I 1)/ 7L, 7L, /L
+~ 1'2); 1'21"";//)
I 11/ 7~, .:7L, /L
: .,'
..~ ::.
....
..........................+ , .
Drug 3 f :
preferred to
Drug I!
(1'1L,A,j,A,j +~)
..........................(A,.JTA.J.;.A,.J) ...:.I /'
Figure 8.9: Preference relationship (drug 1 - drug 3)
Figure 8.10: Preference relationship (drug 2· drug 3)
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({J3
qJ3
The diagram showing the preferences between drugs 2 and 3 is found in much the same
way as above but can be compressed onto a single figure because of the angle the planes intersect
at. The darker plane below represents all points where patients are indifferent between drugs 2
and 3. The lighter plane again is the plane along which all consumers must fall. The darker line
here is the line of marginal consumers that will be used in the next diagram. 19
19 Note that A,3 - A, j > (1'3~1'2) has been assumed here. Were this not the case the marginal line of
consumers would cut the top edge of the set <1>.
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The previous figures have allowed the a pairwise derivation of where the marginal patients
tween drugs lie. The following diagram takes the three lines found above and plots them along
th the plane along which the consumers lie in order to display the preferences of all patients.
({J3
: ~ (0 ~
................................,i ~ .
:tv-.2:·····~
.~... \.V
-~ :
-...
. . :
.. .;.~ :..-r .
: ~
G) 1>-3>-2
G) 3>-1>-2
G) 3>-2>-1
G) 2>-3>-1
G) 2>-1>-3
G) 1>-2>-3
Figure 8.11: Preference areas in the location plane
The above figure allows the final choice of patients to be found; all consumers must lie on
Ie plane pictured in Figure 8.6. Figure 8.7 tells us that treatment choice is a decision between
.ugs 1 and 3 for patients facing cp J < AJ - fI?2 7)';,112 and a choice between drugs 2 and 3 for
atients facing cp J < AJ - Pl~P2 7)1;,7)2. Figure 8.9 and deal with each of these cases in turn and
roduce a line of marginal consumers that increases in cp J along the plane where consumers are
icated. The final preferences of patients over treatment and by location is given in Figure 8.12.
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drug 1
drug 2
drug 3D
'1 '1 '1 + P3-
tP2)(/l. l' /l. I ' /l. I
.. '
•..............................................
·······················i············:··.·
({J3
Figure 8.12: Treatment choice with a generic drug
This diagram is relatively complex but gives some intuitive results.r" Where all drugs
wuld be taken were they the only treatment option" only the best drug available is chosen.
)rug 2 is assumed to be a generic copy of drug 1 and charges a cheaper price. This cheaper price
leans that drug 2 is preferred to drug 1 by those patients not suffering a large adverse effect
rom switching drugs. Where the qualities of drugs 1 and 2 are good but drug 3 is better (upper
ight hand of patient plane) drug 3 is selected.
Where the quality of drugs 1 and 2 are good and drug 3 is reasonable (lower right hand of
.atient plane) drug 2 is chosen. Here the side effects under both drug 1 and drug 2 are small and
a it is not worth paying extra for drug 1.
20 For the purpose of these stylised results 'good' will be taken to mean drugs close to the relevant
1';
Li 'Reasonable' will be taken to mean drugs close to (but above) the relevant T
21 That is, <fJ=(<fJj.<fJ2,<fJ3)E<!>.
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By assumption drug 3 is generally better than both drug 1 and drug 2 (since ,?c., -AI> (flJ~PI)
id A3 -A, > (flJ~/}2»). Where the quality of drugs 1,2 and 3 are close to their respective A values
'ug 3 is generally chosen. Where the qualities of drugs 2 and 3 are only a small distance above
e relevant 'i value drug 1 is typically chosen. Here drug 2 is reasonably marginal so that drug
has a large side effect corresponding to it here. Because of the relationship between drugs 1
id 2 where drug 2 has a reasonably marginal worth drug 1 is still of a good quality. When drugs
and 3 are reasonably marginal drug 1 is typically good and so is chosen.
For patients outside the set <p the optimal treatment choice will be as follows. 22 For patients
icing C(J, ::; 'i ' C(J 2 ::; 'i and C(J 3 ::; Ii' : no worthwhile treatment options are available. For patients
icing C(J, ::; 'i ' C(J 2 ::; 'i and C(J 3 > Ii' : drug 3 is chosen since it is the only worthwhile treatment
ption. For patients facing C(J 1 > 'i ' C(J2::; 'i and C(J3::; Ii' : drug 1 is chosen since it is the only
'orthwhile treatment option. For patients facing C(J, > 'i ' C(J2 > 'i and C(J 3 ::; 'i : drug 3 is not a
'orthwhile treatment. Using Figure 8.7 drug 1 is chosen since it is better choice for low quality
I F · . faci fli P2 d P, • d l' h h (PI-fl,)a ues. OI patients acmg C(J 1> L' C(J2 S L an C(J3 >L' rug IS c osen were C(J 1> C(J 3 +-L---
rd drug 3 where C(J 1 ~ C(J 3 + (P/~PJ) •
Although by no means trivial Figure 8.12 does not accurately portray the difficulty of
mulating the choices made by each party since it relies on a series of assumptions over the
.lative values of consumer prices for each firm. 23 With different assumptions the above
iagram will look quite different with respect to its intercepts with the edge of the set
={C(Ji > v: Vi = 1,2,3}.
In the early part of this thesis Mathematica was used to estimate the basic pharmaceutical
iarket model. The complexity of the problem precluded the initial aim of finding a closed-form
1gebraic solution for price since Mathematica required multiple 'If' statements in order to
22 Since C(J 1 > C(J2 for all patients cases where C(J2 > 'i and C(J 1 S Ii are impossible and hence ignored
1 the analysis.
23 These assumptions have been placed in footnotes at appropriate points.
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/aluate even simple integrals including the cumulative density function.i" This was a result of
ills to the cumulative density function outside its normal range (above A). As a result of this
-oblem Microsoft Excel has been used for the majority of the thesis since it deals faster with the
.·oblem of 'If' statements in calculation and the presentation of results.i"
To solve problems in Microsoft Excel requires the use of the 'Goal Seek' function which
rlves the first order conditions of each firm numerically. The problem faced here in calculating
particularly complex case for three firms is that there is no guarantee of finding convergence
-ithin an acceptable time-frame since three variables must be solved.r? The piecewise nature of
valuating quantity in the above makes it too difficult to use Mathematica where first order
onditions could ordinarily be solved algebraically.
While a difference in risk between the patented and genenc drugs is a more realistic
.amework to evaluate the effects of patent expiration than a difference in efficacy it is not
easible to use it. 27 The difference in efficacy framework will be used from this point when
eferring to generics in a framework with at least two independent drugs.
V. EFFECTIVE PATENT LIFE
The effective patent life of a drug is defined as the residual time available for a firm to
ecoup development costs without threat of generic entry after product development, the
atisfaction of regulatory requirements and finally registration of the drug. It has been estimated
24 Mathematica does not differentiate any function including an 'If' statement, causing a serious
.roblem in computation.
25 Except in the case of finding consumer surplus approximations where, due to the algebraic
omplexity of the required integral and a lack of 'If' statements, Mathematica is used.
26 A three variable case should present few problems in the cases where either three independent or
hree totally correlated distributions are concerned. It is the mixture of totally correlated and non
:orrelated distributions that cause problems here.
27 The difference in risk framework would allow for both firms to survive in the long term after
latent entry.
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.at under New Zealand's existing patent system effective patent life will fall to only 5.98 years
the year 2000 and that this figure will decrease further over time."
New Zealand, as a small nation, faces the temptation to allow this erOSIOn of patent
.otection. The smaller is patent life the sooner New Zealand has access to cheaper generic
rugs which reduces subsidy costs in New Zealand. Two schools of thought exist on the
nportance of effective patent life to small nations.
Johnston and Zeckhauser represent the first of these factions. They suggest that one of the
ivourable points behind the scheme the Australian government implemented in the 1980' s was
rat it allowed for the reduction of profits to the pharmaceutical industry. This obviously
orresponds to a fall in subsidy costs and an increase in consumer surplus. Geographic obscurity
I1d the relatively small size of the Australian market (on a global scale) was thought to allow
.ustralia to implement this scheme without attracting significant interest from the global
harmaceutical industry. Australia, it was suggested, was able to free ride on drug research by
sing the scheme outlined in Chapter 7.
Such a scheme begs that a few questions be answered. Would the pharmaceutical industry
ctually be unaware of the nature of the Australian scheme and if so would they react? It would
ppear that pharmaceutical firms must take attempts to free ride on research seriously. By
gnoring the actions of the Australian government the pharmaceutical industry runs a serious risk
f appearing weak to other small nations who would look to free ride on drug research in much
.ie same way. Although the actions of one small nation are unlikely to significantly alter the
rofits of any multinational drug company it is unlikely that this will hold for actions of several
I' all such nations. The lost profits firms accept by not entering nations who seek to free ride on
rug research may be outweighed by the risk of appearing weak to other small nations eager to
educe their drug bill. Remaining ignorant of the structures countries have in place does not
ppear to be optimal for pharmaceutical companies.
The other major question a desire to free ride raises regards time inconsistency. All nations
lesire advances in pharmaceuticals but these developments are costly. If nations decide now not
28 Parker, J. (1997) Pharmaceutical Patent Reform in New Zealand. New Zealand Economic
"apers 31(1):85-91.
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fund the pharmaceutical industry for the research and development that has gone into their
.oducts then further research becomes unlikely.
John Parker29 takes the alternative view that, although tempting, a nation is better to accept
at it must contribute to the research and development costs of the pharmaceutical industry.
riling to do so, he argues, would have a myriad of negative effects. The pharmaceutical
dustry is unlikely to invest in countries where it perceives that it will be treated badly which
lay account for some of drop in investment in New Zealand by drug companies.
Firms may delay the introduction of drugs and/or demand higher prices m order to
.mvince other nations that attempts to free ride will not be tolerated.30 This would quickly
.duce the quality of available treatments in free-riding countries compared to those that do not
.id serve as a powerful deterrent since patients will demand that governments make sure such
eatments are available.
Trade sanctions are also possible if the government is perceived not to allow an acceptable
.vel of protection for intellectual property. New Zealand was threatened with such sanctions in
991 in order to force modification of the Patents Act 1953?J Parker argues that there are
efinite risks in not allowing for significant protection of the pharmaceutical industry through the
atent system. The relatively low effective patent life in New Zealand would suggest that the
uth of these claims may soon be known.
If the government finds that contributing to research and development is a prerequisite for a
esponsible pharmaceutical system the results of the previous chapter would surely change.
'hese results of Chapter 7 were generated under the JZ scheme which accepts and supports free
[ding. Giving additional funds to firms or using option one of the Johnston and Zeckhauser
eport would achieve the aim of giving a credible commitment to intellectual property in the area
29 Parker, J. (1991) Pharmaceutical Patents in New Zealand. Auckland, NZ, IMS(NZ) Ltd. 161p.
30 Here Parker refers to the 1992 Ministry of Commerce publication Reform of the Patent Act
953: proposed recommendations.
31 The US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act allows the United States to place sanctions on
ountries who are judged not to provide adequate protection for intellectual property. In 1991 New
'ealand was placed on the watch list and the following year pressure from the United States Trade
~epresentative led to a repeal of a section of the Patents Act 1953. (see Baker, A. Pharmaceuticals fight
lot the first New Zealand has faced. National Business Review. 24 April 1997. p.20)
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fund the pharmaceutical industry for the research and development that has gone into their
xlucts then further research becomes unlikely.
John Parker29 takes the alternative view that, although tempting, a nation is better to accept
rt it must contribute to the research and development costs of the pharmaceutical industry.
iling to do so, he argues, would have a myriad of negative effects. The pharmaceutical
:lustry is unlikely to invest in countries where it perceives that it will be treated badly which
ly account for some of drop in investment in New Zealand by drug companies.
Firms may delay the introduction of drugs and/or demand higher prices III order to
nvince other nations that attempts to free ride will not be tolerated.i'' This would quickly
duce the quality of available treatments in free-riding countries compared to those that do not
d serve as a powerful deterrent since patients will demand that governments make sure such
.atments are available.
Trade sanctions are also possible if the government is perceived not to allow an acceptable
vel of protection for intellectual property. New Zealand was threatened with such sanctions in
)91 in order to force modification of the Patents Act 1953.3' Parker argues that there are
.finite risks in not allowing for significant protection of the pharmaceutical industry through the
itent system. The relatively low effective patent life in New Zealand would suggest that the
rth of these claims may soon be known.
If the government finds that contributing to research and development is a prerequisite for a
sponsible pharmaceutical system the results of the previous chapter would surely change.
nese results of Chapter 7 were generated under the JZ scheme which accepts and supports free
jingo Giving additional funds to firms or using option one of the Johnston and Zeckhauser
port would achieve the aim of giving a credible commitment to intellectual property in the area
29 Parker, J. (1991) Pharmaceutical Patents in New Zealand. Auckland, NZ, IMS(NZ) Ltd. 161p.
30 Here Parker refers to the 1992 Ministry of Commerce publication Reform of the Patent Act
JS3: proposed recommendations.
31 The US Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act allows the United States to place sanctions on
iuntries who are judged not to provide adequate protection for intellectual property. In 1991 New
ealand was placed on the watch list and the following year pressure from the United States Trade
epresentative led to a repeal of a section of the Patents Act 1953. (see Baker, A. Pharmaceuticals fight
)t the first New Zealand has faced. National Business Review. 24 April 1997. p.20)
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f pharmaceuticals. Note that such a JZ scheme giving full duopoly profits to firms would still
e superior to the unrestricted form of reference pricing addressed in Chapter 6 which gave far
reater profits to pharmaceutical companies than would have been received in the absence of
ubsidisation.
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CHAPTER 9
DELAYS IN BARGAINING
Bargaining games are defined as situations where two or more parties must agree on the
llocation of a set gain from trade. In an economic context the gain from trade is typically the
ifference between the valuations of the buyer and seller of an item of value. For the
xchange of ownership to occur both parties must agree on the price the seller receives. Both
re type of model used and the knowledge each party brings into negotiations is of vital
onsequence in predicting how long negotiations will last.
DELAYS IN COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
Cooperative models of bargaining place the buyer and seller at a negotiating table and
ttempt to predict the outcome of bargaining by restricting possible solutions to those
atisfying conditions deemed desirable. The actual bargaining procedure is not defined but is
xpected to promote outcomes satisfying these pre-defined axioms. Nash l defined four
xioms a solution should exhibit:
(i) Affine transformations of utility shall not alter the expected outcomes tinvariance to
quivalent utility representations).
(ii) If both players are identical in every respect each player shall receive the same
rtility at the expected outcomes (symmetry).
(iii) Allocations may be discarded from the game so long as the solution to the original
rame is not removed and the reduced game shall retain the same solution as the original
independence of irrelevant alternatives).
(iv) Players shall never agree on a Pareto inefficient outcome.
Osborne and Rubinstein analyse this final axiom and reach the following conclusion:
"If we reinterpret each [possible agreement] as a pair consisting of a physical
agreement and the time at which this agreement is reached, and we assume that
I Nash, J.(1953) Two-Person Cooperative Games. Econometrica 21:128-140.
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resources are consumed by the bargaining process, then [the Pareto optimality axiom]
implies that agreement is reached instantly.t"
The four axioms define a unique outcome termed the Nash Bargaining Solution. This
.utcome is achieved immediately and relies on either the foreknowledge or full and accurate
lisclosure of all relevant information. Where pertinent information is not known by all parties
:ooperative bargaining theory is not applicable as it does not address the incentives firms have
o misrepresent their position. By contrast, non-cooperative theory accounts for this incentive
vhen predicting the outcome of the bargaining process.
1. DELAYS IN NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
Non-cooperative game theory imposes several standard restrictions on the preferences
ind positions of each player.
(i) Disagreement (or alternatively a breakdown 10 bargaining) IS assumed to be the
vorst possible outcome for every player.
(ii) Utility is generally assumed to increase in the share of 'pie' received.
(iii) Utility is assumed to decrease in the time to agreement, generally as a result of
:liscounting or the imposition of a constant delay cost?
(iv) that if the same utility is offered to a player both today and in a future period the
)layer will take the utility today
Finite non-cooperative games fall in two distinct categories:" those in which all
pertinent information is known by all parties (complete information) and those in which some
2 Osborne, M. and Rubinstein, A. (1990) Bargaining and Markets. San Diego, CA., Academic
Press, Inc. p 11-13. The analysis by Osborne and Rubinstein may be suspect in that it analyses the
prospects for delay within the entirely static framework of Nash's model. If, for example, the
disagreement point changes over time there appears to be room for some delay. Here backwards
induction may however still provide a solution without delay but it is unlikely to be the Nash
bargaining solution for the static game taken at time zero.
3 Normally discounting is preferred since it provides more interesting results. Bargaining with
constant costs to delay may promote an outcome of attrition where each party waits until it can
ascertain that it has a greater cost to delay than its opposition. Once such a conclusion has been
reached the player in question will relinquish any remaining surplus to their opposition.
4 Only models with a finite time period are considered since patents provide only limited protection
against generics. The assumptions made in the previous chapter imply that on generic entry the firm
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Jormation is private (incomplete information). The likelihood and meaning of delay in the
mtext of each of these games differ.
(1) Non-cooperative games of complete information
In non-cooperative games of complete information a single subgame perfect equilibrium
xists in which agreement is reached without delay." Backwards induction allows the parties
) ascertain this equilibrium in the first period, promoting an efficient outcome in the sense
iat agreement is reached without delay.
A simple example of such a game follows: suppose two players are involved in a three
eriod game where Player 1 proposes an initial division of $1 between the players. Player 2
lay either accept this allocation or counter with a second allocation. If Player 2 opts for the
itter time elapses, decreasing the size of the available surplus. If play reaches the second
eriod Player 1 must decide whether or not to accept Player 2's offer or make a final take-it-
r-leave-it offer with a further reduced pie.
The application of backwards induction to this game presents an obvious solution. Let 8
,e a discount factor common to both parties. Suppose further that the game reaches the final
ieriod so that 82 is available. As long as Player 1 offers Player 2 some £ > 0 she knows that
'layer 2 will accept. The expected payoff to Player 1 of rejecting an offer in the second
ieriod is then approximately 82 .
In the second period Player 2 must offer Player 1 at least 82 for the offer to be accepted.
rhe maximum surplus available to Player 2 is then 8 - 82. In the first period $1 is available for
livision between the players. Player 1, for the offer to be acceptable, must give 8 - 82 to
)layer 2. The maximum amount Player 1 may take for herself is then 1 - 8 + 82. The
-quilibrium strategies for both players are given below.
s effectively removed from the market by the process of Bertrand competition. The firm faces a
imited time horizon in decision making and so only finite games are applicable..
5 Under alternating offers. Note that other equilibria will typically exist but are not subgame
oerfect. As these alternative outcomes are not based on credible threats by all parties they are
.gnored.
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Where payoffs are denoted (x, y):
Player I
1st period Offer (I - 8 + 82, 8 _( 2)
2"d period Accept all offers with x ;:: 82
3rd period Offer (82, 0)
Player 2
Accept all offers with y ;:: 8 - 82
Offer (82, 8 - ( 2)
Accept all offers with y ;::0
Table 9.1: Equilibrium strategies in the complete information game.
In equilibrium agreement occurs in the first period with the allocation (l - 8 + 82, 8 - 82) .
Backwards induction allows each player to extrapolate into future periods and examine
le equilibrium actions they, and others, would take if the opportunity arises. Each player
lakes current decisions based, in part, on their knowledge of the payoff the other player faces
1 each circumstance. In games of incomplete information there is no guarantee that each
layer will know the payoffs of the other players and cannot always ascertain the choices
tade by the other players in the future. Backwards induction thus loses its power when
ertinent information is not available to all players.
In complete information games delay is a definite source of inefficiency because it
ecreases the available gains from trade. Delay here serves no worthwhile purpose because
11 information is known in each period of time and so attempts at deception or opportunism
vill inevitably be both unsuccessful and wasteful.
(2) Non-cooperative games of incomplete information.
As mentioned above the process of backwards induction does not give satisfactory
iredictions where the information players hold about other players is incomplete. It has been
ugued that in this type of game delay takes on a meaning above that of simply a potential
ource of inefficiency. Kennan and Wilson (KW) argue that:"
An alternative hypothesis, however, is that delays and failures to agree are inefficient
ex post only from the privileged view of hindsight. The substance of this hypothesis is
that bargaining is substantially a process of communication necessitated by initial
differences in the information known to the parties. Thus, delay may be required to
6 Kennan, J. and Wilson, R. (1993) Bargaining with private information. Journal of Economic
'Lterature 31(1):45-104.
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convey private information credibly. For instance, willingness to endure a strike might
be the only convincing evidence that the firm is unable to pay a high wage.
A buyer can always assert that the value he places on an item is low in order to pay a
rialler amount for it. Regardless of their true value every buyer has this incentive and so
-oordingly claims the lowest possible value. The seller will take none of these claims
redibly unless the buyer can reliably show their true valuation. Since cheap assertions of
ieir value are not convincing proof more concrete action is required. Two alternative models
f information revelation have been suggested; screening (price discriminatory) models and
ignalling.' It must be noted that the "screening" and "signalling" labels have been used to
escribe different models by various authors. Since much of this discussion is inspired by
:W their definitions are used here. These definitions focus on the procedures motivating
ach type of equilibrium. KW define screening equilibria as equilibria that arise where:"
one or both parties make offers at prescribed intervals, so that rejection of an offer
entails an appreciable cost of delay until another offer can be made. The [seller's] price
discrimination exploits this feature by, in effect, including with each offer to the firm
the admonition to remember that rejecting the offer entails a costly wait before a better
offer will be forthcoming
Signalling equilibria are also defined in the same way:"
Signalling equilibria arise when either party can delay arbitrarily long before
responding to an offer, thus enabling the length of the delay to act as a signal.
The distinction between screening and signalling models arises through the differing
.tructures each model has with respect to time and delay. In a signalling model delays are
letermined endogenously with each party waiting before responding to an offer and using this
ength of delay as a credible signal to their true value. Signalling models treat time as a
.ontinuous variable, and so use continuous discounting. In a screening model the delay period
s typically denominated in fixed units with at least one party making offers at the endpoints
)f each period. Standard screening models approach discounting with the use of discrete
Iiscount factor.
7 A third 'type' of model proposed by Kennan and Wilson, where each player has an additive
linear cost of delay, falls into the same general category of signalling since bargaining continues until
it has been signalled that a player's own cost of delay has been signalled to fall above that of their
cornpetitorts).
8 Kennan, J. and Wilson, R. (1993) P 56.
9 Kennan, J. and Wilson, R. (1993) P 56.
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(a] Screening
A screening equilibrium involves a situation where the non-informed party (seller)
ffers a sequence of decreasing prices over time. It is generally assumed that the seller cannot
eliably commit to a sequence of prices so that the price offered in each period is a result of an
ptimisation in that period. High value buyers are more impatient to receive the good than
»wer value buyers and so are willing to pay a higher price for it. The buyer chooses the first
rice that gives it a positive utility greater than that expected were it to wait for the next
eriod. The actions of the non-informed party allow the buyers to reveal their type by their
ctions.
The original research on screening equilibria did not focus on a bargaining model but
nstead as a theory to explain durable goods pricing. In her 1982 paper Nancy Stokey
xplored the problem of how a monopolist would release quantity to the market over time. By
Ising a continuous time frame she showed that the only perfect rational expectations
quilibrium involves releasing the full market quantity at price equal marginal cost in the first
.eriod. Such a perfect rational expectations equilibrium has the following properties: 10
A perfect rational expectations equilibrium has the following properties:
CD Each contingent sales strategy maximises the present discounted value of profits,
given the relevant initial condition for the stock and given buyers' expectation
functions, and
CD given any initial level of the stock at any date, buyer's expectations are fulfilled along
the realised path of production from that date on.
In the more interesting case of positive period lengths she showed that equilibria exist
vith positive quantity releases in each period until the market is saturated. The model was
urther analysed by Sanford Grossman and Motty Perry (1986)11, Joel Sobel and Ichiro
I'akahasi (1983)12 and Faruk Gul, Hugo Sonnenschein and Robert Wilson (1986)13. These
10 Stokey, N. (1981) Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing. Bell Journal of
Economics 12(1): 112-128.
II Grossman, S. and Perry, M. (1986) Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information.
lournal of Economic Theory 39(1) pp. 120-154.
12 Sobel, J. and Takahashi, 1. (1983) A Multistage Model of Bargaining. Review of Economic
Studies 50(3):411-426.
13 Gul, F. and others. (1986) Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture.
Iournal ofEconomic Theory 39(1):155-190.
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apers analysed the validity of the Coase conjecture. This conjecture addressed the price of
-jecting an offer from a durable goods monopolist, asserting that consumers would accept
nly the lowest valuation and wait until this valuation was realised before purchasing
nything. The monopolist would choose to saturate the market in equilibrium rather than
-lease their product gradually.
KW use the following model as a example of the screening equilibrium concept. Delay
osts are incorporated into a model of wage negotiation. The firm is placed in the position of
nowing the gain from trade, v, which is the benefit to the firm of employing union labour
bove the market wage rate. The union does not know the gain from trade but accurately
onjectures that it is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
If the parties agree on a premium p, the union receives a payoff of 8 11 where the nth offer
~ accepted. Given such a settlement the firm receives [v-p] 8 IJ in profits. This game has a
imple but non-unique equilibrium'? where the firm accepts the first offer that is not more
han f3v, and the union offers a premium p = av where history denotes that the buyer's
'aluation is at most v.
Initially v=1 and the first offer the union makes is p = ex which is accepted by all firms
vith valuations above %. Since v=%' the offer made is p =C1/fJ which is accepted by
emaining firms with a valuation above C1jpz. The nth offer is p = C1'/tJ"-J which is accepted by
III firms with valuations between (%)" and (%)',-1. The derivation of the parameters ex and f3
s omitted but it can be shown that a = ~ and f3 =~. It is interesting to observe the
1+,,1-8
iredicted behaviour as the discount period falls:
(i) (Trivially) the discount rate approaches 1.
(ii) Both ex and f3 tend towards zero. For small period lengths the union offers only a
small portion of vwith very firms accepting the offer since both parameters are small.
(iii) The average number of periods to an agreement increases.
(iv) The expected time to agreement falls to zero (the average number of periods
increases more slowly than period length).
(v) The offer accepted falls to zero.
14 Non-uniqueness is a common problem in these models. Non-uniqueness is often be
illeviated by the use of specific refinements such as stationarity.
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The final point is the crux of the Coase conjecture. If offers are made continuously the
[lion cannot credibly demand a premium on its labour. The firm, on perception of an offer
oove zero will (costlessly) wait until the next period in order to obtain a lower premium.
ince the union attracts no firms when offering a positive premium it will not do so. If the
'oase conjecture is applicable in the pharmaceutical market model it carries with it an
nportant implication. Here, if the agency is not able to impose a positive delay length, in any
erfect equilibrium consistent with rational expectations the drug agency will pay an amount
.ifficient to compensate the highest possible cost provider of the pharmaceutical immediately
nd no delay will eventuate.
(b) Signalling
The second concept addressed here to model information revelation is signalling. The
oncept of a signalling equilibrium reverses the roles of each party from those observed in a
creening equilibrium as far as information revelation is concerned. Signalling equilibria
llow the informed party to credibly signal the non-informed party by the use of delay. Using
he firm/union framework above: after an offer by the union the firm may decide how long to
lelay before accepting the offer or making a counter-offer. The length of delay selected
eveals the type of the firm and is represented by the delay function t(v). In an equilibrium this
ignal must be credible and accurate and so the union infers that, given a signal of t, the value
nust be no more than vet), the inverse of t(v).
The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of a game where both parties have the same
lisagreement payoff sees the surplus shared equally between the parties. This result is 'used to
nedict the outcome of negotiations between the firm and the union once the value of the
inion labour is revealed. Here half the value of the union labour above the market wage
iccrues to each party. Where the interest rate l 5 is r the firm faces the utility function:
max[ ]U(v,r)= v-tv(t) «»,
t
15 F di "
- or iscountmg purposes.
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In an equilibrium the optimal choice of t must be t(v). Suppose now that the value of v
ills in the range [0, a]. The optimality of tallows v(t) to be derived in the following way:
U(v,r) = m;lX[v-tv(t)]e-rt
0= _rve- rt +.lrv(t)e-rt _.l.!.U:. e- rr2 2 lit
0= rv(t) + liv
lit
v(t) = Ae-rt
nd at t=O, yeO) = A so that v(t) = v(O)e-rt •
The value v(O) corresponds to the maximum available gain since this firm can not gain
'y signalling at a positive time in equilibrium." This restriction allows the final form of the
mplied value function to be found so that vet) = ae-rr. 17
This example shows the general steps required to find a signalling equilibrium. Under a
ignalling equilibrium a perfect information solution concept is adopted with payoffs
.ttributed to each party according to this solution. In the example above this solution was the
-.JBS where each party had the same disagreement payoff. The signalling equilibrium allows
he informed party to wait for a sufficient period of time to allow them to signal their true
ype.
A payoff function is defined with the aid of the solution concept. In the above case the
iayoff to a firm with costs v in the perfect information case is tv. If a firm signals at time t it
s instantly assumed that this firm is of type v(t) and so receives tv(t), the payoff a firm with
ype v(t) would receive in the perfect information case. The firm, as the informed party,
observes v(t) and decides when it will signal. This choice is represented by the expansion of
he first order condition of the firm's utility function above.
Now for the union to wish to retain the same offer function v(t) the signals given by the
.irms must be credible. A firm with value v must find it optimal to signal at time t* where
16 Since a firm with a marginal cost of zero must signal first. If this firm signals after a delay
:hen all firms must wait to credibly signal costs which decreases payoffs to all possible firms without
oenefiting any individual firm. In equilibrium a firm with a marginal cost of zero signals at time zero
III order to prevent wasteful delay.
17 rt /v(t)=ae- ,lnv=lna-rtlne, so t(v)=ln-;;- r.
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t') == v . This restriction is imposed on the first order condition of the firm. The resulting
ifferential equation is solved and an appropriate boundary condition applied to define the
merion v(t). This function is optimal in all cases where the perfect information solution is
ie NBS and all firms have identical disagreement positions.
A sequence of steps very close to those given above is performed in Section IV when
1e signalling framework is modified for use in the pharmaceutical market.
[1. SCREENING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
The proposed model of Johnston and Zeckhauser is based on a single period, complete
nformation setting. The move to a multi-period, incomplete information setting allows a
ignificant degree of freedom in the creation of the model used. The information each party
las at their disposal, bargaining rules and the possible cost structure of firms must be defined
.efore any analysis of screening equilibria in the pharmaceutical market is possible.
Both the pharmaceutical agency and drug companies are assumed to have complete
nformation over the characteristics of all relevant pharmaceuticals in the marketplace. While
he pharmaceutical companies will know the marginal cost of their product there is
:onsiderable doubt as to whether the subsidising agency will. It is assumed that the marginal
:ost of a drug is distributed uniformly along an interval bounded below by zero. A marginal
.ost of 2 has been assumed for the upper bound of this interval. Both the agency and firms are
issumed to share a common discount factor [5=e rL'> where r is the interest rate and ~ is the
ieriod length.
A screening equilibrium in the pharmaceutical market model will be characterised by
he agency making a series of subsidy offers of the form: at time t the agency suggests a
oroducer price P, in exchange for an agreement to price at a consumer price p~. A subsidy of
:r.:p;) is provided by the agency on f1(pn units of the drug, which is the amount purchased
)y patients at the relevant consumer price. The drug companies must decide if and when to
accept subsidisation on these terms. If the company declines the offer of subsidisation it must
wait until the next period to observe the new offer. In this time profit will still occur for the
143
on-subsidised drug. Here the price charged by the producer is p which attracts custom of {i.
'hese prices are known by the agency since they are observed pre-subsidisation.
Generics are expected to enter the market after time T when the patent expires." It is
xpected that the generic and innovative firms will engage in undercutting until the generic
revails."
A generic firm has to compete firm with marginal cost c accepting subsidisation at time
accepts a price Pr in return for charging at p;'. The simplest version of this model sees p;~]
onstant over t. Setting p~+] equal to 0 firms face profits 01'20
1_8 T+r- r
-1-_-8-(Pr -c),u(O).
If the firm was to instead reject the offer and accept the next period's offer it receives
8 _s"":'
eft - c)Ji + (Pr+ ] - c),u(O).1-8
This term is not the profit accruing to a firm that rejects Pr but rather the profit accruing
o a firm who accepts Pr+1 in the following period. Firms close to the marginal firm are
xpected to accept subsidisation in the following period if they do not do so the current one.
For these firms the expression above is equal to the profits they gain if they choose to
eject the current offer. For the marginal firm these profits are equal. Solving the above
.xpressions for the marginal firm's costs, c" , the following can be derived.
* Pr,u(O)-p,u
c = -'---'-'-----,::::_'_
,u(O)- ,u
18 The section on the sensitivity of results includes a scenario with a positive delay before
~eneric entry.
19 It is acknowledged that in reality the generic does not defeat the innovative firm. Chapter 8
~ives the reasons for the choice of assumptions leading to this unrealistic outcome. These assumption
:hould not affect the validity of the results obtained in this thesis as (1) events beyond generic entry
Ire heavily discounted by firms and (2) the JZ scheme can be engineered to allow for modification of
.ubsidies at the time of generic entry. Several studies has suggested that both firms remain in the
narket with the generic pricing below the level previously seen and the innovator increasing its price
.lightly (see Frank, R. and Salkever, D. (1992) Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market for
:>harmaceuticals. Southern Economic Journal 59(2): 165-179).
20 Assuming, for the moment, that fixed costs are zero. See Appendix 9.1 for derivation.
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Firms that have not previously accepted subsidisation and have marginal costs below c"
rill now join. Firms with marginal costs above c" prefer the next period's offer to the current
ne and so wait until the following period.
The drug agency is assumed to place a value, V, on the subsidisation of the
harmaceutical commensurate with its characteristics. A positive multiple of the increased
onsumer surplus resulting from subsidisation is a relatively natural assumption for this value
ince superior drugs should be more desirable for the agency, all other things being equal.
~ach period the agency performs the following maximisation:
Because the definition of CI * includes a reference to the following period's price any
quilibrium must be solved recursively. Microsoft Excel was used to set up the system of
quations which were then solved, period by period, until the values of PI converged in every
,eriod.2I These estimations were not particularly fruitful however since they resulted in
nultiple equilibria. This is not uncommon with screening equilibria and is often alleviated by
he use of a restriction that strategies must be stationary." Stationary strategies have the
iroperty that the prescribed actions depend on neither past experience nor the time period.
Vhile a case can be made for the former of these restrictions the latter makes very little sense
.ince a firm with cost c will choose to accept subsidisation if and only if23
_ 1-8 J.1 8_8 T- t J.1(P~+1)
P >c+(p-c) + (p -c)-'---"'-'-'-''-'-
I 1_8T- t J.1(p~) 1_8T- t t+1 J.1(pn
The above strategy is dependant on the time period since J.1(p:), J.1(P:~1)' Pt+I' and the
liscounting terms all potentially change with t. Without the restriction of stationary strategies
he problem of multiple equilibria appears not to have a simple solution. Adding this problem
21 Using the Solver algorithm.
22 For example Gul, F and others (1986) use stationarity to obtain a unique equilibrium in the
.ituation where an agreement to trade is always optimal.
23 See Appendix 9.2.
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. the length of time taken for convergence for even relatively small (100 period) models and
e screening equilibrium concept begins to look particularly unappealing.f"
Of more concern than this problem is the inability of the screening model to incorporate
len simple strategic behaviour into the bargaining mechanism. Since producer prices are
efined endogenously the only pieces of information that the screening model takes from the
~ framework is the relationship between revealed cost and consumer price. The screening
quivalent of the JZ scheme with zero prices is then simply the screening problem where
onsurner prices are zero. Likewise under the marginal cost framework the screening
quivalent of the JZ scheme is simply the screening problem where charging the average cost
f a firms who optimally choose to join the scheme in that period.
The screening mechanism only uses the definition of consumer prices from the perfect
iformation version of the JZ model. Any scheme that gives the same consumer prices to the
~reening mechanism will have exactly the same results as the JZ model. The strategic
.rength of option four of the JZ scheme (in that it attempts to create a prisoner's dilemma
ame) is ignored and the result obtained is exactly the same as any other option where both
rms are subsidised and set zero consumer prices. Screening equilibria appear to render
npossible any strategic behaviour beyond the price discrimination of the uninformed party.
Analysis of different schemes under a screening framework becomes trivial as, unless
onsumer prices differ between the alternative schemes or some restriction is placed on
quilibria, all schemes promote exactly the same outcome.
V. SIGNALLING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
The model used here for signalling in the pharmaceutical market is very similar to the
xample of a signalling model found above. Here the drug companies credibly signal their
aarginal costs through the use of delay.25 As with the signalling example of Section II 2b the
24 Time to convergence varied from approximately 15 minutes for models with 10 periods to
atent expiration to over 15 hours for some models with 100 periods to expiration.
25 There is a possibility that the signalled cost may in practice be marginal production cost plus
n expectation of foregone profits in overseas markets due to the lowering of international price
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the length of time taken for convergence for even relatively small (l00 period) models and
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Of more concern than this problem is the inability of the screening model to incorporate
len simple strategic behaviour into the bargaining mechanism. Since producer prices are
efined endogenously the only pieces of information that the screening model takes from the
~ framework is the relationship between revealed cost and consumer price. The screening
:tuivalent of the JZ scheme with zero prices is then simply the screening problem where
.msumer prices are zero. Likewise under the marginal cost framework the screening
:tuivalent of the JZ scheme is simply the screening problem where charging the average cost
f a firms who optimally choose to join the scheme in that period.
The screening mechanism only uses the definition of consumer prices from the perfect
iforrnation version of the JZ model. Any scheme that gives the same consumer prices to the
.reening mechanism will have exactly the same results as the JZ model. The strategic
.rength of option four of the JZ scheme (in that it attempts to create a prisoner's dilemma
arne) is ignored and the result obtained is exactly the same as any other option where both
rms are subsidised and set zero consumer prices. Screening equilibria appear to render
npossible any strategic behaviour beyond the price discrimination of the uninformed party.
Analysis of different schemes under a screening framework becomes trivial as, unless
onsumer prices differ between the alternative schemes or some restriction is placed on
quilibria, all schemes promote exactly the same outcome.
V. SIGNALLING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET
The model used here for signalling in the pharmaceutical market is very similar to the
xample of a signalling model found above. Here the drug companies credibly signal their
narginal costs through the use of delay.25 As with the signalling example of Section IT 2b the
24 Time to convergence varied from approximately 15 minutes for models with 10 periods to
latent expiration to over 15 hours for some models with 100 periods to expiration.
25 There is a possibility that the signalled cost may in practice be marginal production cost plus
n expectation of foregone profits in overseas markets due to the lowering of international price
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ignal the non-informed party (the subsidisation agency) receives is the time of delay, which
ere is a function of the marginal cost of the firm. The inverse of this delay function, t(c) will
e denoted c(t) and represents the inference of the agency as to the minimum marginal cost of
re firm when a delay of time t is observed. In equilibrium this signal must be both credible
nd accurate.
Price is determined in a manner consistent with the model used by Johnston and
'eckhauscr. Once the agency has identified the costs of the firm through the signal it will
.ffer it a deal such that the firm is indifferent between accepting subsidisation or remaining
.nsubsidised. If a firm accepts subsidisation at time t it receives a price based on the revealed
ost of the firm. 26 If the firm accepts subsidisation it agrees to price at a patient price of
J'(t)and receive p(t)-p'(t) in subsidies. If a firm agrees to subsidisation at time t it thus
eceives a price per unit of p(t). Patients face a price of p' (t) and so demand p(p' (t)). If a
irrn with marginal cost c accepts subsidisation it makes a profit of (p(t)-e)~L(p'(t)).
If a firm declines subsidisation it charges a price p and attracts a quantity -;i= pep). The
lefinition of p is best addressed at a later stage once the strategic effects of this choice are
.nown. A firm with marginal cost c makes a profit of (p c)-;i. In equilibrium a signal of t
mplies a (correct) belief by the agency that the firm has marginal costs of c(t). The drug
igency will offer only that payment sufficient to induce the firm to accept subsidisation.
(p(t) - c(t) )p(p' (t)) = (p - e(t))-;i
p(t)~L( pC(t)) =(p - c(t))-;i + c(t )p( p" (t))
p p(p'(t))--;i
p(t)=p ( . )+c(t) (. )p pc (t) P p" (t)
Now a firm accepting subsidisation at time t (where t < T) receives profits equal to:
f T
(p-e)-;if e-rxdx+(p(t)-c)p(pC(t))f e-ndx.
o f
benchmarks. This issue warrants further examination in order to ascertain the practicability of the JZ
scheme.
26 This price is composed of both the drug subsidy and any price paid by the patient.
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This profit function extends only until generic entry for two reasons. Firstly the JZ
amework should be engineered in such a way as to make subsidies re-negotiable on generic
itry. Without such a move a generic would face having to enter the market against a firm
.arketing a superior drug and charging a consumer price of zero. Against such a foe no firm
'ouk] never enter. Secondly, because of the assumptions found to be necessary in Chapter 8
iere is a constant difference between the quality of the incumbent and generic. The generic,
.ith a significant cost advantage, is expected to take the entire market. For this reason the
icurnbent is not expected to make profits beyond T and so the profit function ends here.
Each firm chooses the time it accepts subsidisation in order to maximise its profits so
rat:
Now the for the signal f(C) to be credible the optimal strategy for a firm with costs c
nust be to delay a time tic), Rearranging the above profit equation:
r( c)
{
I [- Il( '(f)) 7Lmax - - -rx - I-l r p - t:
== f (p-c).ufe dx+ p ( . )+C(I) (. )
o .u p' (I) .u pC (t)
{
I T 1==m~x (p - c):UJe-rxdx +(Nl + c(t)(.u(p' (t)) - :u) - c.u(pC (t))) fe-IX dx
==m~x {(p _c):u[+ - +e-rl] + (p.u +c(t)(.u(p' (t)) - :u) - c.u(pC (t)))[+e-rt - +e-IT]}
When the interior of this equation is differentiated in order to find the optimum value of
t a differential equation is obtained.
O (- )- -rt de ( ( '()) -)[ I -rt I -r1'] () dl-l dp" c..'.u dp" J[ I -rl I -r1']== p-c.ue +-.u p t -.u -e --e + c t -.--C-. - -e --edt r r dp" dt dp' dt r r
In equilibrium the cost revelation function should be proved accurate. Were this not the
case there must be an incentive for the subsidising agency to revise its beliefs in order to
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-duce subsidy payments. When this condition (c = c(t)) is incorporated into the previous
quation the third term disappears while the final term is greatly simplified.
( - )- rt de ( (" ) -)[ I rt I rT] (- )- rt() = p-c(t) f-le~ ": ,Ll P (t) -,Ll -;e- --;e~ - p-c(t) f..le~
at
Now the first and last terms are identical so that:
() _ de ( ( "()) -)[ I -1'1 I -rT]
-- p p l -,Ll -e --edt I' r
Now this can be simplified to "~It=o where (f..L(p"(t))-J1)*o and i» r . These
equirements are satisfied generally as when p(p" (t)) = J1 there is no motivation for a
ubsidisation scheme.I' With '''!:t, = 0 there can be no cost-discriminating signalling
:quilibrium as waiting to signal does not indicate a higher level of cost to the agency.
With '%, = 0 trivially c(t) = A . If the boundary condition c(O) = 0 is applied the cost
evelation function becomes c(t) = o. However long a firm delays before accepting
.ubsidisation the equilibrium conjecture of the agency does not change. The reason for this is
'elatively straightforward: the definition of pet) provides only the subsidy required to make a
.irm indifferent between joining the scheme or staying unsubsidised. This scheme does not
nelude any motivation for a low cost firm to prefer that it signal its true cost sooner rather
han later. A firm with marginal costs of zero is expected, in equilibrium, to wait an arbitrary
ength of time until accepting subsidisation. However long a firm waits before accepting
subsidisation it cannot free itself from the expectation that it has marginal costs of zero.
An additional payment that decreases over time would give a low priced firm an
incentive to signal early. If a firm was to signal late it can reasonably be assumed by the
agency that it was not a low cost firm. The addition of a premium can then allow firms to
credibly signal their true costs. The form of such a premium is completely arbitrary and it is
acknowledged that no optimality necessarily follows the premiums used here. The differing
premiums used for the zero and marginal cost charge sections were defined in their current
27 Subsidisation is undertaken in order to lower the cost of drugs to patients. If p(pC (t)) = f..L
then the price charged to patients both before and after subsidisation is the same. Any worthwhile
subsidy scheme must therefore have f..L(pC (t)) < J1 for all t<T.
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.rrn because of their properties when evaluating the differential equation. The formation of
1 optimal premium is another area left for further research.
Before proceeding it is necessary to first isolate the types of variants of the JZ scheme
xplored here since each imposes different patient price schedules over time. 28 The simpler
ase sees pC (t) = k so that both patient prices and the quantity demanded of the drug remains
onstant over time. The second case sees p" (t) = c(t) so that the patient is levied with the
iarginal cost of the drug. In the latter case quantity demanded falls as the time to
.ibsidisation increases. Each of these schemes requires that a different premium be added to
le price offered.
The above discussion on the problems faced under a signalling equilibrium is complete
ut for an examination of one aspect of the effects of subsidisation - the effect of subsidisation
n the consumer price of similar drugs. The JZ scheme analysed here results in a fixed
greement over prices for subsidised drugs so that subsidised firms cannot react to changes in
he price of competitors. The only possible reactions can then come from unsubsidised firms.
\s will be outlined below there will be no unsubsidised firms under the JZ scheme in the
omparisons of Chapter lO. Even though this is the case the effect of such changes is assessed
n Appendix 9.3.
The situation assessed when comparing the JZ variant below with reference pricing in
=hapter 10 will place new firms only in markets where all incumbents are subsidised. These
.omparisons assess the cost, consumer surplus and efficiency of both the JZ and RP schemes
'or a two firm example. The first step in each scenario will be to define the initial firm and
ietermine at what price it will be subsidised. Once subsidised the consumer price of this firm
s fixed. 29 The entrant approaches the subsidising agency some time after subsidisation and so
'aces a situation where, regardless of its own price, it will face a constant price from each
ncumbent firm. The following sections address the cases where patient prices are levied at
ooth a fixed charge and at marginal cost.
28 Which in turn changes the form of the price function giving the simplest DE to solve.
29 By assumption. Subsidies are expected to stay at a set lewel throughout the period before
generic entry. Special provisions would have to be made in the case of high unanticipated inflation.
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( 1) Constant patient prices
Consider a scheme where the pnce offered to a drug agency includes an additional
"emium for participation that decreases with time. Consumer prices are set a constant level
) regardless of the true cost of the firm being subsidised. A firm accepting subsidisation at
me t receives a premium ~ [e-rl - e-rT] - K on the price a firm with costs c(t) requires to make
indifferent between accepting subsidisation or not.
(here there is an incumbent it is assumed to be firm 2 and it is also assumed that as an
icumbent it has previously been subsidised (see above) and so has a consumer price of k.
he quantities /1 and fl(k) are then fl/p,k) and fll(k,k) respectively. Where there is no
icurnbent the firm faces competition from no other quarter and so /1 and fl(k) are I-FI(f) and
- Fj (1-) respectively. These figures represent the proportion of consumers that find treatment
.orthwhile.r" The total price offered to a firm accepting subsidisation at time t equals:
pet) =p~+ c(t) fl(k) - fl + 6. [e- rt _ e-rT]_ K
fl(k) ~L(k) r
Now subsidisation here gives a benefit to the firm above that accruing to it when it is
nsubsidised.
(0) =m;x j(p-c)i11 e-"dX+(P(t)-')P(k)[ e-"dX)
=m;x j(p-,)i1Ie-ndX+(p P:~) + ,(t) P~ik~ i1 + ~ [c rt -e-"]- K- +k)['-"dX)
=m;x j(p -,)i1Ie-rrxdx +(pp +c(t)(P(k) - j1) - 'p(k) + ~ [er-rt - e-"]p(k)- KP(k))[ e-ndx)
=m~x {(p _c):u[~ - ~ e-r/] +(pfl + c(t)(fl(k) - :u) -Cfl(k) + ~ [e-rt - e-rT]fl(k) - Kfl(k»)~ e-r/ - ~e-rTJ}
j(P- c):u[~ - ~ e-rl] + (pfl + c(t)(fl(k) -:u) -Cfl(k»)[~e -rt -~e_rT]jmax= t + (~[e-rl -e-rT]fl(k)-Kfl(k»)~e-rl _~e-rT]
30 In the simulation of these cases these figures were found not by appealing to F] explicitly but
'ather to ~L/(0,LA,z). Where Pz = LA,z the definitions of each function are identical.
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As before this expression can be differentiated to find the first order condition for the
rtimal choice of t:
0= (p-c)/Je-'I -(P/J+C(t)(.LL(k)- /J)-c,u(k))e- r, + ~~ ({l(k)- /J)[~e-II _~e-rT]
-( ~[e-II -e-,T],u(k)-K,u(k))e-rl -L'le-r'{l(k)be-"-~e-'T]
0= (p - c)/Je-II - (p/J +c(t)({l(k) - /J) - cP(k)) e-II + ~~ (,u(k) - /J)[~e -rt - ~ e-IT]
+ K{l(k)e- " -~,u(k)e-" [e-rt _e- IT]
r
ow with e = c(t) this becomes:
0= (p-c(t))/Je- II -(P/J-c(t)/J)e-rl + ~~ (,u(k)- /J)[~e-II _~e-IT]
K (k) -II 2 L'l (k) -rt [-II -rT]+ {l e - -p e e -e
r
0= (p-c(t))/Je- rt -(p-c(t))/Je- II + ~~ ({l(k)-/J)[~e-" _~e-IT]
+ Kp(k)e-
"
-2L'l,u(k)e-" [~e-rt _~e-IT]
I r
The differential equation for the cost revelation function e(t) is:
0= ~~ (,u(k)--r-: -~e-'T]-2L'l{l(k)e-'1 [~e-II _~e-rT]+ K,u(k)e-"
de {l(k)e-r, K r,u(k)e- r,
0=- 2L'l _ +
dt ({l(k)-{l) (,u(k)-,u)(e-" _e- IT)
Cost is disclosed exponentially in time.
( ) 2L'l {l(k) -rt K{l(k) I (-rl -rT) De t = - e + og e - e +
r (P(k)-{l) (p(k)-{l)
Imposing the boundary condition that e(O)=0 the final value of e(t) can be found:
0=e(0)=_2L'l {l(k) e-rO + (K{l(k) )IOg(e-ro_e-rT)+D
r ({l(k)- {l) {l(k)- {l
0=e(0)=_2L'l {l(k) + Kp(k) log(l-e-rT)+D
r ({l(k)- {l) ({l(k)- {l)
D- 2L'l {l(k) _ K{l(k) loa(l-e-rT)
- r ({l(k)-{l) ({l(k)-{l) b
:0 that
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( ) 2L'l ~l(k) -rt K~l(k) I (-rt -,T) De t = e + 0" e - e +
r (~l(k)-~l) (P(k)-~l) b
( ) 2L'l p(k) -rt Kp(k) I (-rt -rT) 2L'l ~l(k) K,ll(k) I ( -rT)e t = - e + 0" e - e + - O'T 1- e
r (~l(k)-p) (p(k)-~l) b r (~l(k)-p) (p(k)-p) b
(
- rt -rr J) 2L'l p(k) I -rt K~l(k) 1 e -ectt = -e + og .
r (~l(k)-P)( ) (P(k)-p) l_e-rT
The pharmaceutical agency chooses L'l and K in order to determine the precise makeup of
he revelation function. The former of these variables controls the speed of entry of firms
vhile the latter is used to control the payoff given to the final firm joining the scheme.
Some sort of operating restriction is necessary on the workings of the subsidising agency
vith respect to the time taken to achieve subsidisation of pharmaceuticals. For the purposes
rf this thesis the restriction placed on the subsidising agency is assumed to be largely political
n nature. A budgetary restriction had originally been envisaged for the definition of L'l and K
out was abandoned as being unlikely" after Pharmac exceeded its budget in 1997. The
'estriction placed on the agency here is a function of political and health pressures.Y
In New Zealand and elsewhere patients and their advocacy groups are likely to demand
subsidisation of medicines deemed necessary to the health and welfare of patients. In New
Zealand both the Aids Foundation and the Schizophrenia Fellowship, amongst others, have
been vocal in their demands that different medicines are subsidised. Persistent pressure will
tell on politicians sensitive to claims that patients are being denied access to important
advances in medication. The agency is likely to have a limited time in which to subsidise
drugs before pressure placed on them becomes more costly than the additional payments
necessary to guarantee subsidisation.
:1, At least in New Zealand.
:12 A strict budgetary restriction would result in a different type of scheme. Under a
budget-restricted scheme premium payments on offer would be defined as follows: the budget would
be spent and ratio of the expected change in consumer surplus over the expected change in subsidy
payments would be the same for all drugs. This corresponds to the condition for an individual
maximising utility that a budget is met and the ratio of marginal utilities over price is equal between
goods. The analysis of such a scheme is left for future research.
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Pharmaceuticals represent a significant tool for the care of patients under both the public
nd private health systems. The body in charge of the public health system will expect value
or the money assigned to pharmaceutical subsidisation but will however place a value on
urrently unsubsidised drugs. It would prefer to see all treatment options available as soon as
ossible at the cheapest possible price. It appears reasonable that they too would begin to
lace pressure on the subsidising agency if delays begin to grow beyond limits perceived to be
easonable, particularly for drugs that may reduce expenditures elsewhere in the health sector.
These largely political pressures are likely to vary between drugs depending on the value
hat the unsubsidised drug represents above existing treatment options.
As different patient interest groups have different degrees of political influence it is
.xpected that they will be able to exert differing amounts of pressure. As an example the New
'ealand Heart Foundation may well be more powerful than, say, the Osteoporosis Society and
o delays for coronary drugs may well be less than for osteoporosis. It is envisaged that the
ubsidising agency will determine a threshold by which time firms of all possible marginal
osts shall have accepted subsidisation.33 Where this time threshold is given the symbol (*
hen it is expected that c(t*) = a where a is the highest possible level of marginal cost.
The firm with the largest possible marginal cost need not be offered any return in excess
if that required to make it indifferent between accepting subsidisation or continuing in an
msubsidised fashion?4 The premium above the indifference level for this firm is then zero:
0= ~ [e-n ' _e-rT]_K
;0 that J( is defined as:
K - Ll [-rt' -rT]- e -e .
r
J3 In equilibrium. The subsidising agency obviously cannot force acceptance.
34 Firms with marginal costs below the maximum require a decreasing premium only so that
hey can credibly show their costs. These firms receive a premium only so that firms with higher
narginal costs may in turn credibly signal their true costs. Firms with the maximum possible
.narginal costs have no firms above them and so do not require a premium.
.( ) _ 26 ,Ll(k) (I -rl) p(k) 6 (-rl' -r1') I (e -r Fl - e-vr J( t - - -e + e -e ou "
r (p(k) ILl) (p(k)- p) r '" l_e-rl
1'(t)= 6 ( J.L(k) )[2(I-e-rr)+(e-rl' _e-r1')IOg(e-rl_~,~r1'J]
,. J.l(k)-J.L I-e
nd at time t = t'
6 p(k) [2(1 -r/) (-rl' -r1')1 [e- rr. -e-r1'J](/ = - e + e - e og r1'
r (p(k) p) l-e-
The cost function can now be defined in terms of (* only.
c(t)= 6 J.l(k) [2(1 e-rl)+(e-rl' _e-r1')IOg(e-rl_~,~r1'J]
r (p(k)-p) I-e
raut]: )(P(k) - Ji)[ 2(1-e-rl) +(e-rl' - e-r1') log ( e~'~~~,~~T J]
c(t) 'W)(!I(k)~JiJ[2(H_"' He ,,. ~e'T)10g[e;'~ e_~~'T J]
[2(I_e-rt)+(e-r/ _e-r1')IOg( e~'~ ~~,~1' J]
c(t) = ({~--------------''-:-
(2(1 ~e"' l+(e-'" ~e")IOg[ e-;~ /~'T J]
An example of this function where T=5.98 and {*=0.5 is given below:
Cost[t]
-J£---.f-----+-----+----1-----+t
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Figure 9.1: Cost revelation function (T=5.98, t*=0.50).
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Note that the firm with the largest possible marginal costs can only credibly signal their
)sts at the time threshold. This firm receives no premium above the price required to make it
ldifferent between accepting subsidisation or not. For the case without an incumbent firm
-here it t = TJ J = I and p =3.56098 the relevant price function is displayed below.
Price[t]
04
-+-----j---+-"-:;~____j---t--_j_jt
052.5l}t---=-t-=---F'-F--~+=----=-j'-'-------=-r
2.5R+-----ho''--i----+---f---+
2.5 H---;F--j---t-------t--_j_
Figure 9.2: Sample price function.
Given the time threshold and the total time to generic entry,3S in addition to the
haracteristics of all drugs and the pre-subsidisation price of the drug to be subsidised a price
unction like that in Figure 9.2 can be derived. The differential equation above has been
reated so that the optimal decision of a firm with marginal costs c is to reveal its price at the
ime where c(t) = c. Given the cost and price functions the expected outcome of any scenario
an be predicted.
A firm offered subsidisation under the JZ scheme has no control over any of the
-ariables that define the cost and price functions other than its own pre-subsidised price. The
'irm faces a choice over the value of this, and only this, variable. An important piece of
erminology is introduced at this point. A firm's non-subsidisation optimum is taken to be the
Inn's optimum price were no subsidisation possible. A firm's pre-subsidisation price is its
iptimum price given that the JZ variant outlined here is operating.
35 Total time to generic entry in New Zealand is composed of four distinct factors: the effective
oatent life of the drug, the delay after patent expiration before a generic applies for registration in
New Zealand, the administrative delay in actually approving registration, and finally the time taken
For Pharmac to arrange subsidisation of the generic.
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If a firm was to charge away from its non-subsidisation optimum before being
ibsidised under the JZ scheme it faces two opposing effects. By pricing away from the
otimum it reduces its profits over the entire time period before generic entry.
.e-subsidisation it receives smaller profits when pricing away from its non-subsidised
Jtimum. Lower pre-subsidisation profits also reduce the subsidy required to make a firm
.different between joining the scheme or not. By pricing away from its non-subsidised
otimum a firm may also influence the values of L',and K in order to increase the level of the
'emium enjoyed in equilibrium.
In general the second factor outweighs the first and promotes a pre-subsidisation price
way from the non-subsidised optimum. The value of L',has previously been shown to be
ra(JL(k) -:u)
L', = ----,---,----~---:------~
ut]: { 2(1-e ,,.)+(e-n' - e ")lOg( e:'~ ~_~;'T J]
= a( I - JL~(»)
Now K has previously been defined as a function of L', so that
K= ~[e~rt' _e-rT]=a(l_ JL~k))+e-rl' _+e-rT]
The premium to a firm accepting subsidisation at time t is then:
L',[-rt -rT] K
- e -e -
r
=a(l- JL~»)+e-rt _+e-rT]_a(l_ JL~k»)+e-rt' _+e-rT]
=a(l- JL~(»)+e-rt _+e-rt']
A higher value of p reduces :u =JL(p) and increases the premium on offer to firms. A
irm with marginal costs below the maximum possible level will price above its
ion-subsidisation optimum in order make increased profits over the time they are subsidised.
157
, firm with the maximum possible level of marginal costs will never receive a premium in
quilibrium and so will not price above its non-subsidisation optimum.
The pre-subsidisation pnce is defined to be the pnce that optimises the discounted
rofits of the firm over the entire period before generic entry. This completes the definition of
.ie JZ variant where subsidised firms charge a fixed consumer pnce. Given the
haracteristics and marginal costs of all firms a Nash Equilibrium for the JZ scheme can now
,e found. 36 This model is used as the alternative to reference pricing in the comparisons of
he following chapter.
(2) Marginal cost pricing to patients
The proposed pricing scheme in this case is similar to that used for the fixed charge case
iut here the premium is deflated by quantity.
- -;i )/1(e(t)--;i!':J. e- rt _e-rT -K
p(t) = p---+e(t +
Il(e(t» fL(e(t» r IL(e(t»
Here the additional payment accruing to a firm accepting subsidisation is a fixed amount
~[e r- t'I - e-rT - K] paid continuously from the time subsidisation is accepted (t) to the time the
latent expires. Where there is an incumbent it is assumed to be firm 2 and it is also assumed
hat, as an incumbent, it has been previously subsidised and charges a consumer price of ez, its
narginal cost. The quantities fJ and fL(e(t» are then fLlp,e z) and fLl(e(t),e z) respectively.
Nhere there is no incumbent the firm faces competition from no other firm and so fJ and
,L(e(t» are 1- F j (f) and 1-F j (c~)) respectively. These figures represent the proportion of
.onsumers that find treatment worthwhile.
The profit function of a firm with costs c under the signalling equilibrium where costs
He revealed according to the function e(t) is given below.
36 Where drugs enter the market sequentially (with a sufficient delay) the initial drug is
subsidised. After some time has passed the second firm enters and is subsidised, while the other firm
.ernains fully subsidised. Where two firms await subsidisation (which is not addressed by the
Iynamics above) it is envisaged that each will be subsidised at the level required to make it indifferent
over subsidisation, given that the other firm remains unsubsidised. This assumption should prevent
exploitation of the prisoner's dilemma aspects of the JZ scheme that were suspected of causing
problems in Australia.
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J ' (- () - -r r! -rr ) T }III ax - - <rx - f-l f-l e(t) - f-l L',. e - e - K -irx
== (' l(p-e),ufe "dx « p--+e(l) + -e f-l(e(t))fe "dx
f-l(e(t)) f-l(e(l)) r f-l(e(t))
o ,
~m;x {rr-,-ji1I C-"dX+(PI,+,(t)(~(c(t»-i1) 11'(c(l»+ ~(, "-t "-K))fC-"dX}
==1ll~X {(p-e)Il[+-+e-r'J+(pf-l+e(t)(~L(e(t)) Il)-ef-l(e(t))+ ~ (e- rl _e-rT _ K))+e- II -+e-rTJ}
The first order condition for this function (with respect to time) is:
- - rt de -[I rt 1-IT] du dc df-lde[1 -rl 1-rT]() == (p- e)f-le- +-(f-l(e(t))- f-l) --:e- --e +(e(l)--- e--) --:e ---:e
dt I r de t de t I I
-(PIl+e(t)(f-l(e(t))-Il)-ef-l(e(t)))e-rl + :f, [L',.[~e-'I _~e-rT -;][~e-'I _~e-rT]]
Now A.[A[I -rt _ 1 -IT _ K][I -rl_ 1 -rT]]-_2L',. -,1[1 -rl _I -rT]+L',. K -rl"I Ll 7- e 7- e -;: 7- e 7- e - e 7- e 7- e -; e
Evaluating the first terms in the DE above as before and adding the evaluation of the
inal term we obtain:
O- de ( ( «» -)( 1 -rl 1 -IT) 2 A -II (I -rl I -IT) A K -II- - /I e t - f-l - e - - e - Lle - e - - e + Ll - edt r- r r r I r
de ( -) _ sx-:"0==- f-l(e(t))-f-l -2L',.e rt + _I _ Tdt e I _ e r
de L',.e-rt
-==2---=
dt f-l(e(t))-f-l
de
dt
L',. -rl (~L(e(~))- f-l 2 -II K -rT)e -e
Now L',. and K retain the same purposes as in the constant consumer price case above. A
critical value of t (t*) is again defined which allows K to be adjusted so as to set the premium
.he highest marginal cost firm would receive to zero.
L',. e- r l ' _e- IT - K
0==
r ~L(e(t))
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So that now
I A -I'I ( -1'1' -rr Jac = zxe 2- e -e
cit I-l(C(t»)-p e-r l _e-rT
Since I-l(C(t») is a piecewise function." this differential equation must be solved
umerically with the restriction that c(O) = O. For a given value of ~ an approximation of the
ost function (c~ (t») is derived. The final cost function is determined by an iterative method
.hich seeks to find the value of ~ that satisfies the equation:
where a is the maximum value.
Using this numerical method the optimum value of ~ is found for a particular p. To
ind the equilibrium a further iterative method is required to find the optimum value of the
Ire-subsidised price for the firm. Given the method outlined here the equilibrium can be
ound for any situation where the characteristics and costs of all firms are known.
1. SUMMARY
The choice of the signalling equilibrium framework over that of screening equilibria is a
esult of three distinct factors. Screening equilibria give non-unique solutions and require
rery strong assumptions about the drug subsidising agency in order to give reasonable
esultsr" The signalling equilibrium framework gives a unique equilibrium for both constant
md marginal cost pricing.
37 From Appendix 5.1
PI
L
"2+ (1'1";:")
1-FJ (1\,2+ (Pi ~P2»+ f f J (<p i )F2 (<p i : (Pi ~P2 »)d<p I
1'1
L
38 The utility function of the pharmaceutical agency must be defined and known by all parties.
l'he signalling equilibrium requires no such knowledge.
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'he time taken to obtain results is a factor in selecting the signalling framework over the
creening model since in the fixed price case the time taken to find the equilibrium outcome is
~latively small.
The major reason signalling equilibria are used for analysis in the following chapter is
hat they allow an analysis specific to the JZ scheme where costs are initially unknown by the
ubsidising agency. Under a signalling equilibrium the JZ scheme can be applied (in an
pproximate fashion) to firms once their costs are known whereas under a screening
quilibrium the strategic advantages of the JZ scheme are totally ignored.
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CHAPTER 10
A COMPARISON OF REFERENCE PRICING WITH A MODIFIED JZ SCHEME
The previous chapter analysed the modified JZ scheme that will be used in comparison to
ie status quo. The variant of the reference pricing system currently used must be analysed
efore any meaningful comparisons may take place. Section I contains such an analysis while
ections III to VIII contain the actual comparison of the two systems. The sensitivity of the
nalysis to key variables is addressed in Section IX. Sections X and XI address the feasibility of
iarginal cost pricing and the effects of each framework on patent integrity. The limits of the
omparison process and suggestions for extensions of this work are included in Section XIII.
It has not been feasible to compare the schemes for every possible value of cost so the
omparisons contained in this chapter consider cases where Ci E {O,1,2}, for i =1,20nly. To
ompare schemes over every possible value of cost would be both time consuming and
nnecessary. If one scheme is found to be superior to its alternatives at all nine addressed
omparisons it is likely that this will be the case for sufficient points to make the scheme superior
.verall. A full comparison would be prohibitively time consuming since finding equilibria under
eference pricing may take a considerable amount of time.
The previous chapter analysed a modified JZ scheme and proposed it to be an alternative to
eference pricing. Two different types of systems were designed: one where consumers face a
ixed charge (normally zero) for treatment regardless of the drug used and one where consumers
'ace the marginal cost of any drugs used in treatment. Both the fixed charge and marginal cost
iricing variants are possible under the JZ scheme but only the fixed charge system is available
mder reference pricing. The reason for this is best explained after the fixed charge comparison
s completed as the problems of applying marginal cost pricing are clearer after examination of
he prices expected under the zero price scheme.
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REFERENCE PRICING FRAMEWORK
Chapter 6 considered a completely unrestricted form of reference pricing where firms were
'ee to change their price and could choose to be reference priced at any time. Pharmac appears
) have changed their original operating procedures in two important ways.
Pharmac typically follows its published operating procedures and sets subsidies at the level
.f the lowest priced drug. Pharmac appears to be reluctant to retain the reference price at a given
evel in the face of an increase in the price of the current reference priced drug.' An example of
his modified rule lies in the case of Naprosyn. Roche attempted to increase the price of
~aprosyn, a NSAID2, by 20% to match the price of Voltaren which was the next lowest priced
[rug in that subgroup? Roche rationalised this move by appealing to the need to recoup R&D
xpenditures. If Pharmac was to keep at least one firm fully subsidised in that subgroup it would
teed to increase its subsidy to match the new price of Naprosyn. Pharmac was reluctant to do so,
)avid Moore reportedly stating that Roche's action 'effectively blocks attempts to make sure that
here is at least one fully subsidised prescription medicine for each group of the non-steroidal
inti-inflammatory drugs'. It is unclear what happened past this point but were such price
novements allowable firms would enjoy the full benefits of the high prices reference pricing
irornotes in an unrestricted form. 4
I Where the currently reference priced drug is the only reference priced drug.
2 Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug.
3 For 750 mg tablets only. That Roche only attempted to increase the price of one application from
the range of Naprosyn may suggest that Roche was testing Pharmac' s reaction to an increase in price
from a reference priced drug. Naprosyn is currently fully subsidised (Feb 1998 Pharmaceutical
Schedule) but it is not known whether this is a result of an increase in the subsidy for Naprosyn or a
decrease in the price of Voltaren. If it is the former, Pharmac cannot now credibly state that it will not
increase the subsidy. Pharmac's actions could be seen as establishing a positive probability that
subsidies will not increase if the price of the reference priced drug increases.
4 See Chapter 6.
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Pharrnac also use a tactic designed to prevent drugs from entering a subgroup and charging
. a premium. In Targeting Medicines: Rationalising Resources in New Zealand Pharmac states
lat S
Also, when suppliers wish to have new pharmaceuticals subsidised which have the same or similar
therapeutic effect as currently subsidised pharmaceuticals ... Pharmac negotiates a price lower than the
existing subsidy for the sub group applying at the time, and then reduces the subsidy on all other drugs in
the same therapeutic sub group to that price.
The latter restriction may be even more significant than the former since it impacts directly
n the price at which a firm may be subsidised. A two drug case is again considered where the
icumbent drug (denoted firm 2) initially charges at a producer price of P~ and a consumer price
f zero.6 It is assumed that the drug of the potential entrant (denoted firm 1) has been approved
y the Ministry of Health and is preparing to enter the industry. This firm has the option of being
.illy subsidised and entering as the reference priced drug or remaining unsubsidised and charging
higher price. Since the subsidisation of the first drug in a subgroup is problematical under
eference pricing a framework for subsidisation must be derived.
(I) Subsidisation of the first drug in a subgroup
Where a therapeutic subgroup is to be formed to accommodate a significant new drug a
.roblern arises as to the incentives of this new firm. The firm knows that regardless of the price
hey and the agency agree upon they are assumed to face a consumer price of zero. The firm has
10 incentive to limit the demands it places upon the agency if it believes it will be subsidised.
'he agency must therefore dictate a general scheme of how subsidisation will take place.
~eference pricing and the Johnston-Zeckhauser scheme are two examples of general schemes
ised to set subsidies although the former is not particularly useful in this case.
If the agency chooses either to ignore or not seek cost information it must offer the same
iayrnent to all firms regardless of their true marginal cost. In order to make sure subsidisation
5 Kletchko SL and others. Targeting Medicines, Rationalising Resources in New Zealand. p. 9. In
It least one recent case Pharmac has subsidised a new chemical entity above the reference price level in
ecognition of its superior status.
6 As in Chapter 6 charges levied on drugs by intermediaries (wholesalers, pharmacists etc.) are
gnored. The sensitivity tests later relax this assumption by adding a fixed patient charge and assessing
he effects of a fixed charge.
164
.curs this payment must be sufficient to compensate the highest possible cost producer of the
1armaceutical for joining the subsidy schemer' The targeted firm would accept these terms as
ey represent a payoff at least as great as that available if they remain unsubsidised. If the
raeted firm has costs less than the maximum possible cost they will make larger profits as a
b
.sult of subsidisation.
The agency may decide that discovering the marginal cost of the firm is worthwhile in
rder to reduce subsidy payments. If this is the case it will pursue what amounts to the modified
!.- scheme analysed previously. The latter of these possibilities will promote the lowest initial
-ference prices in a new therapeutic subgroup. It is assumed that the agency, in order to limit
rbsidies will opt for the second alternative. The level of the initial reference price found
irough the modified JZ scheme is given the symbol P~ .
It is acknowledged that this assumption may not necessarily be valid but it is pointed out
rat this assumption promotes the lowest reference prices beneath which new firms must price to
nter the subsidy scheme. This reference price will then allow for the most conservative
stimates of prices and subsidy costs under reference pricing. Comparisons between the JZ
cherne and reference pricing, if biased, will then be biased towards reference pricing rather than
.ie JZ scheme. While bias in these comparisons is never desirable it seems prudent to allow the
ossible bias to lie in favour of the status quo. The use of the JZ scheme to generate starting
alues also has the nice property that it allows a constant base for comparison as both schemes
tart with the same price for the incumbent drug.
(2) The entry of a second firm into a new subgroup
The reaction function of each firm with respect to the price it charges can be derived given
he characteristics of each drug and their marginal costs. By examining the reaction functions in
:onjunction with P~ it is possible to predict the outcome of subsidisation under reference pricing.
;ix general cases are considered in the following sections; these cases differ in the assumptions
nade over the level of initial subsidisation and the degree to which the incumbent and entrant
liffer.
7 While the agency can choose to price above the level that guarantees that all firms are at least
ndifferent between the schemes there is no reason for it to do so.
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(a} Moderate difference between drugs and a low initial reference price.
Where drugs are either distributed identically or with only moderate differences there is a
igh chance that a range of equilibria exist where prices are shared. These shared prices tend to
e large and reflect the problems of an unrestricted scheme of reference pricing.f The outcome
f reference pricing in this case is predicted in the Figure 10.1 below."
Unrestricted equilibria
po.
2
Figure 10.1: Very little difference between drugs and a low initial reference price.
Here firm 1 enters at price equal to the previous equilibrium price. Each firm has an
ncentive to increase price since price here is less than that dictated by the firm's reaction
unctions. Because of the restriction Pharmac places on the firms they are unable to increase
heir price above P~. Since neither firm has an incentive to decrease price the pricing strategies
p~, P~» constitute a Nash Equilibrium.
A similar case to the above covers those situations where there is a unique equilibrium
inder an unrestricted form of reference pricing but the point (p~, pn is still a Nash Equilibrium
n prices. 10 Figure 10.2 below displays this case. Note that while the unique equilibrium in the
rnrestricted case sees firms charging different prices this difference is not significant enough to
notivate a difference in price under the restricted form of reference pricing. It is not significant
8 See Chapter 6 for further details.
9 Note that these cases deal only with stylised versions of reaction curves since the actual shape of
these curves is not particularly important.
10 This is typical of a case where moderatedifferences do exist between drugs.
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rat the diagram below shows a supenor entrant (since PI' > P~' where PI'" and P; are the
nrestricted equilibrium prices) as the result holds also for the case where the incumbent is
loderately superior to the entrant.
R](P2)~
Unrestricted equilibrium
pO,
2
Reference pricing
equilibriumrl>, , P2 ) PI
Figure 10.2: Moderate difference between drugs and a low initial reference price.
Each firm would again prefer to price above P~ but is unable to do so. Not wishing to
ecrease price each will price at this level, resulting in a Nash Equilibrium of (P~, pn.
Both these case are identified by the identities P~ ::; R] (P~) and P~ ::;R 2 (p~).
(b) A strongly superior entrant and a low initial reference price.
Here the differences between drugs are large enough to motivate a premium for the entrant
n equilibrium. Two different cases generate such a premium, the first of which requires a low
nitial price and is typified by Figure 10.3.
Unrestricted equilibrium
Figure 10.3: A strongly superior entrant and a low initial reference price.
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The entrant here accepts subsidisation at the rate P~. Where both firms charge at the
.ference price patients are free to choose any drug without paying a premium. I1 As a result of
Ie entry of the new firm the incumbent, now competing with a strongly superior product at a
onsumer price of zero, perceives a large fall in quantity. The incumbent decreases its price to
2 (P~)) while the entrant, on perception of the incumbent's new price, wishes to increase its price
'om p~) to R I (R 2 (pn). The entrant still cannot freely increase price so it continues to price at P~ .
ince prices do not shift from the point (P~, R2(P~)) it represents a Nash Equilibrium in prices.
'his case is identified by P~ ~ R, (pn, P~ > R 2(pn and P~ ~ R, (R2(pn).
(c) A strongly superior entrant and a high initial reference price.
The second case giving a premium to the entrant is represented by Figure lOA below. Here
be entrant enters at the previous reference price, prompting its competitor to decrease its price.
n response to this decrease the entrant (firm 1) decreases its price, prompting a further price
lecrease from the incumbent. The process of price reductions continues until the unrestricted
:quilibrium (pt , P;) is reached. This case is unlikely to be significant in the analysis of reference
iricing to follow since it requires the initial subsidy to the incumbent firm to be high in relation
o the prices involved in the unrestricted equilibrium. 12
pO.
2
Reference pricing
:j: *
equilibrium(PI ,P2 )
"-P j
Figure 10.4: A strongly superior entrant and a high initial reference price.
II Pharmacists fees etc. are ignored as before.
12 Since the JZ scheme allows for subsidisation at relatively low prices while Chapter 6 showed
that prices under unrestricted forms of reference pricing tend to be high.
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(d) A strongly superior incumbent and a low initial reference price.
This case provides the opposite result to the previous one in that here the difference
etween the drugs is sufficient to promote a higher price for the incumbent (who markets drug 2) .
•s with the previous case of a superior entrant this case is divided into two scenarios. The
ituation where p~ is low relative to the unrestricted equilibrium is addressed here. The
)llowing section addresses the alternative scenario where p~ is assumed to be high.
"'(P~ .
\ ~oP'J
.' . Unrestricted equilibrium
Reference pricing
equilibriumrk.Il',"), P2o)
Figure 10.5: A strongly superior incumbent and a low initial reference price.
Here the entrant is subsidised below the previous reference price at pg. The incumbent
nay or may not have an incentive to decrease its price from this level. The case where the
ncumbent will keep this price is given in the above diagram. This case has an equilibrium at
Rj(P~),pg) and is characterised by p~ > Rj(pn, p~ :S;R2(pn and P~ :S;R2(Rl(P~)).
(e) A strongly superior incumbent and a high initial reference price.
The alternative case to the above sees a series of lower prices leading to the unrestricted
equilibrium being realised in the marketplace. This second case is characterised by P~ > R] (P~),
P~) :s; R2(P~) and P~ > R2(Rj(P~)). This scenario is displayed on Figure 10.6 below.
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R~ibrium
=unrestricted
equilbrium
Figure 10.6: A strongly superior incumbent and a high initial reference price.
As with the case of a superior entrant and a high initial price equilibrium is achieved here
)y each firm reducing price to the level of the unrestricted equilibrium. The likelihood of such a
:ase is again low since the JZ scheme keeps prices below the unsubsidised producer price.
(f) Very high initial subsidisation.
Previous cases have been identified using algebraic identities. All possible cases have been
iddressed but for the case where p~ > R, (p~) and p~ > Rz(pn which is included here for
.ompleteness only. This case requires that the point (P~ ,pn involve prices so high that both
'irms would wish to decrease their producer price from this level. This case is extremely
rnlikely in practice due to the relatively small size of the pre-entry reference price within the
subgroup, This case requires that the price the incumbent was awarded in order to accept
reference pricing is higher than any observed under the unrestricted equilibrium. This case is
.lisplayed on Figure lO.7 and sees the unrestricted equilibrium occurring after a series of price
decreases,
170
Figure 10.7: Very high initial subsidisation.
In summary the expected outcomes of each of these different cases is as follows:
P~) vs p~ vs p~ vs p~ vs PI P2 Notes
~I(P~)) R 2(pn R I(R2(P~)) R 2(R 1(P~))
~ n/a n/a p~ p~ normal case: low P~) and little to moderate
difference between drugs
> ~ n/a P~ R2(P~) strongly superior entrant - low P~)
> > n/a pt p; strongly superior entrant - high P~
~ n/a ~ RI(P~) pO strongly superior incumbent - low P~2
~ n/a > pt P; strongly superior incumbent - high p~
> n/a n/a p* P; high P~ and little difference between drugsI
fable 10.1: Summary of cases under modified RP schemeP
The previous sections have established the outcomes possible under reference pncmg.
I'hese results will be used later when explaining the results of particular cases in the
~omparisons. The following section explores the method by which results were obtained. Of the
.eference pricing results it is expected that the majority of the cases will satisfy the conditions of
:he first row of Table 10.1. Here neither firm charges away from the pre-entry reference price.
This is a direct result of the very high level of prices seen in the unrestricted form of reference
pricing analysed in Chapter 6. The cases where a high level of the pre-entry reference price is
required are likely to be extremely rare.
13 Where pt and P; are the prices observed in the unrestricted RP equilibrium.
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(g) Searching for the reference pricing equilibrium
The reference pricing equilibrium in each scenario was found by recursive calculation of
le optimal price for each firm. Given the starting price P~ the price at which firm I enters the
rarket pi = min {P~, R I (pn} is calculated. Firm 2 is then given the chance to react and
'~= min{PI' ,R 2 (p i )} is calculated. If both these figures equal P~ then the equilibrium is (p~, pn. If
ot then the following program actions are performed until both Pi and P~ converge.
Pi = min {p~-I ,R1(p~-I)}
P~ = min {pr l ,R 2 (pr l ) }
This sequence can be time consurning to calculate because each call to the reaction
unction must be solved numerically.
I. JZ FRAMEWORK
The JZ scheme is analysed using the signalling equilibrium found in the previous chapter.
t is assumed that, as with reference pricing, the incumbent has been previously subsidised. The
.ntrant enters and prices at a pre-subsidisation price p. The subsidising agency computes c(t),
'J(t) and p" (t) for the fixed charge scheme. At time 0 entry occurs and negotiations begin.
'Jegotiations are expected to be completed by time t* =0.50. Subsidisation continues until time
r where generic entry occurs and subsidies are renegotiated. It is expected that the generic will
)e successful in undercutting the incumbent in these subsidy negotiations.
n. NOTES ON THE COMPARISONS
The earlier chapters addressed four different cases covering identically distributed drugs,
Iifferences in efficacy, risk and a scenario where asymmetries in risk and efficacy approximately
oalance. Each of these scenarios is duplicated in the following sections and include the results of
subsidisation for the incumbent drug for different values of cost, the predicted behaviour under
.eference pricing and a comparison of reference pricing with the modified JZ scheme. In these
comparisons and the sensitivity tests following them reference pricing is assumed to mean the
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nriant outlined in Section I above. Where reference pricing in the unrestricted sense of Chapter
is meant it is referred to as unrestricted reference pricing.
These comparisons assume that income (m) is 10, the loss in income due to illness (L) is 5,
le time to generic entry (T) is 5.98 years, the interest rate is 10%, a uniform marginal cost
istribution exists on [0, 2] and (for the JZ scheme) a maximum time to subsidisation of half a
ear. These comparisons also assume that the subsidising agency desires subsidisation of these
rugs. The value of the maximum time to subsidisation is of most concern here. While 0.50
ears has been used to approximate the time threshold it is acknowledged that, as a variable
efined by political pressures, it is estimated best by the subsidising agency and may differ
ignificantly between drugs.
The consumer surplus and subsidy figures given in the tables below are not per-period
neasures but rather represent cumulative amounts over the period before generic entry. For the
mrposes of the explanation below the instantaneous value of consumer surplus is represented by
he function CS(p~, p~). Now for the JZ scheme where k is the fixed charge to a subsidised drug
normally k = 0) and [* is actual delay to subsidisation consumer surplus is:
" T
CS = CS(p,k)fe-rxdx + CS(k,k)fe- rxdx.
o "
Under the JZ scheme it is worthwhile to analyse quantity in order to simplify the
.alculation of subsidy payments .. The JZ quantity and subsidy payments (where PI and P2 are the
orices to firms one and two) are:
" T
qi = ~Li(P,k)fe-rxdx+ ~i(k,k)fe-rxdx
o (
T
subsidy = (P2 - k)q2 + (p I - k)~ I(k,k)fe""dx
"
since subsidies are always paid for the incumbent throughout the period but only from t'
onwards for the entrant. The larger is cost the longer will be the delay to subsidisation and
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ccordingly the lower will be consumer surplus. Subsidies may nse or fall for larger costs
epending on whether the shorter subsidised period or the larger subsidised price dominate.
An entrant offered subsidisation under the reference pricing scheme will not delay in their
hoice as the offer presented to them does not change over time. The quantity, subsidy and
onsumer surplus figures for firms under reference pricing are:
T
qi =:j.Li (k + max( PI - P2'0 ), k+maX(P2-PI,0»J e-r'dx
o
T
CS =: CS(k + max(PI - P2'0), k +max(P2 - P1,0) Je-rxdx
o
vhere PI' P2 are the producer prices and k is the fixed charge under reference pricing.
Deadweight loss is not incorporated into the results because of concerns over the
ippropriateness of the 10% level used earlier. The comparison in Chapter 6 between reference
iricing and the unregulated market under distortionary taxes is less relevant now than in Chapter
) given the assumptions under reference pricing outlined above which reduce subsidy levels and
he deadweight loss from subsidisation markedly.
V. IDENTICALLY DISTRIBUTED DRUGS
In this case AI=: A 2 =: 11 1 =: 112 =: 1 where drug 2 is assumed to be the incumbent drug. The
'ollowing table gives (for the three addressed levels of cost) the signalled p, the actual time to
subsidisation ((*), the maximum allowed time to subsidisation and the final subsidised price.
* (max pOC P t 2
0 3.5610 0.0000 0.5000 2.5532
3.5722 0.2405 0.5000 2.6002
2 3.6067 0.5000 0.5000 2.6182
Table 10.2: Initial subsidisation of a drug with A =:11 =: 1.
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Now under reference pricing the case of identically distributed sees a range of shared
quilibrium prices under the unrestricted RP scheme. As predicted in Section a both firms
.harge at P; under the modified RP framework defined above.
As defined for a firm with marginal cost c earlier the JZ scheme generates prices equal to:
n(p,O)
p=c+--.
,u(O,O)
This price is independent of the costs of the second firm. 14 As with the RP case the
:onsumer price of each drug under all nine JZ scenarios is zero. The following tables examine
he outcomes of subsidisation under both the RP and JZ schemes as well as the outcome where
he entrant remains unsubsidised. The outcomes of interest are producer prices (consumer prices
n brackets), the subsidy payment required over the time to generic entry and the consumer
.urplus gained over that period. The delay before subsidisation occurs in the case of the JZ
.ariant is also given.
Reference Pricing
:1 C2 PI P2 subsidy
(2") ($m)
JZ Variant Only drug 2 subsidised
PI P2 subsidy
( I") ($m)
fable 10.3: Comparison of systems with identically distributed drugs. IS
14 Regardless of the costs of the second firm the consumer price the entrant faces when
unsubsidised is zero. It is the profits available when facing this consumer price that define the subsidy a
firm gains.
15 Note that this table gives only the main results of the model for the purpose of comparison. The
quantities each firm faces, the total surplus of each outcome and the p signalled by firm 1 in the JZ case
are not given above for space reasons but do appear in the full tables in Appendix 10.1.
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A convention that will be continued in future tables is introduced in Table 10.3 above.
Vhere prices (be they consumer or producer prices) or subsidies under either RP or JZ are higher
han their alternative they are displayed in bold type. Table 10.3 shows that producer prices are
ower under the modified JZ scheme than reference pricing while both schemes provide drugs at
.ero cost to patients. The lower prices contribute to lower subsidy costs under the JZ scheme.
xlso leading to lower subsidy costs under JZ is the small delay experienced while a firm signals
hat it has positive costs. Subsidisation of drug 1 results both in increased costs to the
.ovemment and significantly increased consumer surplus. In the case of identically distributed
lrugs the modified JZ scheme results in a consistently superior budgetary outcome at the cost of
mly a small delay.
Average decrease in subsidies (RP ~ JZ)
Average decrease in CS (RP ~ JZ)
Average total surplus - RP
Average total surplus - JZ
Average change in total surplus (RP ~ JZ)
$ 0.59 m (5.87%)
$ 0.22 m (1.72)
$ 8.88 m
$ 8.75 m
-$ 0.14 m
Table 10.4: Summary of schemes: identically distributed drugs
The 5.87% reduction in subsidies appears to outweigh the 1.72% reduction in consumer
.urplus that would occur in a switch to the modified JZ scheme. Total surplus would fall slightly
vere the reference pricing scheme to be abandoned because of the delay involved in
.ubsidisation under the JZ scheme.
V. BALANCED ASYMMETRY
As the distribution of drugs differ in this case the comparison must take place in two parts.
Section assumes that the drug with A=0.85,1] =1.10 has been previously subsidised while
Section 2 has the drug with A=0.90,1] =1.00 as the incumbent with the A=0.85,1] =1.10 drug
entering the market.
(1) Balanced asymmetry (A.=0.85, n=1.lO) previously subsidised.
Here drug 1 with characteristics A1 =0.90,1] 1 =1.00 seeks subsidisation in a market where
drug 2 is the incumbent drug (with characteristics A2 =0.85,1]2 =1.10). The following table gives
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he equilibrium values of p, the time to subsidisation, the maximum allowed time to
ubsidisation and the final subsidised price for the initial subsidisation of drug 2.
c P t* tmax p~
o 3.1447 0.0000 0.5000 2.3381
0.5000 0.5000 2.40752
3.1563
3.1917
0.2405 0.5000 2.3883
Table 10.5: Initial subsidisation of a drug with A. =0.85, T] = 1.10.
Now under reference pricing the case of two drugs whose distributions are generally
ialanced sees a range of shared equilibrium prices under the unrestricted RP scheme. As
iredicted in Section a both firms choose to charge at p~ under the modified RP framework. The
ollowing table gives the same general information as that given above in Table 10.3.
Reference Pricing JZ Variant
I C2 PI P2 subsidy PI delay
( C ( 2C) ($m)
0 2.34 2.34 8.86 10.67 2.27 2.34 8.61 0.24 10.48 2.69 2.34 6.18 7.29
2 2.41 2.41 9.12
(0.00) (O.gO) ..
10.67 2.27 2.41 8.74 0.24 10.48 2.69 2.41 6.36 7.29
(0.00) (0.00) (2.69) (9.90)
fable 10.6: Comparison of systems with balanced asymmetry in distributions.l"
As in the case of identical drugs where the distributions of the two drugs are 'close' to each
ither the JZ scheme results in lower prices and subsidy payments. Again the small delay in order
o allow firms to credibly signal costs only affects consumer surplus slightly but provides an
ipportunity to save a significant amount in subsidy payments. On average the decrease in
.ubsidy payments when moving from the JZ scheme to the RP scheme is 3.85% while the
lecrease in consumer surplus is only 1.85%.
16 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
Average decrease in subsidies (RP ~ JZ)
Average decrease in CS (RP ~ JZ)
Average total surplus - RP
Average total surplus - JZ
Average change in total surplus (RP ~ JZ)
$ 0.35 m (3.85%)
$ 0.20 111 (1.85%)
$ 6.89 m
$ 6.77 m
-s 0.11 m
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'able 10.7: Balanced asymmetry (A. = 0.85, TJ = 1.10 previously subsidised)
The lower subsidy costs associated with the JZ scheme again have their basis in lower
trices than RP and a delay in the subsidisation of drugs. This delay prompts an efficiency
omparison to favour reference pricing over the JZ scheme.
(2) Balanced asymmetry (;GO.90, n=1.00) previously subsidised.
Here drug 1 with characteristics A. J = 0.85, TJ J = 1.10 seeks subsidisation where drug 2 is the
ncumbent drug (with characteristics A. 2 = 0.90, T/2 = 1.00). The following table gives the
.quilibrium values of p, the time to subsidisation, the maximum allowed time to subsidisation
md the final subsidised price for the initial subsidisation of drug 2.
* t max pOC P t 2
0 3.2779 0.0000 0.5000 2.3994
3.2894 0.2405 0.5000 2.4487
2 3.3248 0.5000 0.5000 2.4676
Table 10.8: Initial subsidisation of a drug with A. =0.90, T/ = 1.00.
As with the previous balanced asymmetry case reference pricing sees both firms pricing at
:he pre-entry reference price. The following table gives the general information required for a
comparison of the RP and JZ schemes.
JZ Variant
PI
Only drug 2 subsidised
PI P2 subsidy
( C ($m)
2 2.45 2.45 9.27 10.67 2.27 2.45 8.65 0.50 10.29 3.12 2.45 6.36 7.16
178
able 10.9: Comparison of systems with balanced asymmetry in distributionsP
Again the JZ scheme results in lower prices and subsidy payments when compared to the
:ference pricing outcome. Delays are again small and provide an opportunity to save on subsidy
ayrnents by allowing the agency to pay only what is necessary to firms.
Average decrease in subsidies (RP ~ JZ) $ 0.57 ill (5.74%)
Average decrease in CS (RP ~ JZ) $ 0.19 ill (1.77%)
Average total surplus - RP $ 6.89 ill
Average total surplus - JZ $ 6.79 ill
Average change in total surplus (RP ~ JZ) -$ 0.09 ill
'able 10.10: Balanced asymmetry (A =0.90, TJ =1.00 previously subsidised)
Higher pre-entry reference prices lead to greater savings under the JZ scheme than in the
revious comparison. In general, the case of a balanced asymmetry in drug distributions favours
reference pricing scheme since efficiency tends to be higher here. Note that in order to gain
igher efficiency under reference pricing greater subsidy payments are necessary in both
alanced asymmetry scenarios.
TI. A DIFFERENCE IN EFFICACY.
As with the balanced asymmetry case the scenario addressing a difference in efficacy will
eed to be compared in two parts, where both the inferior and superior drugs each are taken to be
.ie incumbent firm. The case considered next subsidises the superior drug and then analyses the
ffect of subsidising a markedly inferior drug. The second case (Section 2) compares the
chemes where the inferior drug is the incumbent while the superior drug seeks subsidisation.
17 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
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(1) Difference in efficacy (;\,=1.00, n=1.00) previously subsidised.
Here drug 1 has characteristics AI == 0.50,71 I == 1.00 and seeks subsidisation in a market where
[rug 2 is the incumbent drug (with characteristics A2 == 1.00,712 == 1.00). The following table gives
he equilibrium values of p, the time to subsidisation, the maximum allowed time to
.nbsidisation and the final subsidised price for the initial subsidisation of the superior drug 2.
c
o
* tP t m~
3.5610 0.0000 0.5000 2.5532
3.5722 0.2405 0.5000 2.6002
2 3.6067 0.5000 0.5000 2.6182
Table 10.11: Initial subsidisation of a drug with A == 1.00, 71 == 1.00.
As with the previous three cases reference pricing sees the both drugs pricing at the pre-
entry reference price under the modified RP framework. The following table gives the same
~eneral information as that given in previous tables above.
JZ Variant Only drug 2 subsidised
:1 C2 PI delay PI P2 subsidy
( c ($m)
0 2.55 9.49 9.34 8.62 0.24 9.28 6.97 8.37
Table 10.12: Comparison of systems with difference in efficacy."
Once more the JZ scheme has delivered lower pnces and subsidy payments. Under
reference pricing the inferior drug is accorded the same rights as the superior drug in that each is
18 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
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iven the right to charge at or below the pre-entry reference pnce and be fully subsidised.
eference pricing is effectively blind to the different characteristics of each drug which makes
ie modified JZ scheme very attractive in this case. The JZ scheme represents an decrease of
.8% in subsidy payments compared with reference pricing at a cost of only 0.6% of the
Jnsumer surplus attained under reference pricing. This case suggests more strongly than any
revious case that the JZ scheme should be used in preference to reference pricing. A switch to
ie JZ scheme here would save a relatively large amount in subsidies while improving total
rrplus.
Average decrease in subsidies (RP ~ JZ)
Average decrease in CS (RP ~ JZ)
Average total surplus - RP
Average total surplus - JZ
Average change in total surplus (RP ~ JZ)
$ 0.93 m (9.84%)
$ 0.06 m (0.60%)
$ 5.62 m
$ 5.65 m
$ 0.03 m
'able 10.13: Difference in efficacy (A=1.00, TJ =1.00 previously subsidised)
Note however that it is doubtful that Pharmac would desire to subsidise such a drug since it
; both relatively ineffective and expensive. The price of drug 1 barely affects consumer surplus
since it has low usage) and so committing funds to such a drug may be unlikely in an
nvironment where money is scarce. Subsidisation is doubtful even under the JZ scheme as an
verage increase in consumer surplus of $ 0.88 m is unlikely to warrant an additional cost of
: 1.63 m to the taxpayer. Total surplus would however favour the JZ scheme were subsidisation
J take place.
The difference in efficacy above was large enough to favour the JZ scheme over reference
iricing. Appendix 10.3 analyses where this is the case and finds that where Al = 1,A2 > 0.62, and
t, = I reference pricing is expected to be superior than the JZ variant. Where the difference in
.fficacy is greater than 0.38 the JZ scheme is favoured above RP.
(2) Difference in efficacy (A =0.50, n =1.00) previously subsidised.
Here drug 1 has characteristics Al = 1.00, TJ I = 1.00 seeks subsidisation where drug 2 is the
ncumbent drug (with characteristics A~ =0.50, TJ2 =1.00). The following table gives the
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:juilibrium values of p, the time to subsidisation, the maximum allowed time to subsidisation
rd the final subsidised price for the initial subsidisation of the superior drug 2.
* tmax pOC P t 2
0 2.2013 0.0000 0.5000 1.9389
2.2140 0.2405 0.5000 2.0053
2 2.2531 0.5000 0.5000 2.0310
Table 10.14: Initial subsidisation of a drug with A= 0.50, TJ = 1.00.
As with the three previous case reference pricing sees the both drugs pricing at the pre-
ntry reference price under the modified RP framework. The following table gives the same
eneral information as that given in previous tables above.
Reference Pricing JZ Variant Only drug 2 subsidised
Cl PI P2 subsidy PI delay PI P2 subsidy
( ") ($m) ( I") ( 2") ($m)
0 1.94 1.94 7.21 9.34 7.85 0.24 9.00 4.43 3.57
l'able 10.15: Comparison of systems with difference in efficacy.l"
One of the fundamental tenets of a subsidisation scheme should be that it can reliably
.ubsidise a worthwhile drug. In this case a drug which is highly effective compared to all
ilternatives may be effectively denied subsidisation on the grounds that its marginal cost is too
iigh. Reference pricing does not consider differences in quality between drugs but simply treats
ill drugs in exactly the same manner. In the case of a difference in efficacy the very low
rayments made to drug 2 in order to prompt subsidisation make it possible that a firm chooses
J<) See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
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)t to join the subsidisation scheme. Where C2 =0 subsidisation under reference pricing occurs
and only if c/ >1.48 leaving over a 25% chance that drug representing a large improvement in
~atment will not be subsidised. Where C2 = 1 this threshold figure becomes 1.57 leaving over a
)% chance that subsidisation will not occur. Even where C2 =2 subsidisation is not certain with
rly 80% of firms taking up the offer to join.
The modified JZ scheme recognises the differences between drugs and pays a premium to
lose drugs that are superior. All firms will be subsidised at all possible levels of cost for the
icumbent because the JZ scheme makes certain that all firms are at least indifferent between
ccepting subsidisation or not. This necessitates that the JZ scheme offer a higher price to
rperior drugs which increases the cost of subsidisation. This can be seen above in the higher
rices offered to the entrant in the cases where reference pricing results in subsidisation.
While the JZ scheme has not delivered lower prices and subsidy payments in this case it
as delivered subsidisation of the targeted drug. Reference pricing in this case acts to the
etriment of the superior drug, placing it in a worse position than if no framework existed at all.
Average decrease in subsidies (RP ----c> JZ) -$ 1.50 ill (23.55%)
Average decrease in CS (RP ----c> JZ) -$ 1.76 ill (24.36%)
Average total surplus - RP $ 5.04 ill
Average total surplus - JZ $ 5.40 ill
Average change in total surplus (RP ----c> JZ) $ 0.36 ill
"able 10.16: Difference in efficacy (A. =0.50, 71 =1.00 previously subsidisedj'"
An increase in consumer surplus of 24.36% is possible under the JZ scheme at an increased
ubsidy cost of $1.50 m. The cases where reference pricing fails to give sufficient returns to
irompt subsidisation of the entrant are the major reason for the moderate increase in total surplus
rvailable through switching to the JZ scheme here. The non-subsidisation of the entrant reduced
.onsumer surplus under reference pricing, which was significant in the total surplus comparison.
n general, this case has to be said to favour the JZ scheme over reference pricing for the reasons
if superior efficiency and the guarantee that the JZ scheme will deliver subsidisation.
20 Non-subsidised values used in place of reference pricing for applicable scenarios.
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II. DIFFERENCE IN RISK
As with previous cases the companson between reference pncmg and the modified
ihnston-Zeckhauser scheme must take place in two parts. Section 1 assumes that the drug with
== 1.00, '1 == 5.00 has been previously subsidised first while Section 2 has the drug with the quality
istribution characterised by A == 1.00, '1== 1.00as the incumbent with the superior drug seeking to
rter the subgroup.
(1) Difference in risk with (/l =1.00, 7] =5.00) previously subsidised.
Here drug 1 with characteristics A/ == 1.00, '1/ == 1.00 seeks to enter the subgroup where a
iarkedly superior drug 2 is the incumbent (drug 2 has characteristics A2 ==1.00,'12 =5.(0). The
rllowing table gives the equilibrium values of p, the time to subsidisation, the maximum
llowed time to subsidisation and the final subsidised price for the initial subsidisation of drug 2.
c
o
2
p
3.8994
3.9060
3.9263
*t
0.0000
0.2405
0.5000
0.5000
0.5000
0.5000
3.2412
3.2667
3.2766
Table 10.17: Initial subsidisation of a drug with A == 1.00, '1== 5.00.
This case is the first considered where the entrant chooses to price below P~ when
ccepting subsidisation. The general behaviour exhibited by firms in this case under reference
ricing follows the pattern of Figure 10.5. All nine considered scenarios see the incumbent
ontinuing to charge at the pre-entry reference price while the entrant, trying to compete with a
ar superior drug, undercuts in order to gain market share. The entrant's undercutting implies
hat the use of drug 2 attracts a positive charge while, being reference priced, drug 1 remains free
o the consumer.21 The marginal cost of drug 1 is significant in the definition of its reaction
"unction so that the price the entrant charges is dependant on its cost. Firm 1 needs not delay to
.ignal its true cost because regardless of its true cost it has no incentive to misrepresent this
igure. Such a misrepresentation would simply decrease its profits.
21 Recall that pharmacists fees etc. are ignored.
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JZ Variant
P2
2.30 3.27 10.27 15.47 1.94 3.27 13.68 0.00 18.76 0.99 3.27 13.76 18.29
able 10.18: Comparison of systems with a difference in risk (superior firm subsidised).22
The JZ scheme delivers lower producer prices than reference pricing. Consumer prices are
ero under JZ but positive for drug 2 under reference pricing. As a result of this positive charge
le subsidy payments for drug 2 are generally smaller under reference pricing.
The scheme judged superior in this case depends on the criterion that any comparison
x.uses on. If either total surplus or subsidy expenditures is the main measure used, reference
ricing is found to be superior since marginally higher average total surpluses and lower
ubsidies arise here. If consumer surplus is judged as more important than subsidies then the JZ
cheme is favoured. On balance the comparison used here favours the JZ scheme above
eference pricing since the proportionate increase in consumer surplus is of the same magnitude
s the increase in subsidies. The extra expenditure the JZ scheme requires of the taxpayer does
ot increase the average price for treatment greatly. As this comparison relies on a subjective
udgement over the average price of each scheme it is weighted slightly less than the other cases
n the overall comparison.
22 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
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Average decrease in subsidies (RP -0 JZ) -$ 1.57 ill (-12.88%)
Average decrease in CS (RP -0 JZ) -$ 1.85 ill (-10.97%)
Average total surplus - RP $ 14.33 ill
Average total surplus - JZ $ 14.26 ill
Average change in total surplus (RP -0 JZ) -$ 0.06 ill
'able 10.19: Difference in risk (A =1.00, 11 =5.00 previously subsidisedjv'
An interesting point in this example is the question of whether subsidisation would occur
nder reference pricing. The subsidisation of drug 1 under this scheme cuts subsidisation costs
reatly while harming consumer surplus. If the pharmaceutical agency wishes to reduce the cost
f subsidisation it is possible that consumer surplus will be sacrificed. Under the JZ scheme this
rill not be a temptation for the agency since consumer surplus rises and subsidy costs fall as a
esult of the subsidisation of drug 1.
(2) Difference in risk with (Il =1.00, n =1.00) previously subsidised.
Here the superior drug 1 (with characteristics Al = 1.00,lJ 1 = 5.00) seeks subsidisation where
rug 2 (characterised by A2 =1.00,112 =1.00) is the incumbent. The following table gives the
quilibrium values of p, the time to subsidisation, the maximum allowed time to subsidisation
nd the final subsidised price for the initial subsidisation of drug 2.
c * tmax pOp t 2
0 3.5610 0.0000 0.5000 2.5532
3.5722 0.2405 0.5000 2.6002
2 3.6067 0.5000 0.5000 2.6182
Table 10.20: Initial subsidisation of a drug with A=1.00, 11 =1.00.
As in the previous section reference pricing normally results in the two firms charging
lifferent rates with the superior firm pricing at a higher rate. The type of situation covering the
.irst six cases is that displayed on Figure 10.7 where the incumbent reduces price in response to
23 Non-subsidised values used in place of reference pricing for applicable scenarios.
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try but the entrant does not reduce its price below the pre-entry reference price. The final three
enarios follow the more usual case where both firms charge at the pre-entry reference price.
JZ Variant
delay
Only drug 2 subsidised
PI P2 subsidy
") ($m)
able 10.21: Comparison of systems with a difference in risk (inferior drug subsidisedj.i"
For the cases where the costs of both firms are small reference pricing achieves the lowest
roducer prices at the cost of a considerable surcharge for the consumption of the superior drug.
his again comes at the cost of risking non-subsidisation in the case that the entrant has a high
ost. Where the incumbent has marginal costs of zero there is a 16% chance (the probability that
, > 1.67) that the entrant will prefer to remain unsubsidised charging over $3.50 for treatment
-hich must be borne totally by consumers.
Where the incumbent has moderate costs reference pricing again achieves generally lower
rices. The producer price of the inferior drug is smaller under reference pricing while the
uperior drug is marginally more expensive than under the modified JZ scheme. The chance of
on-subsidisation falls to around 12% here.25 The JZ scheme again provides greater consumer
urplus to consumers at the expense of greater subsidy payments.
The case of a high cost incumbent is interesting. With higher costs the reaction function of
he incumbent under reference pricing is sufficiently high to change the type of behaviour
24 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
25 In this case a firm with marginal cost 1.75696 is indifferent to whether or not they are reference
iriced.
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chibited. Instead of the incumbent choosing to undercut it now chooses to remain at the
cisting reference price. The JZ variant continues to give a higher payoff to the higher quality
.ug to compensate them for their non-subsidised profits. This results in higher prices than
.ference pricing where the cost to the entrant is moderate and above but guarantees that
eatment will remain available to consumers free of charge. For firms with costs greater than
Jproximately 1.96 subsidisation under reference pricing is not worthwhile when compared to
Ie alternative of charging a high price directly to consumers.
Again the inability of reference pricing to discriminate between high and low quality drugs
leans that subsidisation is not guaranteed, even where the targeted drug represents a great
dvance to consumers. With a drug as effective as the entrant this leads to a 23% smaller
onsumer surplus measure under reference pricing as opposed to the JZ scheme. Subsidies
.ould have to increase to compensate for this consumer surplus and efficiency would be slightly
nhanced (an average increase of $3.41 m on the nine cases considered) by a move to
ubsidisation under a JZ framework. As the magnitude of average treatment cost is similar
etween the schemes the JZ scheme is found to be superior since it provides higher consumer
nd total surplus measures without wastefully transferring large subsidies to the drug companies.
Average decrease in subsidies (RP -7 JZ) -$ 2.36 m (-25.93%)
Average decrease in CS (RP -7 JZ) -$ 3.41 m (-23.02%)
Average total surplus - RP $ 13.74 m
Average total surplus - JZ $ 13.87 m
Average change in total surplus (RP -7 JZ) $ 0.13 m
Table 10.22: Difference in risk (A= 1.00, TJ =1.00 previously subsidised)
lIll. SUMMARY OF COMPARISONS
The cases considered above give a qualified approval to reference pncmg over the
nodified version of the Johnston and Zeckhauser scheme. This approval is based on a higher
.fficiency measure in most of the addressed cases, including the three considered to be most
ikely (the identically distributed and balanced asymmetry scenarios). As the JZ scheme
suarantees subsidisation it is more predictable in its outcomes than reference pricing.
Jnfortunately for the JZ scheme the cost of this predictability is a delay in subsidisation which
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ill often reduces both consumer and total surplus. In the less likely cases (where drugs that are
)t the same or similar are listed together in a subgroup) the JZ scheme delivers subsidisation
ithout promoting significantly higher prices. It may be possible that the JZ scheme could be
.ed in a limited form to provide subsidisation where reference pricing fails to provide the
-cessary incentive to join the scheme. An alternative means to provide subsidisation may be a
iluable tool for Pharmac here. Note that firms with similar products would not have an
.centive to falsely signal differentiated products as the returns accruing to such firms under the
~ scheme are relatively low.
Efficiency considerations recommend reference pncrng In cases where drugs are
.iaracterised similarly. With such drugs, reference pricing leads to no price differentials and the
rugs attain a relatively even share of the market. Here reference pricing results in zero
onsumer prices throughout the time period. The JZ scheme results in zero prices only from the
me of subsidisation onwards. Pre-subsidisation, the JZ scheme results in high consumer prices
)1' the entrant and correspondingly lower consumer and total surplus measures. The JZ scheme
romotes lower efficiency because of lower total surplus during the pre-subsidisation period.
'he cases of identically distributed drugs and a balanced asymmetry between drugs favour
eference pricing for this reason.
Efficiency considerations recommend the JZ scheme in many of the remaining cases.
Vhere there is a large difference in efficacy (for example A.] = 1,A. 2 < 0.62, where 7J i = 1) and the
.iferior firm attempts to join the scheme the benefits of the drug are often not enough to justify
.ie marginal cost of treatment. Total surplus is often higher in the case where the
re-subsidisation price is charged rather than zero. Reference pricing, which immediately
chieves a zero price for the entrant is therefore of a lower level of efficiency than the JZ variant.
Vhere there is a difference in efficacy and the superior firm is the entrant there is no guarantee
hat subsidisation will take place under reference pricing. Here there is a significant probability
hat the entrant will choose not to be reference priced, resulting in a large drop in consumer
urplus. Efficiency is higher under the JZ scheme which achieves subsidisation at a low price,
ilbeit with a delay.
Where the case of a difference in risk is considered, efficiency favours the JZ scheme in the
.ase of a superior entrant. Here the problem referred to immediately above occurs again in that
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~ entrant may optimally choose not to accept subsidisation under reference pricing. This makes
erence pricing far less expensive but causes a large drop in total surplus.
Where there is a difference in risk with entrant seeking listing alongside a supenor
ernative both schemes achieve subsidisation. Where the inferior firm has a low marginal cost
chooses to price considerably below the pre-entry reference price. The relatively large
nsurner price leads to far lower consumer surplus, although total surplus is higher under
ference pricing. The superior efficiency under reference pricing is due both to higher consumer
ices (which are more accurate signals of marginal cost) promoted, and the delay the JZ requires
fore subsidisation occurs.
For a scheme to be judged superior overall it would have to promote either a moderately
.tter outcome in the cases where drugs were similar (which are the most likely scenarios) or it
auld have to promote a very large increase in efficiency in some of the less likely cases. The
ference pricing scheme satisfies the former of these criteria, while the JZ scheme fails to
'omote far higher efficiency in the less realistic cases in which it is superior.
These results may however depend on the values taken for different variables. The
.nsitivity of results to changes in these variables is assessed in the following section.
(, SENSITIVITY TESTS
The above results rely on several variables many of which have already been tested for
ieir affect on results through the comparisons. Differences in efficacy, risk and costs are not
nalysed because of their inclusion in this process. The following two sections consider changes
) the results as a consequence of changes in the allowable time to subsidisation and the time
ntil generic entry. Section 3 analyses the effect of adding a fixed charge to the model. This
ixed charge would apply to all drugs under the JZ scheme and serve as a base to which positive
rice differentials would be added under reference pricing. Tables for each of these cases are
ncluded in Appendix 10.2.
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(1) Sensitivity of results to the allowable time to subsidisation
The previous chapter showed how the JZ scheme defines the subsidy received by a firm as
'unction of the time at which subsidisation is accepted. Firms with low marginal costs are
couraged to signal their true cost by means of decreasing premium on top of the payment
pporting their pre-subsidisation profits. This premium decreases to zero at the maximum
owable time to subsidisation. Two alternative cases are considered to the tmax =0.5 years used
ove: tmax =0.25 and tmax = 1.00. It is expected that the more patient is the agency'? the lower
11 be the premium required for subsidisation within the time threshold.
The case of identical drugs where both firms have marginal cost equal to 1 is considered
r the purpose of analysing the sensitivity of results to tmax ' In the normal case27 initial
bsidisation occurs at time t =0.2405 at a price of 2.6002. Prior to subsidisation the firm would
rve priced at 3.5722 in order to obtain maximum profits. A firm determines this pre-subsidised
ice by trading off cost and benefits of moving from the non-subsidisation optimum. A higher
e-subsidisation price increases the premium on offer to firms received once subsidised.
lternatively the higher is the pre-subsidised price the lower will be profits before subsidisation
.curs and the lower will be the price that makes firm indifferent over whether it is subsidised.
Low cost firms are subsidised quickly under the JZ scheme and so obtain a relatively large
'emium. By pricing above their no-subsidisation optimum these firms can increase the size of
le premium and attain higher profits. Firms with higher costs face a longer time unsubsidised
rd so receive a smaller premium. These firms find it optimal to price closer to their no-
ibsidisation optimum because the payoff to increasing their price is 10wer.28 Firms with the
iaximum marginal cost possible never receive a premium and so choose to price at their no-
rbsidisation optimum.
Suppose that the time threshold for subsidisation (t") falls so that firms with positive costs
xpect to be subsidised sooner. The benefits to pricing above the no-subsidisation optimum have
rcreased because the period over which the increased premium is enjoyed has grown. Firms
26 And hence the longer the delay to subsidisation.
27 t* =0.50
2B The price referred to here is pre-subsidisation price.
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th marginal costs less than the maximum will then price further away to their respective no-
osidisation optimum, selecting a higher pre-subsidised price. Where the time threshold falls to
~5 initial subsidisation of a firm with A=1.00, TJ =1.00 and marginal cost of 1 predictably occurs
)re quickly than where the time threshold is tmax =0.50. Subsidisation is accepted at t =0.1226
a higher price (2.6094) and is motivated by the greater pre-subsidised price of 3.5891. Note
lt the shortening of the time threshold affects both reference pricing and the modified JZ
heme since both use the same value for initial subsidisation. With an entrant marketing an
dependent and identically distributed drug (denoted drug 1) the outcomes of the JZ scheme and
Ference pricing are given below:
Reference Pricing JZ Variant Only drug 2 subsidised
PI P2 subsidy CS PI P2 subsidy delay CS PI P2 subsidy CS
(PI") (P2") ($m) ($m) (PI") (p/) ($m) ($m) (PI") (P2") ($m) ($m)
~5 2.61 2.6\ 10.15 12.78 2.38 2.61 9.64 0.12 12.66 2.95 2.61 7.05 8.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.95) (0.00)
.o 2.60 2.60 10.11 12.78 2.37 2.60 9.54 0.24 12.56 2.95 2.60 7.03 8.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.95) (0.00)
able 10.23: Comparison of results with a shortening of the allowable time threshold.i"
The results of each of these cases are similar as far as subsidies and consumer surplus are
mcerned; reference pricing promotes higher prices and subsidy payments than the modified JZ
.herne. With a higher pre-entry reference price subsidy payments have increased under
.ference pricing. Subsidy payments have increased under the JZ scheme due to slight increases
1 price and a longer period over which subsidisation occurs. This second factor slightly closes
Ie gap between the subsidy payments required under each scheme. Under the smaller threshold
alue a comparison of total surplus still favours reference pricing over the JZ scheme as any
elay harms efficiency here. The margin by which the efficiency measure favours reference
ricing has fallen with the effect of shifting from the RP scheme to JZ being -$0.18 m for the
nux =0.50 case but only -$0.09 for the smaller threshold.
The following diagrams show the effect of reducing the subsidisation threshold graphically.
'he diagram on the left is relevant to a firm with constant marginal costs of I under the JZ
cheme since this firm would price at 3.4559 pre-subsidisation. The graph shows the prices
iffered to such a firm if it accepts subsidisation at time t where the time threshold is 0.25 years.
29 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
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such a firm was to have accepted subsidisation at time zero it would be subsidised at a price of
Iproximately 2.35, if it waited until t =0.25 it would obtain a price of approximately 2.39.
iven this function the firm chooses to accept subsidisation at time 0.1226 and receives a price
:2.3783.
Price[t]
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0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
Price[t]
2.3~--+----+---+:;7"""'----+---+
2.3n+---+----A'i"'------+----+-------..+-
--t---cr--t----_t_~~-+---+_~___+_t
05
Figure 10.8: Price functions for time thresholds 0.25 and 0.5, respectively.
The diagram on the right displays the prices offered to the same firm where the time
ireshold is 0.50. The firm charges at 3.4353 before being subsidised and chooses when to
ccept subsidisation given that the subsidy to a firm accepting subsidisation at time t is as shown
n the second graph. The price at the end of the period is very close to the equivalent under the
rwer time threshold while price at time zero is approximately 2.31. Reducing the time to
ubsidisation reduces the potential for the JZ scheme to restrict prices since the smaller the
rreshold is the closer are prices to the level required to make the maximum cost firm indifferent
) whether subsidisation occurs.
For the case of a longer time to subsidisation the results found are still close to those in the
riginal but, because of a longer delay to subsidisation, tend to favour the modified JZ scheme
[lore. With tmax =1.00 initial subsidisation occurs at time 0.4641 and results in a price 2.5808.
\ price of 3.5402 had been charged by the first firm before subsidisation.
Reference Pricing 1Z Variant Only drug 2 subsidised
"ax PI P2 subsidy CS PI P2 subsidy delay CS PI P2 subsidy CS
(PI") (P2") ($m) ($m) (PIC) (P2C) ($m) ($m) (PI") (P2C) ($m) ($m)
,00 2.58 2,58 10.04 12,78 2.34 2.58 9,33 0.46 12.36 2.95 2.58 6.98 8.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.95) (0.00)
1.50 2.60 2.60 10.11 12.78 2.37 2.60 9.54 0.24 12.56 2.95 2.60 7.03 8.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.95) (0.00)
fable 10.24: Comparison of results with a lengthening of the allowable time threshold?O
30 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
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Again the general results found earlier hold here also. It appears that while changing the
dmum allowable time to subsidisation does affect the level of prices it does not change the
lparative standings of RP and the JZ variant significantly as far as the general results in
:es, subsidies and consumer surplus obtained. Under a total surplus comparison however the
, between reference pricing and the JZ scheme has grown from $0.18 m (tmax=0.50) to
35 m (tmax = 1). Given these, and even higher thresholds the findings of this thesis in favour
-eference pricing become stronger still. The diagram corresponding to the price function the
11 faces under a threshold of tmax =1 is given below:
Price[t]
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2.34- -r- -- ,
2.32 ~ I
L......-OkL_- .8----
i
_----1 _
i
··---··1--------------···-+------ ---- ---+-
Figure 10.9: Price functions for time threshold 1.00.
The prices available to the firm on acceptance of subsidisation vary greatly with respect to
~ time threshold. This diagram strengthens the argument above that the smaller is the threshold
~ flatter is the curve representing the prices on offer to a firm. The flatter is this curve the
taller is the advantage gained by using a scheme that discriminates on price over a scheme that
mpensates all firms at the level perfectly compensating a firm with c =2. The general results
~ likely to be consistent between different cases relieving concern over the sensitivity of results
the time threshold.
(2) Sensitivity of results to the time to generic entry
The comparison above has used a time to generic entry equal to the effective patent life of a
ug but it is acknowledged that this may be inaccurate for one of two reasons. There may be a
lay either between the registration of a drug and any application to Pharmac or a delay once
ch an application has been lodged while firms await a response from Pharmac. Generic drugs
ay either not be available at the time of patent expiration or they may face significant barriers to
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ry. Woodfield, Fountain and Borren make reference to an informal policy of Pharmac to
[uire successive generic entrants to cut prices by 30%, 20%, and 10% of the currently reference
ced product. It was argued that this could represent a significant deterrent for generic entry? 1
Of these factors the latter is judged to be significant to only generics while the former is
ely to apply to both innovators and generic manufacturers. Delays in introduction applying to
th innovative drugs and generics will cancel out and so are ignored here. In order to be safe a
atively long delay is assumed for generic entry into the market for the purposes of this
nsitivity test so that the total time innovative drugs face they expect before generic entry is 8.00
ars. This is composed of the 5.98 years that has been estimated for effective patent life under
~w Zealand patent law and a delay to generic entry of just over two years. As before the case of
entically distributed drugs is assessed where the time threshold is 0.5 and marginal costs are 1.
ne Reference Pricing JZ Variant Only drug 2 subsidised
entry PI P2 subsidy CS PI P2 subsidy delay CS PI P2 subsidy cs
(PI') (p2') ($m) ($m) (PI') (P2') ($m) ($m) (PI') (p?') ($m) ($m)
)0 2.611 2.60 12.40 15.63 2.37 2.60 11.71 0.24 15.41 2.95 2.60 8.61 11.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.95) (0.00)
)8 2.611 2.60 10.11 12.78 2.37 2.60 9.54 0.24 12.56 2.95 2.60 7.03 8.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.95) (0.00)
able 10.25: Comparison of results with an extension of patent protection.Y
For the case where T =8.00 very little changes as far as the results obtained are concerned.
he subsidies required and CS resulting from each alternative inevitably rise with the expansion
f the time frame. What has not changed is that reference pricing still results in larger prices and
rbsidy costs for both firms. Prices have risen slightly'" because the relative length of time
ireshold to the total time period lengthens as a result of the change. The change is minor
owever since profits are discounted by firms when making decisions." Without changes in the
elative sizes of variables between schemes very little has changed, suggesting that the
31 Woodfield, A. and others (1997) p.150.
32 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
33 As an example the price of firm 1 under the JZ variant rose by 0.004.
8.00
34 The value of $1 given through the additional period is only fe-0. Itdr = 1.0058. The total value of
5.98
; I profit throughout the interval does not change greatly as a result of the lengthening and so neither do
iptimal choices.
35
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mparisons above are not particularly sensitive to a lengthening of the time period. A
ortening of the time period is unlikely unless the effective patent life of a drug falls further and
is not considered here.
In an efficiency comparison reference pricing was found to be $0.18 m superior to the JZ
heme for the case where T = 5.98. Where the larger time to generic entry is considered the
fference is close to this level while the overall size of total surplus has increased, rendering the
fference less significant. It is expected that this difference will remain under larger time
irizons as the JZ scheme still requires a delay for signalling purposes. The findings of this
esis should then persist under changes to the time to generic entry.
(3) Sensitivity of results to a positive fixed charge
Both the JZ and RP schemes allow for the levying of a fixed charge to consumers. In the
ase of the JZ scheme consumers face this charge on every treatment option while under
.ference pricing consumers face this charge plus any positive price differential. Previously a
xed charge of zero has been used for simplicity reasons. The sensitivity of the results to the
nplementation of a positive charge is expected to be very low given that this charge applies
qually to both schemes and to all drugs in the subgroup. A fixed charge of 0.50 has been
pplied to all patients for the purpose of this analysis which addresses the case of two identically
istributed drugs with qualities distributed according to A = 1.00, TJ = 1.00 and marginal costs of
With the fixed charge of k =0.50 initial subsidisation involves higher prices with the
ncurnbent accepting subsidisation at time t =0.2405 and receiving a subsidy-inclusive price of
:.6412.
35 In reality different groups of people are charged different amounts for the same medicine. The
ictual price paid may depends the income, age, occupation and prior illnesses of a patient. For example,
ow income patients and students may use community service cards to obtain cheaper (or free) treatment.
I'hese differences between individuals are ignored in the simple test above which attempts only to see
effects of imposing a positive charge. If the relative standings of schemes do not change greatly in the
sensitivity test then the results are likely to hold for all patients of similar income, age etc. If standings
told across all the different types of consumers the results, being an aggregation of each of the individual
cases, should hold.
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Reference Pricing JZ Variant Only drug 2 subsidised
PI P2 subsidy CS PI P2 subsidy delay CS PI P2 subsidy CS
(p IC) (P2C) ($m) ($m) (Pi C) (p/) ($m) ($Ill) (PIC) (P2C) ($m) ($m)
0.50 2.64 2.64 8.04 10.86 2.42 2.64 7.53 0.24 10.68 2.95 2.64 5.38 7.68
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (2.95) (0.50)
0.00 2.60 2.60 10.11 12.78 2.37 2.60 9.54 0.24 12.56 2.95 2.60 7.03 8.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.95) (0.00)
ble 10.26: Comparison of results with the addition of a fixed charge.'"
With a fixed charge quantity falls and price rises but not by the full value of the charge.
bsidy payments have fallen because of lower per-unit subsidies and quantities. The relative
sitions of the three schemes have stayed constant with reference pricing promoting higher
ices and increased subsidy costs to the JZ alternative. Both the RP and modified JZ schemes
~ superior to leaving the entrant's drug unsubsidised on the basis of consumer surplus while
.th are correspondingly more expensive.
Total surplus in the benchmark case found that reference pricing was $0.18 m superior to
e JZ scheme. With the addition of a fixed charge this figure falls to $0.15 m suggesting
corporation of a fixed charge would have enhanced the strength of the JZ scheme in the
imparison to reference pricing above. The effects of larger fixed charges are unknown and may
'esent an avenue for further research.
In summary the results obtained above appear to be stable with respect to the factors of the
.aximum time to subsidisation, the value of the fixed charge placed on drugs and the time that
inovators enjoy freedom from generic competition.
36 See Appendix 10.1 for full table.
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MARGINAL COST PRICING
Under a modified form of the JZ scheme it is possible to charge consumers the marginal
st of their treatment. A parallel scheme under reference pricing would see firms charge at
arginal cost plus any positive price differential. This modified reference pricing scheme is
iwever not possible given the restraints that Pharmac places on entry under reference pricing.
Pharmac was to release these restraints then the pharmaceutical bill would rise sharply as
ference pricing in an unrestricted form is unable to keep prices low.
The basis of the JZ scheme was a signalling equilibrium where different firms select
fferent points at which to enter and gain different payments in equilibrium. These payments
creased over time and were orientated in such a way as to make it worthwhile for firms to
'edibly signal their true cost. It is the necessity that these subsidies increase that prevents a
gnalling equilibrium in price under reference pricing.f The scenarios above suggest that firms
.cepting subsidisation under reference pricing typically do so at the pre-existing reference price.
. all firms choose to price at the same level there appears to be no way for Pharmac to
ifferentiate between firms of different costs. Without the ability to identify the marginal cost of
firm a scheme of marginal cost pricing is impossible. Where firms have positive fixed costs
ie problem of such pooling equilibria may prevent the use of Ramsey pricing which relies on an
gency knowing the both the fixed and marginal costs of the firm. 38
The modified JZ scheme identified previously gives the subsidising agency more options
«ith respect to policy decisions. While such options are not essential for an agency such as
'harrnac they may prove valuable. The ability to use a cheaper scheme in areas where
ubsidisation is currently considered marginal may enhance the chance of drugs being available
o consumers at low cost.
37 Signalling equilibria where other variables are used are likely to be logistically difficult but may
.till be possible.
38 Ramsey pricing is a two part scheme involving a fixed fee and price per unit. The price per unit
s equal to marginal cost of the firm. The fixed fee is specific to individuals and is inversely proportional
o the buyer's elasticity of demand.
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:I. PATENT INTEGRITY
The ability of firms to make payments to parent companies is a vital link in the process of
ncouraging research and development in the pharmaceutical industry. New Zealand's scheme
f reference pricing has faced criticism for not providing adequate returns to pharmaceutical
.rdustry. Danzon (1997) specifically identifies New Zealand as a small country not contributing
) research and development in the following quoter'"
The low ratio of marginal cost to sunk, joint costs gives any powerful drug purchaser an
incentive to try to drive prices down to the marginal cost of serving their patient population,
leaving others to pay the joint costs of R&D. Small countries such as New Zealand can
pursue this strategy with a negligible effect on global incentives for drug innovation as long as
markets remain separate. The effects of these strategies expand, however, and affect
consumers worldwide once spillovers become common and markets are no longer separable
because of parallel trade and regulation based on international price comparisons.
In addition to the arguments put forward above a scheme promoting insufficient returns
vill also spread if seen to be effective. While such a scheme may be relatively harmless if
mrsued in one or two small countries only it becomes dangerous to patent integrity if appreciable
xirtions of the worldwide pharmaceutical market adopt it.
The following section addresses the profits made by each firm and attempts to assess the
effects of subsidisation on the ability of firms to make research and development contributions to
parent companies. This analysis cannot seek to state whether either the JZ or reference pricing
schemes would allow for a reasonable return to pharmaceuticals in a real world situation since
this depends largely on the length of patent protection. This section compares each scheme to an
unregulated duopoly and can only assess whether, given a sufficient patent length, a scheme
provides for sufficient profits to protect the integrity of the R&D process.
Part of the rationale for not using option four of the original JZ scheme for the template of
the modified version was concern over the low level of profit accruing to firms. For the patent
system to retain integrity there must be parity between the profits achievable under the
subsidisation scheme and the free market. The following tables examine the outcomes expected
:I') Danzon, P.M. (1997) Pharmaceutical Price Regulation: National Policies Vs Global Interests.
Washington, AEI Press. p.2S
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or each case under a unregulated duopoly as well as the modified JZ and reference pricing
chemes.
(1) Identically distributed drugs
~ntrant: A= 1.00, TJ =1.00 Incumbent: A=1.00, TJ =1.00
Unregulated duopoly JZ Variant Reference pricing
cz=a Cz = I Cz =2 Cz =a Cz = 1 Cz = 2 Cz = a Cz = 1 Cz = 2
;1 =a 3.49 3.84 4.12 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.97 5.06 5.09
3.49 2.26 1.28 4.97 3.JJ 1.20 4.97 3.JJ 1.20
;1 = 1 2.26 2.45 2.69 2.59 2.59 2.59 3.02 3.JJ 3.15
3.84 2.45 1.39 5.08 3.18 1.23 4.97 3.JJ 1.20
; I =2 1.28 1.39 1.52 0.76 0.76 0.76 1.08 1.17 1.20
4.12 2.69 1.52 5.20 3.26 1.26 4.97 3.11 1.20
fable 10.27: Profits to firms with identically distributed drugs.4o
Table 10.31 displays the profits accruing to firms where both firms have identically
distributed drugs characterised by A =1.00, TJ =1.00. Under an unregulated duopoly the average
profit for a firm in the nine cases displayed is $2.56 m. For both the JZ variant and reference
pricing to maintain the integrity of the patent system each must contribute at least this amount on
average. In the above table where the profits to a firm are more than $0.10 m lower than the
profits under the unregulated duopoly position they are displayed in bold type. Where the profits
are more than $0.10 m higher than expected without any subsidisation they are displayed in an
italic font. Through this simple device it is hoped that a graphic representation of the behaviour
of each scheme with respect to profits can be used to aid the summary of results. This
convention is continued through to Table 10.33.
The JZ scheme favours the incumbent firm as this firm receives a large subsidy than if
positions with the entrant were reversed since it makes lower unsubsidised profits when facing
competition. Under the JZ scheme high cost firms are unlikely to make the profits they would
have had the market been unregulated but this loss is outweighed by the higher profits made
elsewhere. On an average of the nine cases considered the entrant makes $ 2.62 m while the
incumbent gains $3.17 m, both of which are in excess of the $ 2.65 m that would have been
made in the absence of regulation.
40 In $m, drug 1 is assumed to be the entrant's product. Profits in each cell appear as (~~).
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Reference pricing also provides adequate returns to firms. Under reference pricing both the
.ntrant and incumbent make $3.09 m. The cases above for reference pricing are not generally
:ymmetrical in the sense that the profit accruing to the entrant where c\=O and c2=2 does not
.qual the profit to the incumbent where c\=2 and C2=0. For profits to be symmetric in the above
.ense would require that the pre-entry reference price in each case is identical which in turn
'equires firms to have identical costs. As with the JZ case high cost firms are typically under-
unded in the sense that their profits are less than that expected under an unregulated duopoly.
[he reference pricing scheme does provide for slightly smaller profits for the incumbent firm
.han the JZ scheme but larger profits for the entrant.
(2) Balanced asymmetry
Entrant: A = 0.90, T) =1.00 Incumbent: A = 0.85, 1] = 1.10
Unregulated duopoly JZ Variant
C2 =0 C2 = 1 C2 =2 C2 =0 C2 = 1 C2 =2
Reference pricing
C2 =0 C2 = I C2 = 2
CI =0 3.00 3.29 3.51 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.27 4.36 4.39
2.85 1.69 0.82 4.59 2.72 0.80 4.59 2.72 0.80
CI = I 1.81 2.00 2.17 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.44 2.53 2.57
3.13 1.84 0.89 4.68 2.78 0.82 4.59 2.72 0.80
CI =2 0.93 1.02 1.12 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.62 0.71 0.74
3.37 2.02 0.97 4.77 2.83 0.83 4.59 2.72 0.80
Table 10.28: Profits: balanced asymmetry (A =0.85, T) = 1.10 incumbent)."!
In the case of a balanced asymmetry the firm with A =0.85, T) =1.10 typically makes profits
of around $1.95 m under the unregulated position while a firm with A=0.90, T) =1.00 gains
$2.09 m. Both the JZ and reference pricing schemes allow for profits greater than these amounts.
Where the entrant drug is characterised by A =0.90, T) =1.00 the JZ scheme promotes average
profits of $2.28 m while the RP scheme provides for profits of $2.51 m. Under each of these
schemes lower cost firms predictably make higher profits these averages. The incumbent firm
here makes profits of $2.76 m (JZ) and $2.70 m (RP) both of which are higher than the profits
achieved under an unregulated duopoly.
41 In $m, drug I is assumed to be the entrant's product. Profits in each cell appear as G~).
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itrant: It == 0.85, TJ == 1.10 Incumbent: It == 0.90, 17 == 1.00
Unregulated duopoly JZ Variant Reference pricing
C2 == 0 C2 == I C2 == 2 C2 == 0 C2 == 1 C2 == 2 C2 == 0 C2 == 1 C2 == 2
== 0 2.85 3.13 3.37 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.71 4.80 4.84
3.00 1.81 0.93 4.38 2.64 0.85 4.38 2.64 0.85
= I 1.69 1.84 2.02 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.75 2.84 2.88
3.29 2.00 1.02 4.48 2.70 0.87 4.38 2.64 0.85
= 2 0.82 0.89 0.97 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.79 0.88 0.92
3.51 2.17 1.12 4.58 2.77 0.89 4.38 2.64 0.85
'able 10.29: Profits: balanced asymmetry (It == 0.90,17 = 1.00 incumbentj.f
Where the drug with the distribution characterised by It == 0.90, 17 == 1.00 is the incumbent both
chemes give (on average) greater profits to both schemes than enjoyed under the unregulated
else. The incumbent can expect to receive $2.95 m under the JZ scheme and $2.62 m under the
.P scheme while only $2.09 m is expected under an unregulated duopoly. The entrant receives
2.40 m under the JZ scheme and $2.82 m under reference pricing, up from $1.95 under an
nregulated duopoly.
It is expected that in compansons over the entire range of costs both schemes grve
ufficient returns to firms to allow them to make at least the R&D contributions made were no
ubsidy scheme in place.
(3) Difference in efficacy
ntrant: It == 0.50, 17 == 1.00 Incumbent: It == 1.00, 17 == 1.00
Unregulated duopoly JZ Variant
~==O ~==1 ~==2 ~=O ~==1 ~==2
Reference pricing
C2 == 0 C2 == 1 C2 == 2
1=0 0.90 0.97 1.06 2.74 2.74 2.74 3.63 3.70 3.72
4.23 2.78 1.59 5.86 3.67 2.29 5.86 3.67 1.42
1= I 0.32 0.35 0.38 1.35 1.35 1.35 2.21 2.28 2.30
4.40 2.92 1.70 5.93 3.71 1.42 5.86 3.67 1.42
1= 2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.79 0.85 0.88
4.48 2.99 1.75 6.00 3.76 1.45 5.86 3.67 1.42
l'able 10.30: Profits: difference in efficacy (It == 1.00, 17 == 1.00 Incumbentj.P
42 In $m, drug 1 is assumed to be the entrant's product. Profits in each cell appear as (~~).
43 In $m, drug 1 is assumed to be the entrant's product. Profits in each cell appear as (~~).
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'his case gives excess profits to both firms in the vast majority of cases. Only where the
icumbent has a high cost is there potential for firms to be given less than had no subsidisation
cheme been implemented. The incumbent here makes profits of $2.98 m in an unregulated
uopoly but $3.69 m and $3.65 m under the JZ and reference pricing schemes respectively. The
ntrant makes far greater profits under the subsidisation schemes than an unregulated duopoly:
1.37 m (JZ) and $2.26 m (RP) as compared to $0.46 m in the absence of subsidisation. Both
urns benefit from subsidisation in almost all cases.
ntrant: A = 1.00, lJ= 1.00 Incumbent: A = 0.50, lJ= 1.00
Unregulated duopoly JZ Variant Reference pricing
~=O ~=I ~=2 ~=O ~=I ~=2 ~=O ~=I ~=2
1=0 4.23 4.40 4.48 5.16 5.16 5.16 4.45 4.60 4.66
0.90 0.32 0.04 2.76 1.43 0.04 2.76 1.43 0.04
1=1 2.78 2.92 2.99 2.91 2.91 2.91 2.29 2.30 2.37
0.97 0.35 0.04 2.84 1.47 0.05 1.42 1.43 0.04
1=2 1.59 1.70 1.75 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
1.06 0.38 0.04 2.92 1.51 0.05 4.25 1.43 0.07
~able 10.31: Profits: difference in efficacy (A = 0.50, lJ= 1.00 incumbentj."
Where the superior drug seeks to enter the market there are problems regarding the level of
ubsidisation of this firm. Under the JZ variant the firm makes $2.94 m as opposed to $2.98 m
vhen all firms are unsubsidised. This is a relatively small drop in profits (especially when
:ompared to the increases in profits from JZ subsidisation earlier) although it does point to the
iossibility of serious problems should the difference in efficacy be any greater. The RP scheme
s problematic in this case. The level of subsidisation is defined by the pre-entry reference price
if the incumbent. Where the incumbent is markedly inferior to the entrant the reference may not
illow the entrant to make sufficient profits. Subsidisation is accepted by the entrant for the first
wo cases but in the third (C2 =2) the offer of subsidisation is declined in favour of the firm
'etaining the ability to price above the reference price. Here the entrant makes only $2.53 m as
ipposed to the $2.94 m required if reference pricing could be said to provide for adequate
rubsidisation.
44 In $m, drug 1 is assumed to be the entrant's product. Profits in each cell appear as (~;). With a
righ cost entrant reference pricing is declined by the entrant who chooses to remain unsubsidised.
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In each of the cases in Table 10.31 the incumbent is provided with at least as much profit
that achievable under the unregulated duopoly. The $0.46 m made without subsidisation is
.arfed by the $1.45 m possible under the JZ scheme and the $1.58 m available under reference
cmg.
In general this case points to a senous problem with reference pricing that has been
-ntified earlier. Reference pricing gives no consideration to the quality of a drug so that a
perior entrant may find that the subsidisation on offer is insufficient to prompt participation in
~ scheme. Even where subsidisation is accepted reference pricing will not always give
equate profits to firms at moderate levels of cost.
(4) Difference in risk
trant: A = 1.00, T) = 1.00 Incumbent: A= 1.00, T) = 5.00
Unregulated duopoly JZ Variant
C2 = 0 C2 = I C2 = 2 C2 = 0 C2 = I C2 = 2
Reference pricing
C2 = 0 C2 = I C2 = 2
=0 2,81 3.25 3.66 1.46 1.46 1.46 3.19 3.23 3.24
8.56 6.16 3.94 12.12 8.48 4.78 9.95 6.95 3.91
=1 1.61 1.97 2.30 0.73 0.73 0.73 1.92 1.95 1.89
9.32 6.70 4.28 12.25 8.57 4.82 10.85 7.57 4.31
=2 0.72 0.97 1.22 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.94 0.96 0.97
lO.18 7.31 4.67 12.37 8.65 4.87 11.86 8.28 4.66
able 10.32: Profits: difference in risk (A =1.00, 1] =5.00 Incumbent)."
Here the JZ scheme fails to give the requisite return to the entrant in any of the nine cases
msidered, Without the ability to impose a positive price on its opposition the entrant makes
ext to no profits when unsubsidised which severely affects the profits it makes in equilibrium.
he JZ scheme on promotes average profits of only $0.74 m to the entrant compared to the
2.06 m available to the firm on average had no subsidisation scheme been implemented.
eference pricing also fails to allow the firm to make its required profits, the average of $2.03 m
illing slightly short of the unsubsidised level. The incumbent in each case is well provided for
.ceiving $8.54 m under the JZ scheme and $7.59 m under reference pricing compared with a
gure of $6.79 m under an unregulated duopoly.
45 In $m, drug 1 is assumed to be the entrant's product. Profits in each cell appear as (~~).
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urant: A = 1.00, TJ =5.00 Incumbent: A= 1.00, TJ =1.00
Unregulated duopoly JZ Variant Reference pricing
C2 =0 C2 = 1 C2 =2 C2 =0 C2 = 1 C2 =2 C2 =0 C2 = 1 C2 =2
=0 8.56 9.32 10.18 9.64 9.64 9.64 8.32 9.21 9.80
2.81 1.61 0.72 1.91 1.20 0.46 2.29 1.26 0.46
= I 6.16 6.70 7.31 5.96 5.96 5.96 5.06 5.67 6.05
3.25 1.97 0.97 2.17 1.36 0.53 2.29 1.26 0.46
=2 3.94 4.28 4.67 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41
3.66 2.30 1.22 2.44 1.53 0.59 6.79 4.25 1.64
able 10.33: Profits: difference in risk (A =1.00, TJ =1.00 incumbentj."
In the final case neither firm makes the profits it would have made were no subsidisation
ffered. The entrant receives on average profits of only $6.08 m under the JZ scheme and
5.70 m under reference pricing compared with the $6.79 m it would have made under an
nregulated duopoly. The incumbent also receives too little by way of profit from the JZ scheme
1.35 m (as opposed to $2.06 m). Under reference pricing the entrant receives on average
2.30 m because of the non-subsidisation of high cost incumbents under reference pricing. In
eneral both schemes would suggest that with differences as extreme as those in the case of an
symmetry in risk above it is prudent to list both drugs in separate therapeutic subgroups in order
) maintain the integrity of the patent scheme. That this will occur is not clear given the subsidy
avings available to agencies and may well be a cause of concern under any subsidisation
cherne.
GI. RAMSEY PRICING
Posner (1992) defines Ramsey pricing as follows: 47
Ramsey pricing - if one ignores the formidable information costs entailed by efforts to
measure elasticities and to prevent arbitrage - is the following. As in two-part pricing, every
buyer pays and entry fee to cover fixed costs, but the fee varies inversely with the buyer's
elasticity of demand - and the truly marginal buyer pays no entry fee. In addition to the entry
fee each buyer pays the marginal cost of each unit that he buys. Given perfect information,
46 In $m, drug 1 is assumed to be the entrant's product. Profits in each cell appear as (~~). With a
iigh cost entrant reference pricing is declined by the entrant who chooses to remain unsubsidised.
47 Posner, R.A. (1992) The Economic Analysis of Law. Boston, Little, Brown and Company. 4th
.dition. pp.354-355.
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output will be carried to the point where marginal cost intersects demand, yet without
imposing a deficit on the regulated firm or a tax on non-users of the regulated service.
Posner describes the two part form of Ramsey pncmg. Alternative forms of Ramsey
'icing exist that see different individuals purchasing goods at different rates according to the
.verse of their price elasticity of demand. The analysis below concentrates on the two part form
c' Ramsey pricing. This is not significant given the problems of applying Ramsey pricing here.
Ramsey pricing is unlikely to be an optimal arrangement in the market for pharmaceuticals.
uppose that the subsidising agency does not know the individual specific side effect that a
atient faces but still has perfect information over the costs of each firm. They will have to either
ay exorbitant amounts to ascertain this figure or act only on the basis of the information by
atients. If the agency decides to pursue the former they can obtain the true effect that the
elected drug has on a patient.
If the agency does not know the individual specific side effect a patient faces it acts from
ie only piece of information it has - that the patient actually used the drug in treatment. All
atients using a particular drug are perceived identically by the agency and therefore must be
'eated identically. Two part pricing results with marginal cost charged on a per-unit basis and a
ixed charge of F / {l.48 Patients indifferent over treatment at marginal cost will find it optimal
ot to consume given the additional charge F / {l levied upon them. Ramsey price is distortionary
ere and so loses its optimality. The JZ scheme of Chapter 7 (marginal cost pricing) is not
istortionary although it will be more expensive to the government since it is not self-financing.l"
Let us now consider the case where the individual specific side effect is known. Recall that
he quantity of a drug taken is not a choice over a continuous range of values but rather is a
rinary choice. Quantity is choice between the values 0 (connotes no treatment) and 1 (implies
u11 treatment). This is not a particularly challenging assumption but causes major problems in
he application of Ramsey pricing. For a patient facing quality CfJi:
48 Where F is the fixed cost and {l is the quantity of the drug.
49 Recall that the version of the JZ scheme in Chapter 7 was based on perfect information and so
.ncornpassed no delay.
Jo
q :="1
' II
if cP_ < i:
I L
I-t' > PiCPi -T
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he derivative of the demand function is:
jo if Pi> LCPidq, _ -00 if Pi = LCPidp, 0 if Pi < LCPi
rd the elasticity of demand is:
jUndefined ifE = dqi l!i- = -00 ifdp, a. 0 if LCPi < PiLCPi = PiLCPi > Pi-
Under Ramsey pricing patients who do not purchase the drug (LCPi < Pi = cJ and patients
-ho are indifferent towards the purchase of the drug (LCPi = Pi = ci ) pay nothing. All fixed costs
l'e paid by those who find purchasing the drug strictly better than not doing so. Elasticities are
qual for all consumers with CPi> Ii so the fixed fee will be charged equally across all these
atients.i" Where fixed costs are positive some patients will decide not to undergo treatment
ven though the net benefit of it is positive." As in the case where no individual specific side
ffects are known Ramsey pricing is less efficient than the marginal cost pricing JZ scheme of
'h t 7 52, ap er .
Ramsey pricing does not discriminate well between patients with different valuations in the
ase where quantity is a binary choice. A scheme of Ramsey pricing cannot be recommended for
50 The problem of the elasticity of demand being zero (the inverse of this is infinite) is ignored.
51 Assume that Ramsey pricing is non-distortionary. That is, assume all patients with CPi > i
.ptimally choose treatment. Here the fixed costs of F are shared amongst the proportion fl of patients
vho take the treatment. V cP E(~, c'+2 11) treatment is therefore optimal. The gain in utility from
reatment for these patients is negative and so we have a contradiction. Ramsey pricing is therefore
listortionary in the case where utilities are known.
[
c-+FI/l JLcp-(ci + F / fl) < L-'-L--(Ci + F / J.L)
=(ci+F/fl)-(ci+F/J.L) .
=0
52 Where distortions are ignored. Without an adequate measure of the marginal deadweight loss of
axation there is little that can be done to estimate the effects of a distortion.
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e in the case of pharmaceuticals if doubt remains over the way patients select treatment. While
is acknowledged that the assumption that quantity is a binary choice is an assumption and not
ct it appears plausible enough to seriously limit the chances of a successful Ramsey pricing
heme. Where quantity is a binary choice (as above) Ramsey pricing is equivalent to average
ist pricing as consumers face only a choice between the options: pay no fixed charge, pay the
xed charge but do not pay for treatment, or pay the fixed charge and for treatment. Of these the
.cond option is trivially inferior. The choice becomes take no treatment or pay the marginal
rst of treatment plus the average fixed cost of those accepting treatment. The "marginal cost of
eatment plus the average fixed cost of those accepting treatment" is simply average cost and the
utcorne of Ramsey pricing simply represented by the same total payments and quantities as a
.gulation setting price to average cost.
Where costs must be discovered Ramsey pricing imposes a far larger informational burden
ian either reference pricing or the JZ scheme. Not only must marginal costs be known but fixed
osts also. As shown in Chapter 9 prices can be used to signal marginal cost but there appear to
e few avenues for firms to signal fixed costs.
The alternative form of Ramsey pricing faces the same problems as given above. If all
atients taking treatment have the same elasticity of demand they must be treated identically.
Vhere the price to each patient is defined by this elasticity all prices must be identical. Average
ost pricing results if fixed costs are met.
CIII. A DISCUSSION OF THE COMPARISON PROCESS
The analysis of the above chapter has focused on the subsidisation of drugs that the
ubsidising agency wishes to see subsidised. Where drugs are considered low priority additions
o the basket of subsidised treatment options either delays may occur in subsidisation or no
.ubsidies will be offered. Under the JZ scheme drugs that represent small improvements could
)e accommodated by allowing a longer time threshold for subsidisation or through the use of a
.cherne that incorporates increased consumer part payments through the levying of at least a
iortion of marginal cost to the patient. Under the RP scheme such drugs may face significant
Ielays and in order to be subsidised the firm may have to make concessions elsewhere. One
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cample of such a case is in that of Famvir which was listed only after SmithKline and Beecham
~reed to reduce the price of Tagamet, an existing drug in an unrelated subgroup, by 40 percent.
/hile such a move may well have occurred under the JZ scheme other options were available in
'del' to see Famvir subsidised. It is not clear that this was the case under reference pricing.
One weakness of the comparison process used was that it did not address the problem of
Ie expiration of the patent life of the incumbent. Presumably this would occur before the
rtrant faced generic entry and so the profit function of the entrant may be affected. This will not
ias results if a consumer price of zero is maintained for the incumbent. One worrying facet of
Ie modified JZ scheme is that it may deter generics from entering the market. The incumbent
as previously been assumed to dominate the generic for all consumers. If consumers are faced
-ith a choice between an incumbent drug pricing at zero and a positive price for an unsubsidised
eneric it is clear that the generic will not gain any market share. A JZ-type scheme, in practice,
lould need to be designed to allow for the expiration of a firm's contract if generics are to be
ncouraged. Further research would need to be undertaken in this area before the JZ scheme
auld be recommended without serious reservations.
A future avenue of research lies in the possibility that firms may use the prices of other
ariables as strategic variables. Here the firms offer to decrease the price of an unrelated drug to
btain listing on the Pharmaceutical Schedule. There are two general ways in which this occurs,
1e first of which has been covered above with the Tagament-Famvir deal. Pharmac has also
hown a willingness to relax its restriction on drugs joining a market below the reference price
(here firms are willing to decrease prices elsewhere.f This is significant where the drug to be
isted represents an improvement on the drugs already in the subgroup since this type of deal may
Ie used to circumvent the problem of insufficient subsidisation under reference pricing referred
o above.
53 In January 1998, it was reported that Pharmac were negotiating with respect to Parke Davis's
tatin Lipitor" (chemical name Atorvastatin) with a view to it entering the statin subgroup in return for
lecreasing the producer price of Accupril'", its Ace inhibitor, by 60%. Atorvastatin has been found to be
wice as potent on a mg per cholesterol lower basis as Zocor® (from Merck Sharpe and Dohme) in short
erm trials. It is assumed that long term mortality/morbidity trials are continuing. Atorvastatin'" was
rroposed to enter at above the current reference price for statins.
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CHAPTER 11
SUMMARY
Subsidisation of pharmaceuticals is likely to become a more contentious topic in the future
governments worldwide continue to look for ways to reduce the cost of health care. The
istitutions and mechanisms put in place to aid subsidisation are vital to the success of a nation
1 limiting the pharmaceutical budget to only that required to make fair contributions to research
ad development. This thesis has attempted to analyse two options available to governments.
.eference pricing has been shown theoretically to be expensive where adequate restrictions are
ot placed on the operating policies of the pharmaceutical agency. Where these restrictions are
sed by the agency reference pricing becomes unreliable, giving no guarantee that worthwhile
rugs will be subsidised. The analysis of Zammit-Lucia and Dasgupta (1995) has shown that
(here reference pricing has been successful, it was only so for a short time.
In New Zealand the rate of growth was arrested after the introduction of reference pricing.
'he problems Pharmac faced keeping spending within its notional budget in 1997 indicate that
.ie period of efficacy for reference pricing may be drawing to an end. The JZ variant outlined
oes appears to be far from an ideal replacement for reference pricing though. The JZ scheme is
nore reliable than reference pricing as well as being generally less expensive but the delay it
equires before subsidisation generally lowers both consumer surplus and efficiency. Rather than
uesent all the possible expansions of the model in this summary I have opted to place the
najority of them at the end of each chapter. The most serious questions left to are however
aised below:
(a) Patent integrity under marginal cost pricing: in Section XI of Chapter 10 the patent
ystem was found to maintain its integrity where a fixed charge of zero was used. Under
narginal cost pricing the JZ scheme might not, in general, give firms the same profits they would
lave enjoyed in an unregulated market.
(b) Simultaneous entry: the JZ model analysed did not attempt to ascertain what the likely
.ffect of firms simultaneously attempting to obtain subsidisation under the JZ scheme would be.
'\s most activity after the introduction of the JZ scheme would involve the subsidisation of
rre-existing groups of drugs this would have to be considered. Rent seeking may also become a
.erious problem.
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(c) Generic entry: a mechanism would have to be designed to encourage generic entry
ecause, as yet, the question of why a generic would wish to enter a JZ regulated market remains
nanswered.
(d) Other informational asymmetries: in Chapters 7 and 10 the agency was assumed to
now the true characteristics of drugs as well as fixed costs. Under imperfect knowledge a
ignalling mechanism will likely be used to form a new variant of the JZ scheme. The nature of
lis mechanism is difficult to determine without in-depth analysis but it is likely that it would
wolve either signalling with an additional variable or partial revelation of information. Under
artial revelation of information firms of particular types signal at a given time. While the
gency cannot tell the exact type of firm that has signalled it does know which firms choose to
ignal at that time and can act accordingly.
(e) An alternative view of the pharmaceutical market: the VIew of the pharmaceutical
.iarket taken here saw that the majority of firms have independent distributions of drug quality.
'he pharmaceutical market may be suited to a model where all firms have dependant
istributions of the type explored in Chapter 8.
(f) Alternative definitions for utility: the utility function used throughout this thesis is
elatively unsophisticated. A new definition for utility could incorporate two distinct effects in
.iat drug use (with a positive quality drug) increases earning capacity and reduces a separate
tility loss specific to the signs and symptoms of the illness. It is very likely that this will not
hange the predictions of the model greatly.
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rJpendix 2.1 Derivation of Expected Utility
Ie utility function of an individual consumer is:
; = m - p;qij - L(I- cpij;q;;)-k.
len evaluated at the choice values of zero and one this expression becomes
I = m- Pi -L(l-CPi)-k.; 'I·~I
"
I - m-L-k.; 'I·~()-
"
)w full treatment will occur only where
- Pi - L(l-cp ij)- k > m - L - k.
-Pi + Lcpij> 0
{~
te individual subscript j is removed from this point onwards. Expected utility is invariant between
dividuals who know nothing about the individual-specific quality they face from the drug. As expected
ility does not differ between such individuals the j subscript is redundant and is so ignored.
;Ul~P;,Pi' A;",TJ ie)ffj"(CPi)U j(CPi' P;)dCPi
,1/ l![ff i " (CPi )(m- Pi - L(l-cp) - k )dcp; + ft/ (CPi )(m- L - k )dcp;
1 A/, A{ t
(m- P; -L-k) ffje(CPi)dCPi +L fCPifje(cp;)dCPi +(m-L-k) ffje(CPi)dCPi
11: A/Jf
(111- P; - L - k )[1- Fj eCi )]+ L fcp;fje (CPi )dcp; +(m- L - k)[W(Ii) - 0]
t)../
(m-L-k)- Pi[l-FjeCi)]+ L fCP;f;"(CPi)dCPi
/'i
T
,1..'
(m - L - k) - Pi[1- F;"(~)]+ L JTJ/CPi e1)i'(CfIi-J..;')dCPi
n.
L
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»v since Jax e
'"
dx = (T,-x - a) eh' + C we can rewrite expected utility as:
Ui(Pi,Pi,A/,17;")
(111 - L - k) - p[l- F" (i'L)]+ L(m ._~)e1);"(qJ;-A/)lqJ;=A;";IlL 't'l 1). fI"
t lfl;=-t
(111- L - k) - Pi[1- Fj e(Ii)] + L(ffJi-7!:)Fj e (ffJi)!::::"
(111- L-k)- Pi[l- Wei)]+ L[(It;" -7!:)-ei -7!:)Wei)J
( k) F e (I'; ) L( 1 e I) F e (I'; ) L F e ( 1'; )m-s L>- -Pi+Pi i T + f\,i ---;- <P, i T +--;- j T
7), 1);
(111 - L-k)+L(It" ----L)+~F"(i'L)- P
l Tf/ 11/ 1 L I
ippose a price is required to set expected utility equal to a value, C.
EU/pi> Pj'}.,/' 11/) =C
'1- L-k)+L(ke _---L)+~Fe(i'L)-p. = C
I 71/ TJ/ J L I
~e7J;"(Jt-A/) -po =C-(m-L-k)-L(}.," _---L,)
'1/ I I 17/
~e-7J;"A;"erltl'; = C-(m-L-k)-L(}.," _---L)
17/ I 11/
which is of the general form
nfortunately problems of this form are not solvable algebraically and so numerical methods must be
sed to obtain a solution to this problem.
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ppendix 2.2 Some useful integrals
NO integrals will be used extensively in future appendices and rather than evaluate them in several
aces within each appendix it is preferable to manipulate them here. Before these integrals can be
.fined however some attention must given to the question of how patients trade off the qualities of
fferent drugs.
ippose both are tested. The qualities of both drugs must be known if some comparison is to be made
-tween them drugs so this is not a challenging assumption. The decision between drug 1, drug 2 and no
ugs (when both drugs are tested) is decomposed into four separate cases dependant on the values of
ich drug quality. The choices made in each circumstance are given in the following table:
< 1'2({)z - T
No drugs are purchased
Drug 1 is purchased
Drug 2 is purchased
Uncertain but a drug IS
definitely used
I the case where ({)I > Ii and (() z > Ii either treatment would be chosen if it were the only option since
e qualities of both drugs are greater than the treatment threshold. Because treatment will be taken of
hichever drug is selected qij is set equal to 1. The decision is made using the following process:
u., =m-PI-L(l-({JJj)-k
U 2j =m- P: - L(l-({Jzj)-k
uppose U1; > U2j then
- PI + L({J1;> -P2 + L({J2;
L({J1;> L({J2;+(P1- Pz)
m>m .+ (PI-PZ)
'r 1/ -r z) L
a finally,
D 1 · hosen if (PI-PZ)rug IS c asen 1 ({J Jj> ({JZj+ L
(PI-PZ)Drug 2 is chosen if ({JZj'?- ({J Ij L
tlindex, superior drug's price, inferior drug's price, upper value for quality ofdrug 1)
tl refers to the proportion of patients who:
Face a value of less than B for the quality of drug}
Face a quality sufficient to continue using either drug in preference to taking no treatment at all.
Change their decision as a result of a price change
B
f f ( )t' ( (Jlj-Jl,»dj (Pi i (Pr-L- qJ j
I';
I
",
T
1'.1
I
'7;Tl i -IJj A, - I),A,- I),-' I',_- I_'; ' [ (1)+I)rp]8
-----'-.-e Lei J J I'i
'7i+'7i T
1 [ -IJ,A,-IJ,A.,-I),_'I,,_~I_'" (1),+l)j)rpj J8
-- '7'7e e
17, +17; I) I'J
T
_._I_[f( .. )f( .. _(Jlj-Jl,)]8
I) +1) J qJ I 1 qJ I L r,
I I T
_I_[f (B)f (B- (Jlj-Jl'»_f,(£!.)f (£!._ (Jli-Jl,»]
/),+IJ,.1 I L J L ILL
_1_. [f. (B)f (B- (Jl j-I',»-f.(£!.)f. (..&.)]
1),+1), J I L J L I L
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tiindex, superior drug's price, inferior drug's price, upper value for quality ofdrug 1)
2 refers to the proportion of patients who:
Faced a value of less than B for the quality of drug j
Face a quality sufficient to continue using either drug in preference to taking no treatment at all.
Select drugj
2 (j, Pi' Pi' B)
B B
f . (1',-1';) d I Jf ( )f ( (I'j-I';))df(cp)Fj(cp---) cp. =- . cp. j CP--L- cpJ I J L J 1]. J J J J
") I II}
r L
(1'-1';)
Where B + -'L-< Ai
~__I _. [f (B)f (B - (I'j-I',)) - f(.!i)f (.E!..)]
'7, '7,+'7, J I L J L I L
[
f (B - (I'j-I',)) f (Jl.)]
_I_ f.(B) j L _f.(.!i)_I_L_
ry;+1J; J TJ; J L 1];
_I_(f (B)F (B (1';-1';))_ f(.!i)F (.E!..)]
1J,+11, J I L J L I L
ote: if B + (l'j~I';) ~ Ai then the interval must be more precisely defined for meaningful results. The
ason for this is given later where different cases are defined for the proportion of patients using specific
iarrnaceuticals.
222
ppendix 2.3 Proportion of patients using a particular drug
.fore any analysis is undertaken the notation used must be explained. From the doctor/patient valuation
I possible drug options are ranked from J through N on the basis of expected utility to the patient. This
dering is dependant on the estimations that doctors and their patients hold on the values of lambda and
a for each drug and not necessarily on the actual merits of particular drugs. From this point the process
.testing begins.
Appendix 2.2 the following decision rule was derived:
<.!'..!..
, - L
>.!'..!..
, L
No drugs are purchased
Drug I is purchased
> 1'2({J2 L
Drug 2 is purchased
See below
his analysis can be generalised a sequential search case. The critical value of <Pi for accepting drug i
'ithout testing drugj (denoted cp,*) will occur where the expected utility from searching for another drug
equal to the utility gained with quality cp, *. This value of quality will satisfy the expression:
EVj-k=m-p, L(J-cp/)-k
EUj =m-Pi-L(J-CP,")
.xpected utility net of search cost for any marketable drug must be greater than the no treatment level m
L - k.
ED -k > m- L-kJ
ED > m -LJ
I1l-L-I1l+p;+L
> L
p.
=-t
"his last statement is important when restnctmg cases further. The standard case explored here
onsiders only two drugs which will routinely be indexed by expected utility. Drug 1 is the superior drug
in this basis and will be accepted without further testing as long as cp I > cp 1*'
n general in a two drug setting patients fall into four categories. The definition and probability for each
if these outcomes are:
PreV, > EV2 - k) is the proportion of patients who test drug 1 and find it of sufficient quality for
them to accept it as the best available drug
Pr(V,>V2, CPI > Ii IV] > EU2 - k)(I-Pr(U I > EU2 - k)) is the proportion of patients who test both drugs
and find that drug 1 is superior to both taking drug 2 and taking no treatment.
PreV2>V I' cP 2 > Ii IV] > EU2- k)(1- Pr(U] > EU2- k)) is the proportion of patients who test both drugs
and find that drug 2 is superior to both taking drug 1 and taking no treatment.
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Pr( C(J I < Ii, C(J 2 < Ii) is the proportion of patients who test both drugs and find that neither drug is
of suitable quality to continue treatment.
he table given above extends easily to accommodate the sequential search case:
m < 1'2
'r 2 - L
No drugs are purchased
Drug I is purchased once the
quality of drug 2 is known
Drug 1 is automatically
chosen without testing drug 2
Drug 2 is purchased once the quality
of drug 2 is known
D I · h 'f (1',-1',)rug IS c osen I C(Jj> C(J2+-L---'
otherwise drug 2 is chosen
Drug 1 is automatically chosen
without testing drug 2
emma:
= Pr( 1'2 «to m _ (1'1-1'2) ~ < m < m ")
L -r 2<'t' 1 L ' L -r 1 - 't' 1
l{JJ (Pf~{fII~1'2)
= f ff J(CPI)f2(CP2)dCP2 dCPI
III /1)
T L
ip/
= f f l (cp 1)[F2 (cp 1- (1'1/2»)_ F2 ei )dcp 1
1'1
L
~I ~/
= f f j(CPI)F2(CPI- (PI~P2»)dCPI-F2ei) f fJ(CPI)dCPI
/'/
T
/'1
T
ip/
= f f l (cp 1)F2 (cp 1- (PI~P2) )dcp1- F2 ei )[FJ(cP,*) - FJei)]
1'1
T
'robability ofDrug 1:
tj =Probability of not taking drug 2 + Probability of taking drug 1 after testing drug 2 and finding that
rug 1 is better than both drug 2 and taking no drug at all
1 =Pr(rp,* < rp j)+ Pr(u l>u2.!f-<<Pllrp j ::;, cP ,*)Pr(cp1 ::;, cP,*)
: Pr(rp,* < rp I) + Pr( <P I>~ 1- (1'1~'2),.q.<<p Ilrp j ::;, cP /) Pr(cP 1 ::;, cP ,*)
_ . ., (1'1-1'2) PI *)
- PI(cp 1 < cP 1)+ Pr(cp 1 »tpr-L-'T < cP I::;' cP 1
by Bayes' Theorem
(I F( '» P( (1'1-1'2)1'1 "1'2) P( (1'1-1'2)1'1 * 1'2): - j CPI + rcpj>rp2+-L-'T<CPI::;'CPI ,rp2::;'T + rrpj>CP2+-L-'T<rpl::;'rpl ,CP2>T
'ito cases on C(J 2
'» (PI * 1'2 (1'1-1'2) 1'1 "1'2):(1-F1(CPI) +PrT<rpj::;,rpl ,rp2::;'T)+Pr(CPI>CP2+-L-'T<rpl::;,rpl ,rp2>T
. > + (1'1-1'2) .. 1 < 1'2
since the C(J J C(J 2 -L- inequality must ho d for the C(J 2 - Tease
~/
: (1- F1(cp ,*))+[ FJ(rp /)- F]ei )]F2ei)+ f fJ(cp j )F2(cpr: (PI~1'2»)dcp1- F2ei )[FJ(cp /)- FJei)]
1'1
T
by the lemma
splitting
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'PI
(I-F1(CPI »+ f fl(CP/)F2(CPr(I'/~1'2»c1CPI
1'1T
(I - FI ((P l'» + Tnt 2 (1, PI' pz, cP /)
Where Int2 is defined as in Appendix 2.1
'robability ofDrug 2:
z = Pr(U 2 :::: U j , Ii < cP z Icp j 5 cP / l PrecP I 5 (P / l
P ·(u U 1'2 *)I 2:::: l,y<CPZ,CP j5cpj
by Bayes' Theorem
P· .( (1'1-1'2) 1'2 *I (P2 ?CPI--L-'Y<CPZ,CP I5cpj )
.Pr('i <CP2.CP I5cp/'l-Pr(cpj >cpz+(1'1/2l,li <CPZ.CP I5CPl')
FJ (cp /' )(1- F2 ei» - ['Pif 1(cp j )F2 (cp i: (1'/~1'2l)dcp1- F2 (Ii)[FJ (cp l') - F1(Ii )J]
1'1
T
by the lemma
1'1
T
Ip/
F( ") ft'( )F( (1'1-1'2l) 1 F(I'I)F(1'2)• I cP I - I cP I 2 cPr-L- C cP I - I Y 2 Y
1'1T
'robability of no drug being used:
'he probability of no use is the probability that both drugs are of such poor quality for a patient that they
,",auld choose to use neither drug, This probability is equal to flN=F1(Ii )F2( Ii ).
7heck on the sum ofprobabilities:
)r(Drug I) + Pr(Drug 2) + Pr(No Drugs)
: [(I-FJ(cp/» + Int 2 (1, p j , p z, CP / ) ] + [Fl(CPI*)-Int2(l,pj,pz,CP/)-
F2Ci)F1Ci)] + [F2Ci)F1Cn]
: I-FJ(cp l') +Fj(cp/) + Int 2(l,pj,pz,CP/)- Int 2 (1, p j , p z, CP / )
_F (1'2) F (.E.!..) + F (1'2) F (.E.!..)2L lL 2L lL
: I
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urther refinement ofprobabilities
le algebraic complexity of the probabilities given above is small compared to the actual complexity
hen evaluated. The distribution of adverse side effects is assumed to be exponential in this model. The
obability density function of the strictly positive exponential distribution is
hile the cumulative distribution is
{
e- ,1£
~,(E) 0 if E ~ 0
if E <0
he probability and cumulative density functions for quality can be evaluated once the side effect E has
~en subtracted from the fixed efficacy of the drug A. The range [0, 00) for the side effect (where fe(E) is
.isirive) corresponds to the range (-00, A]. Only over this range is the evaluation f(cp)=1Je-17(A- rp) correct.
he full definition for the cumulative and probability density functions for drug quality are:
ifE~O(qJsA)
if s <O(qJ>A)
if qJ SA
if tp> A
ld {
ne I7(rp- A)
F(qJ)=
1
if qJ S A
if c»> A
'nfortunately there is no guarantee that in the evaluation of Int, required to find the proportion of users of
ach drug will include references to Fi qJ2) only where qJ2<Az. The integral
'PIff) (cp J )F2 (cp r: (1'1~1'2)dcp J
1'1
T
lay indeed include some values of qJ J- (1'1~1'2) above A2' This problem occurs for some values of <p J
/henever cp /' - (1'1/2) > It 2' For these values the simple evaluation outlined above will be incorrect. This
roblem necessitates a more thorough examination of the expressions found for the consumption of drug
and drug 2 above.
'he practicalities of this problem in addition to some others covered 111 Appendix 3.? deem that a
umerical solution be used when evaluating the results of this model.
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te probability of drug 1
(P I
A2 > cP J' - (/il~/i,) then F2 (cp / - (P/~J!l»)< I and III = (1- F1(cp J')) + Jf l (cp / )F2 (cp r: (P/~P2»)dcp / as before.
1'1
T
A2 ::; cP /' - (PI/') however:
'P/
I =(I-F1(cp!'))+ Jfl(CPI)F2(CPI-(PI~P2»)dCPI
1'1
T
)..2+ (Jl/~Jl2) rp /
',' Jt' ( )F (/i l - /J2»)d Jf ( )F ( (PI-P,») I(I-F1(cp/ ))+ I CPI 2 CP/--L- cp/+ I cp/ 2 CP/--L-CCP/
E[ A2+U'J~fJ2)
A2+(I'J~Jl2) cp/
(I-F1(cp/ ))+ Jf l(CPI)F2(CPI-(P'/2»)dcp/+ Jfl(cp/)dCPI
!!.f: A
2
+(fJ/~P2)
,1.2+ (Jll~P2)
(1- F1(cp /' ))+ f f] (cp 1)F2 (cp r: (P/~J!2»)dcp / + FI (cp /) - FI (A 2+ (P/~P2»)
1'/
T
,12+ (PJ~P2)
(1- F (A?+ (PI-P2»))+ f f (m )F)(m - (p/-P2»)dmI _ L I'l'"l _ '1'"/ L '1'"/
1'1
T
his formula for the consumption of drug I bears a great deal of resemblance to the earlier case of this
'obability. Note that in this case if perceived quality of drug 1 is less than cP 1* drug 2 will still be tested
.it unless it attains a higher level of quality than this, drug I will definitely be taken. To examine the
nplications of this case occurring we can look at what it means for the patient's initial estimates of
reduct quality.
'" ) EUj-m+p;+L
cpj (EUj = L
cP 1 (EU2 ) - (P/~P2) > A2
EU,-m+PI+ L (/'1-1'2) 1
L -L->/\'2
EU2-m+1'2+L 1
L > /\'2
CP2*(EU2» A2
row as cp;" (EUj ) is the level of drug i required to achieve the level of expected utility for drug j we can
~e that the quality of drug 2 never reaches the level of its own expected utility. The expectation of drug
,s quality is grossly incorrect and renders this an unlikely case although still must be considered.
nd
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he probability of drug 2
he probability of the inferior drug is subject to these same considerations. If A2 ::; cP / - (1'1~P2) then:
'PI
F( ") ft'( )F( (PI-1'2»)d F(I'I)F(1'2)2 = I cP I - I cp] 2 cP r-L- cp] - 'T 2 T
1'1
L
F1(m r ) F (£L)F,cr'2)--r I L _ L
).2+~
F1(cp /') F1cri )F2 cri)- (F] (cp /) - F1(A 2+ (PI?2»)) - ff] (cp I )F2(cp]- (1'1~/'2»)dcp]
1'1
T
A
2
+ ( JlILJl2 )
F (A + (1'1-1'2»)_ F (£L)F (!!.2.)_ ff (m )F (m - (PI-1'2»)d m
. I 2 L 'L 2 L svr t 2~1 L ~l
1'1
T
,s observed earlier this equation is again the A2 > cP / - (1'1~P2) case with A2+ (1'1~1'2) substituted for cP /.
'ummary ofprobabilities
'he probability of the superior drug is equal to:
( I - F1(cp .»+ Int , (1, p], P2' cP 1*)
(I F( 1 (PI-/'2»)) I (1 1 (1'1-1'2»)I /!'2+-L- + nt 2 ,P/,P2'/!,2+-L-
'his expression can be simplified to give
[/ = (l-Fj(X))+lnt2(1,p],P2'X)
xnd likewise the probability of the inferior drug being used in treatment is:
[2 = F,(X)-lnt 2(1,p],P2,X)-F]cri)F2ei) where X=min( cp/,A2+(PI~P2»)
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.ppendix 3.1 The responsiveness of quantity to a drug's own price
o find a profit maximising producer's best response functions we must first find dJ.1 J since:
dpJ
dn J dJ.1 J
n J =(PJ-cJ)J.1J, --=J.1J+(PJ-cJ)--.dpJ dpJ
his evaluation must be approached in a piecewise fashion since the equation for the quantity demanded
l' a particular drug is sensitive to the expected utility of the drug compared to its competitors. Note: in
lis appendix price changes are phrased as increases because while decreases are equally valid
»mparison between cases is simpler with consistent terminology.
he probability of drug I being selected by a consumer is J.1] and the profit achieved per consumer is n J
'here:
1-11 =(1 FI(X))+Intz(1,pJ,Pz,X),
= (1- F] (cp /))+ Int, (1, p J' Pz- cp /)
x = min(m * A + (JlI-Jl2»)
-r J • Z L
h(x) h(x)
now~ fc(t,x)dt = c(b(x),x)b' (x)-c(a(x),x)a' (x)+ f ,fx c(t,x)dt so
a(x) a(xl
'he expression for 0:1 is composed of three terms which each have an intuitive meaning. The first term
Up]
ddresses the proportion of consumers who previously accepted drug 1 without testing drug 2 but will
lOW choose to check drug 2 after the price change. Of these consumers the proportion Fz(cp/ - (Pl~P2»)
vill choose to take drug 1 even after testing the quality of drug 2.
i'he second term deals with the increased number of consumers who find that no treatment represents
heir best option in treatment. The proportion-j-f (~) find that it is no longer worthwhile to use drug 1 in
ireference to taking no treatment. Of these consumers Fz(7.) will also face a quality of drug 2
nsufficient to choose it as a form of treatment either. In total the proportion tf] ei) Fzei) choose to use
ieither drug directly as a result of an increase in the price of drug 1.
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final term' considers those patients who test both drugs both before and after the price increase. Inti
-s the proportion of changes of drug choice at the margin as a result of the price change.
',E 2'. EU >EU d * (1'1-1'2) > 1
- I 2 an cp/ --L- /\'2'
outcome of this case bears much resemblance to the previous case. We can begin In the same
lion as before:
.12+(fJJ212 )
= (1- F1("2+ (PI~P2)))+ f f) (cp / )F2(cp t: (PI?2))dcp /
1'1
T
"2+¥
-.If (.!'..L)F (.!'..L_ (PI-P2))+.l f f (m )f (m - (pl-P2))d mL I L 2 L L L I'/'/ 2 '/'/ L 'r t
1'1
T
=-.If(A +(PI-P2))[1-F (A +(PI-P2)_(/II-P2))]_.lf(.!'..L)F (.!2)+
LI2 L 22 L L LIL2L
A
2
+ (Jll tP2)+ f f1(cp/)f2(cp/-(PI?2))dcp/
1'1
T
1 (J'j-P2)
/\.2+-L-
=-.If (A +(PI-P2))[1-F (A )]-.If (.!'..L)F (.!2)+.l f f (m )f (m -(PI-P2»)d mL ) 2 L 2 2 L I L 2 L L I '/'/ 2 '/'/ L '1'/
u:
L
~ expression for ~ll is composed of two terms in this case. The first term of the earlier case no longerUPI
iears. Appendix 2.3 found that in this case drug 2 never achieves its own expected utility implying
t the patients expectation of the quality distribution for drug 2 is incorrect. This estimation leads to a
ue for cp /' less than that which would have prevailed if the true characteristics of drug 2 were known.
cp / the value of drug 1 equals the expected utility of drug 2 which is in turn greater than any possible
ality for drug 2. Patients choosing to check drug 2 only as a result of an increase in the price of drug 1
d that the value of drug 1 to them is in excess of the value of drug 2 they observe. All consumers
xising to test drug 2 as a direct result of the price increase will choose to use drug I. The firm
iducing drug I has lost none of the custom of those consumers who now choose to test drug 2 and so
such loss appears in the expression above.
e first and second terms correspond to those found in the previous case; the first term is identical to its
rnterpart while the third term takes A2+ (pI~p2) as an input. Drug I will always be superior to drug 2
ierever the quality of drug 1 is above A2+ (PI~p2) so no marginal changes will occur and so qualities
ove this level will not be of interest when evaluating the integral.
.s defined in Appendix 2.2
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-rorn Appendix 2.2 if drug I is the inferior drug then:
PI = F2(X) F2 ( 'i )Fje i ) - Int2(2,pz,PI'X),
* fJ2 P, *
=F2(tpz )-F2(T)Fj(T) Int 2 (2, pz, PI ' tpz )
'P,.
= Fz(tp z*) - F2('i )Fj('i) - Ifz(tpz)Fj(tpz- (1'2~1'1»)dtpz
1'2
rt:
'P2'
- J.... If (m )f (m - (1',-1'1 »)dmL 2 orZ j -r : L orZ
1',
L
a".. 'P;-~f ( ")(l-F ( * - (1'2-1'1»))_J...F (!!2.)f (12)_J... If ( )f ( - (l''-I'I»)d
- a 2 tpz 1 tpz L L 2 L 1 L L 2 tpz J tp2 L tpz
PI n
L
-, liZ I "EU,-m+I',+L dEU ( 1 e ") ( L k) L(1" j) L F"(I'/)<eca tnat tpZ = L an , PI'/\'I ,TIl = 111- - + /\'1 -ry:- +ry:- j T -PI'
atpz = J... aEUI = J...(J...-L f e (12) -I) = ...L(_J_f "(12) -I)
:'J L:'J L L TI' j L L TI" j Lup, UPI I I
- 1 ( 1 f "(1'/) I)t' ( *)(1 F ( " (P2-1'1))) J F (1'2)f (PI) J I (2 "
-T ry:- 1 T - 2 tpZ - j tpZ --L- -T 2 T j T -T nt, ,PZ,p"tpZ)
Note: '(1'1 ')_l_r"(12)_1 =e Tl I ,-hi -1:;0TIt 1 L
As with the first case explored this outcome has three terms which correspond to the definitions given
earlier. The first term once more addresses the loss in custom of patients who now change their choice of
whether or not to check the price of the inferior drug. As drug 1 is now inferior on the basis of expected
utility an increase in the price of drug 1 leads to a decrease in tpz" and results in some patients choosing
not to check the quality of drug 1. Of those who now choose not to check the quality of drug 1 as a result
of the price increase the proportion Fj(tpz" - (P2~PJ») would not have chosen to use drug 1 in any case.
The loss of consumption in drug 1 as a result of the price increase of drug 1 is then given by the
expression a~ z" f 2 (tp z" )(1- FJ (tpz* _ (P2?1»)).
UPI
The second term is again the proportion of patients who find that no treatment is preferable as a result of
the increase in the price of drug 1. The final term once more addresses the marginal changes in treatment
choice as a result of the price increase where drug 2 gains patients formerly using drug 1.
2 From Appendix 2,1
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CASE 4'. EU >EU d * (1"-1',) > 12 I an qJ2 - -'L- - /l, J •
-F(X) F(f!2)F(J1') I (2 X) X-' (1 (1',-1',) *PI-2 -2T IT- nt2 ,P2,PI" -mm/l,/+-L-,qJ2)
= F2 (A,/ + (J12~J1')) - F2 (Ii )FI(Ii) - Int , (2, P2' PI' A, 1+ (f!2~J1'))
1 (Jl2-1II)
.... '+-L-
= F2 (A / + (/)'~J1')) - F2 ('i )F, (Ii)- If2 (qJ2 )F, (qJ2- (/)2~J1I))dqJ2
PI
T
BpI = -l..f (A, + (/)2-J1J))_l..F (.!!2.)f (.!'J...)+l..f (A, + (J12-J1I))F (A, + (1',-1'1) _ (1'2-1'1))
:1 L2 ILL 2 L I L L2 J L I J L L
UPI
Aj + (/}2~JIJ)
= -J...f (A, + (J1rJl'))_l..F (J12)f (.!'J...)+l..f (A, + (J12-J1'))F (A, )_J... If (m )f (m _ (J12-P'))dL 2 ILL 2 L ILL 2 J L I I L 2 '1'2 1'1'2 L qJ2
I"L
AJ+ ( P2i.J1I)
= -l..f (A, + (prpJ))+l..f (A, + (prp'))_l..F (.!!2.)f (.!'J...)_l.. If (m )f (m _ (J1,-P'))dmL 2 ILL 2 J L L Z L ILL 2 '1'2 1'1'2 L wz
1'2
T
As in the second case only two terms appear in the expression of ()~l,. The first of these represents the
up,
decrease in patients treated as a result of the price increase and the second the marginal changes in the
choice of drugs.
CASE 5: Suppose EUI=EUz
The four cases covered previously give different values for the sensitivity of quantity to price. The fifth
case where expected utilities are equal is problematical. Very little can be said about price sensitivity
here since superior drug will always obtain a greater share of the patients than the inferior drug causing a
discrete jump of quantity at the level of price that equalises expected utility.
The superior drug is always tested first and the inferior drug is tested only when the expected
improvement in the value of the drug exceeds the cost of searching. As a result the superior drug is often
chosen when the unobserved value of the inferior drug is actually greater than the observed value of the
superior drug. The superior drug gains and the inferior drug loses these consumers simply because of
their respective status. This phenomena causes a discontinuity in quantity at the price where expected
utilities are equal since at an epsilon below this level the drug is superior and attracts the extra consumers
and at an epsilon above it must lose other consumers for the same reason.
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o III summary:
Undefined
-'-(_I fe(.!'..L)-l)f ((() *)(l-F({() *_(1'2-1'1)))
L 1)/ 1 L 2 '1'2 I '1'2 L
I F (P')f (PI) I I (2 *)
-T 2 TIT -T nt, ,P2,P],qJ2
EU <EU A >{() * _ (/,,-1'1)
2 - I' I 'I' 2 L
)n closer examination the previous expression can be further simplified. The first two cases above are
imply
,hile the latter cases are
-'-(_I f e(.!'..L)-l)f (X)(l-F (X - (PI-1'2)))_-'-F e")f (.!'..L)--'-Int (2 P P X)L 1)/ 1 L 2 1 L L 2 L 1 L L I ' 2' ],
with X = rnin(qJ/,A]+ (PI?'))
o
-tfl (X)(l- F2(X - (PI~P'))) - tflei)F2ei)-tInti (1,p], P2' X)
where X = rnin(qJ /,A 2+ (PI~P'))
Undefined
-'-(_I f e(.!'..L)-l)f (X)(l-F (X - (PI-l'2)))_-'-F (.!!..L)f (.!'..L)--LInt (2 P P X)L 1)/ 1 L 2 ILL 2 L IL 1 ' 2' ],
where X = rnin(qJ/,A]+ (PI~P2))
l'he reaction of consumption to price for drug 2 can also be found by a symmetry argument.
t f2(X)(F1(X - (P'~PI)) - J) -tf2ei)F1ei)-t Inti (2, P2' PI' X)
where X =rnin(qJ2*,A]+ (P'~PI))
Undefined
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ippendix 3.2 A property of the reaction function
rver some range of prices the reaction function of firms are invariant with respect to the price of the
ther firm. This behaviour is unusual and is a consequence of the exponential distributions used to
iodel individual drug qualities.
{here firm 2 accepts the status of an inferior drug (so that drug I is tested first in equilibrium) it attracts
ie quantity.
f.12 =Fj(X)-Int2(l,p/,P2,X)-Fj('i)F2('i) where X=min( cp/.A2+(P}~P2»)
. I * 1 (1'1-1'2)
.ssummg t rat cp / ~ /\'2 +--L-
iJ/J 2 = iJ 172 [e7)I(A 2 + ( l' lt 2)-A I ) _e7),(1)1--A I)e7)2(-Lt--A 2 ) ]
iJp, iJp, lJ2+lJ/
_ lJ2 [171 7),(A 2+<1't/."2)-A I) 7)} 7),(1)1--.1. 1) 7)2("t--A2)]
- -e --e e
lJ2+lJ/ L L
lJ/lJ2 [ 7) (A +(1'1-1'2)_.1.) 1) (l'L-A) 17 (1"_.1. )]
= e' 2 L } -e 'L "e 2 T 2
lJ2+lJ]
=~/l2
L
low where tp J' ~ A2 + (PI~P2) a change in the price of the superior drug shifts the quantity of the inferior
rug proportionately. Let p; be the profit maximising price for firm 2 for some value of p i-
n=f.12(p;-C2)
du , "O=~(P2 -C2)+f.17(JPl ~
., up
P? = c) - f.12 /~
- - up2
ill'; _ "( / UP2 )
-;rp; - --;rp; f.12 UP2
= (0/(UP2 )2
'I UP2
=0
)0 that the optimal choice of price for an inferior firm is invariant to the competitor's price over the
'ange where cp / ~ A2 + (p}~p2) •
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ppendix 3.3 Efficacy differentials
he following drug characteristics are assumed: AJ =1,17 J = 1,17 J == I.
he size of the efficacy differential will determine whether or not a pure strategy equilibrium exists
here the market is characterised by an unregulated duopoly. The example given in Chapter 3 uses an
.sumption of A2 =0.5 which allows for a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. With larger values of A2 such
rre strategy equilibria do not exist.
Reaction curves
4.500 ,------------~..,_--~---__,
4.000
3.500
3.000
2.500·
rS.:
2.000
1.500
1.000
0.500
5.0004.0003.0002.0001.000
0.000 +----+-----+-----+-----+---~
0.000
J k, = 0.9 there remains a large area where both firms undercut their competitor's price.
Reaction curves
4.000 .----~---_---~..,_--~---__,
3.500 .
3.000
2.500
O!.ooo
1.500
1.000
0.500
5.0004.0003.0002.0001.000
(WOO+----+-----+-----+-----+---~
0.000
'he above diagram shows the reaction curves for the case where A2 = 0.8. With non-intersecting curves
rere is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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Reaction curves
3.51111 ,-----_--- .,.---,,.- ------,
3.111111
2.51111 .
2.111111
6:
1.S00 ..
1.111111
0.500
4.()lJO3.011112.()I)I)1,11011
11,1100 .1---_--+-----+-------if------+--__--1
0.0011
At 1L 2 = 0.7 the reaction curves barely miss. There remains a small area where both firms choose to
undercut. The switch point where Nash equilibria start to occur is obviously quite close to 0.7.
2001l
/I.501l
1.000
1
- - R2(P! l l
--1<.1(1'2)1
0,5011
5.1I()I)4.111111J,OIlOPI2,0001.000
11.0110 \-------+------4----+-----+------+
1l.IlOO
The final diagram displays the scenario where ILz = 0.6. This diagram bears a great deal of resemblance
to the example given in the text with a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
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ppendix 4. 1 Proof of Hotelling proposition in Chapter 4
is impossible to for a firm to price its competitor out of the market where each has constant
arginal costs.
firm is able to price its competitor from the market only if there exists a price so that it makes non-
-gative profits and its competitor makes non-positive profits. Suppose two firms exist with constant
arginal cost c, are located a distance l apart and charge mill prices Pi and P; respectively. Transport
ists for a consumer of distance d away are incurred at the level telwhere t is common to both firms.
or firm i to price firm} from the market it must have the custom of all consumers between itself and
rm j. For this to be the case the then for must every consumer between the firms and l; away from firm
Pi + t(l-l;)
Pi
=
Pj + a,
Pt + tlr t( l- lj)
Pj - til- 2l;)
\i ljE [0, l]
\i ljE [0, l]
\i l;E[O, l]
.firm i is to just cover costs (and place the highest possible pressure on firm) then Pi=C and
c+t(l-2l;) ::; Pi \il;E[O,l]
. firm} is to charge a profitable price and have no market share then VE > 0, P; = C + E and
c+t(l-2l}) ::; c+E \iljE[O,l]
ia. 2UJ ::; E \i liE [0, l]
El} ;::: Yz(l--) \i ljE[O, l]
t
'he above is true if and only if it holds for the lower bound of l;
Eo ;::: Yz(l--)
t
E ;::: ti > 0
.et E =Yz tl > O. Now E < tl which represents a contradiction since firm i does not take all the market
nd firm} charges a profitable price. So it must be impossible for one firm to take the entire market in
ie Hotelling model and cover costs.
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ppendix 5.1 The use of a drug under the no search model
)pendix 2.2 contains the following decision rule for the treatment chosen by a patient if the qualities of
.th drugs are known.
< 1',CfJ2 -T
No drugs are purchased
Drug 1 is purchased
(fl >!i
'1"'2 L
Drug 2 is purchased
Drug 1 is chosen if CfJ j> CfJ 2+(p j~P2)
(Pj-P2)Drug 2 is chosen if CfJ 22: CfJ j L
he proportion of patients using drug 1
rug I will be used only when its own quality net of price is greater than that of drug 2 and it represents
better treatment option that taking no treatment at all. This can be represented by the inequalities:
(fl >12. and m>m+(Pj-P2)
'I"' / L -r j -r 2 L
he second inequality will be true whenever CfJ2< CfJj (Pj~P2) The probability of this inequality
olding will be F2 (CfJ i : (Pj ~P2» and the proportion of patients using drug I will be:
AI
f · (PrP2)f j (CfJ / )F2 (CfJ / - L )dCfJj
1'1
L
y the same rationale used in Appendix <Get correct reference> this value must be further refined since
Ie simple evaluation of the integral in the Inti and Int- functions used will not be valid. If
2? A., - (p /~P2) then the above integral can be represented by Int2(l ,phP2,AI). If A. 2 < A., _ (p j ~P2) then
Ie integral must be modified:
AI
f · (Pj-P2»)df l (CfJ j )F2(CfJ r L CfJj
1'1
L
AIff l (CfJ')dCfJ/
A,+(I'I~I'2)
1'1
L
xnd by symmetry
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1e proportion of patients who choose to use neither drugs remains the same.
-
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.ppendix 5.2 The sensitivity of drug quantity to prices
ppendix 5.1 derived that the proportion of patients using drug I will be:
AI
ft' ( )F ( (P/~P2»)dml1= j(PI 2rpl 'I'
iu.
J.
Int 2(l,Pl,P2,A /) if AI (Pl~P2) :SA2
I-F(A+(Pl-P2»+Int (lp P A+(PI-P2» if 1 (PI-P2»1
I 2 L 2 ' I' 2' 2 L /\-1 L /\-2
aking each case in turn the effects of an increase in price of either drug can be determined.
1 1 (Pl-P2) l' .~ASE : /\- I L :S/\- 2' increase 111 PI
I = Int 2(l,PI,P2,A l)
AI
ff ( )F ( (Pl-P2»)d= Irpl2rpl- L rpl
1'1
T
'he two terms here represent the reduction in patients who face a worthwhile drug and the marginal
hanges in drug choice where both drugs are at least treatment quality.
:ASE 2:
n.
L
_ d [I F(A, + (Pl - P2»+ A2+(fI'ILI'2l f (m )F (m (PI-P2»dm]
-a -12 L vvr t r- zvr t L 'r t
PI ~
T
- o-..Lf (A, + (Pl - P2»+..Lf (A, + (PI-P')F (A, + (1'1-1',) (Pl-P2»
- LI 2 L Ll2 L 22 L L
A2+~
-t f 1ei )F2ei -~)--t f fl(rpl)f2(rpr (Pl~P2»)drpl
1'1
T
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= --.Lf (;1., + (Pj - P2»+l.f (;1., + (PI-P2)F (;1., )
LI2 L LI2 L 22
It'(PI)F(/J2) II (J 1 (PI-P2)
-T I T 2 T T nt l ,PI,P2,/12+-L-
= --.Lf (;1., + (PI - P2»+l.f (;1., + (PI-P2)_l.f (.!.'..L)F (P2)-l.Int (J P P ;1., + (PI-P2)L I 2 L L I 2 L L I L 2 L L I ' I' 2' 2 L
- It'(PJ)F(/l2 ) II (J 1 (/lI-P2)
--T I T 2 T -T nt J ,PI,P2,/12+-L-
- 1]1 1]1 I (J 1 (PI-P2)
- -T{L N -T nt 2 ,pj,P2,/12+-L-
- _!J..LfJ _!J..L(fJ -(1-F (;1., + (PI- P2»)
- LN L j J 2 L
- ~ ({L N + {L1- (1- FI(;1.,2+ (PI ~P2»)
with the earlier case the two terms represent the reduction in market size and marginal changes in
19 choice.
3 1 (p j - P2) l' .\SE : /1 j L :s; /12' Increase III P2
1]2
=-fJj
L
n increase in the price of firm 2 increases the quantity of firm 1 proportionately.
'\sE4: 1 (Pj-P2) l' ./1 j L > /12' Increase III P2
A - (P/-P2) > A
I L 2
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1 _ (P/-P2) < 1
/\" I L - /\"2
1 _ (fi/-fll) > 1
/\" I L /\" 2
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opendix 6.1 Consumer surplus in the no search model
Appendix 5.1, where the proportion of patients using each drug was defined, it was necessary to
;tinguish between two cases. These cases were:
CASE I: AJ (p J~ P2) ::; A2' The quantity consumed is a simple integral. In the picture corresponding
to the two shares this case (for drug I) is represented by the line of marginal consumers cutting the
right edge of the box.
CASE II: AJ- (p 1 ~ P2) > A2' The quantity consumed is the sum of a probability and a simple integral.
In the picture corresponding to the two shares this case (for drug I) is represented by the line of
marginal consumers cutting the top edge of the box.
CASEl
D No treatment chosen
Drug J chosen
Drug 2 chosen
CASE II
D No treatment chosen
Drug I chosen
Drug 2 chosen
o proceed it is necessary to retain these cases and formulate a definition for consumer surplus in a
.ecewise fashion. Before separating the cases it is worthwhile to first define two lemmas that are
.quired in each case.
emma I: Utility above the non-treatment level
onsumer surplus is the measure of the difference between the aggregate willingness to pay of patients
ad the total cost they incur by them. This requires a definition of the willingness of a single patient to
ay.
has previously been assumed that the utility function of a patient, under a no search model is of the
nrn:
U = m-pq-L(1-cpj"q).
J0 treatment (base) utility is U0 = m - L.
Vhere treatment is selected, utility is
UI ( cp J) = m - P - L(1- cp )
I1l - P - L + Lcp
= (m-L)-p+Lcp
Uo +Lcp- p.
'he difference between the treatment and no treatment levels of utility is therefore
UJ(cpJ)-Uo =Lcp-p.
B
.emma II: Evaluation of fcp /1 (cp J)F2 (cp J - (p J~P2))dcp J
PI
T
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and after expanding out the exponential terms
Ii:J(p ,( TJ ,e']I(tp l- AI))( eTJ,(tpl-I/'I/"-A,) ~rp1
"IT
bringing all constant terms outside the integral
J Br A 1 Bxnow since Axe'dx=-(x--)e +CB B
after reincorporating constants the expression becomes
and after grouping 1] i terms
,_I_[(rp1--'-)(1]1e TJ I(tpl- AI) )(eT/,(tpl-IPI~/'J'-A,)JB
TJI+TJ, TJI+TJ, l!f:
the expression can be re-written using the density functions
evaluating at the integral endpoints we find
:_I_[(B__1_)f (B)F7(B- (fJl-fJ'»_(l!.L__1_)f (.!2)F7(.!2- (fJl-fJ'»J1],+1], TJI+TJ, I - L L TJI+TJ, ' L - L L
_1_[(B__1_)f (B)F (B- (fJl-fJ'»_(EL __J_)f (.!2)F7 ( fJ' )J771+7), TJ,+TJ, , 2 L L TJI+TJ, I L - L
and on expansion this becomes
~f (B)F (B- (fJl-fJ,» __'_ELf (.!2)F e")
TJ,+TJ, I 2 L TJI+TJ, L J L 2 L
__'_[_I_f (B)F (B-(fJ,-p'»--'_f (EL)F (1")]
TJI+TJ, TJI+TJ, I 2 L TJI+TJ, 1 L 2 L
which, from Appendix 2,2, is
B
~f (B)F (B- (pl-p,) __I_ELf (.!2)F e},)--I-Jf (rp )F (rp - (pl-I")drp
7)I+TJ,' 2 L TJI+TJ, L ' L 2 L TJI+TJ, ' 1 2 1 L 1PI
T
:ASEI:
AI
'he quantity of drug 1, Ill' was derived in Appendix 5.1 and takes the value ffl(CP])Fz(cp] (P]~P2\ICP]'
1'1
T
he value of consumer surplus is the excess willingness to pay weighted by the likelihood of drug 1
eing used. The consumer surplus associated with drug 1 is:
A) .
'5] = Jf l(rp])F2(rpr (fJ}~fJ2)[UI(rp1)-Uo]drp1
I')
T
A,
=Jf, (rpj)F2(rp r: (pI~p,»[Lip t : P j ]drp1
/'I
T
(Lemma I)
AI A,
LJrp /, (rp1)F2(rp r: (pI~p')drp1- P1Jf, (rp1)F2(rp r: (p?')drp j
1'1 .E1.T L
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rt
T
L[.-!!-f (B)F (B- (p/-p,l) __'_.!!..Lf (£L)F (1")--' fB f ( )F ( - (pl-p,l)d ]
1),+/),' 2 L 1),+1), L J L 2 L 1)/+1), ,qJI 2 qJI L qJI
p/
T atB=A/
(Lemma II)
L[_AI_f (A. )F (A. - (p/-p,l) __J_.!!..Lf (£L)F e")- _1_Af/ f( )F ( - (pl-p'l)dm]_ /I
1),+17,' I 2 I L 1)/+1), L ' L 2 L /)/+/), 1 qJ 1 2 qJ I L 'r I Pu- I
p/
T
: L[_A'_f (A. )F (A. - (pl-p,l) __'_.!!..Lf (£L)F (-".2.) __1_ 1/ J- I[
1),+1],' I 2 I L /)/+/), L ' L 2 L 1]/+1], t- j Pi} j
:~f (A. )F (A. - (pl-p,l) __L_.!!..Lf (£L)F (1")-( +_L_) [
'7,+ 1], 1 j 2 j L I)1+1), L ' L 2 L P j 1],+1], ~ j
: LI),A, F (A. _ (p/-p,l) __L_.!!..Lf (£L)F (-".2.)_( +_L_)
/),+1], 2 j L 1]/+1], L ' L 2 L PI 1],+1], III
n this case the expression for the quantity of drug 1 is slightly more complicated than in the earlier case.
n Appendix 5.1 the value of III was derived to be the following:
A,+(f'I-l'l)
(
1 (Pj-P2» 'fl. f()F (P1-P2»d/ j = I - F, /\- 2+ L + , qJ j 2(qJ I L qJ I
1'1
T
-l-F(A. +(P1-P2»+ 1 [f(A. + (p/-p,l)F (A. )-f(£L)F (1")]
- '2 L + 12 L 22 'L2L
TIl Tl2
-1_F(A.+(P1-P2»+ 1 [f(A. + (pl-p,l)_f (£L)F (1")]
- 12 L + 12 L IL2L
TIl Tl2
-.Jow as before the value of consumer surplus is the integral of the product of increased utility and the
ikelihood of purchase for each value of qJ I'
l,ff,(qJj)F2(qJr (pl~p2l)[U,(qJI)-Uo]dqJl
1'1
r
A,
= f f, (qJ 1 )F2 (qJ r: (p/~P,l)[LqJ t : PI ]dqJ1
1'1
T
(Lemma I)
A, A,
-I f ( )F «pl-p,l)d ff' ( )F ( (p/-p,l)d= qJ j , qJ j 2 qJ r: -L-' qJ I - PI' tpI 2 qJ r: -L-' qJ I
/'/ HT L
A A,+''''I''>
=L JqJ1f,(qJI)F2(A.2)dqJ1+L' f~jfl(qJ1)F2(qJI-(p'2"l)dqJI-PIIlI
Al+lf'I~r1) l!f
A A,+''''I''>
=L JqJ jfJ(qJ1)dqJl+L - f~lfl(qJl)F2(qJr(p/~p'l)dqJl-Pl.u1
A.
1
+ (PI;".?) .Et
To proceed it is worthwhile to evaluate the first term separately. From Lemma II there is already a
relatively simple expression for the second term while the third term is already in its simplest form.
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)1.,f cP 1'1 (cp I }j cP I
A,
L f771CP le/j,(fP,-A,JdcpJ
A
2
+ (1'7 '21
f Bt A 1 Btand since Axe 'dx=-(x--)e' +CB B
after evaluating at the endpoints
le second term in the consumer surplus equation is:
.:t!+/III~-')Jl
J f ( )F ( (p,-p,l)d<P I I <P I 2 <P J--L- cP J
rt
T
(Lemma II)
L[~ f (B)F (B- (p,-p,l) __l_.£i.f ("!:!")F eJ, ) __I_JB f ( )F ( - (p,-p,l)dm ]
1),+1), I 2 L /j,+/j, L 1 L 2 L /j,+/j, 1 <P J 2 <PI L -r J
1',
T B~A.1+rl'liI'1)
evaluating this expression we get
(A ) + (p,-p,J)L[ ~ L f (A + (p,-p,l)F (A + (p,-p,J _ (p,-p,J) __I_.£i.f(..!:!..)F (12)
1),+/j, I 2 L 2 2 L L /j,+/j, L 1 L 2 L
/j,+/j,
A~+(/'I-P:!)
-f; ( )F ( (p,-p,J)d]I<PJ 2 <PI L <PI
1',
T
(A + (p,-p,l) A,+"'7'"
L[ 2 -L- f (A, + (p,-p,l)F (A, ) __l_.£i.f ("!:!")F (12)__1_ - Jf (<p )F (<p - (p,-p,l)dm] from the
/j,+/j, 1 2 L 2 2 /j,+/j, L I L 2 L /j,+/j, 1 I 2 J L -r J
1',
T
pression for J1 J above
(
1 (p,-p,l)fl,2+-L-
L[ f (A + (p,-p,l) __l_.£i.f ("!:!")F (p,) __I_(J1 -(l-F (A, + (p,-p,l))]
1),+/j, 1 2 L /j,+/j, L 1 L 2 L /j,+/j, J 1 2 L
_L_[(A, + (P,-p,l)f (A, + (p,-p,l)_.£i.f ("!:!")F eJ' ) - J1 +l-F (A, + (p,-p,l)]
/j,+/j, 2 L ] 2 L L] L 2 L J ] 2 L
ombining the three terms we get:
51 = L(A I - ~)- L(A,2+ (p,~p,l .L)F1(A,2+ (p,~p,l)/j, n,
+_L_[(A, + (p,-p,l)f (A, + (p,-p,l)_.£i.f (£L)F eJ' ) - J1 +l-F (A, + (p,-p,l)]
/j,+/j, 2 L ] 2 L L I L 2 L I I 2 L
-PII-L J
L(A, I - :,) - L(A, 2+ (p,~p,l - :, )F] (A,2+ (p,~p,l)
+_L_[77 (A, +(p,-p,l)F(A, + (p,-p,l)_.£i.f(£L)F (")-J1 +l-F(A + (p,-p,l)]
/j,+/j, I 2 L ] 2 L L I L 2 L J I 2 L
-PIJ11
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and after rearranging to isolate terms involving F, ()"2+ (p,~p,»
L(A I ) _ ) 1L _ L !!J... f (l!.!-)F (12) + L I _ L 1L
I -I); I l t- I ry/+ry, L I L 2 L ry,+Il, ry/+ry, t- I
+~(A + (p,-p'»)F (I\, + (p/-p,l) __L_ F (I\, + (1'/-1',»Il,+ry, 2 L I 2 L ry/+ry, I 2 L
-L(I\, + (1'/-1',) -~)F (I\, + (1',-1',»
2 L ry, I 2 L
and grouping terms involving F1(A'2+ (p/?,»)
L(A I + L ( + L ) 1 L PI f (p')F (1")
1- ry/ ry/+ry, - PI ry,+ry, I 1- ry/+ry, LIT 2 T
+F(I\, +(p/-p'»[~1\, +~(p/-p,)__L__ L(1\, +(p/-p,)-~)]
I 2 L ry,+ry, 2 ry,+ry, L ry/+ry, 2 L ry,
taking _L_ outside the brackets allows for a simpler cancellation
1),+7lz
L(A I ) L ( + L) _ L !!J... f (l!.!-)F (1")
I -I); + ry/+ry, PI 1),+1), fIl ry/+1), L 1 L 2 L
+_L_F(I\, +(1'/-1"»[7]1\, +7] (1'/-1")-1-(7] +7] )(I\,+(p,-p,)-~)]
ry,+ry, '2 L I 2 I L I 2 2 L ry/
L(A 1)+ L _( + L ) L _ L !!J...r (l!.!-)F (12)
I -I); 11,+ryz PI ry,+ryz I I ry,+ry, L I L 2 L
+_L_F(I\, +(1',-1'2»[7] (I\, +(p,-p2l_~)_(7] +7] )(A +(p'-I'z)_~)]
ry,+ryz I 2 L I 2 L ry, I 2 2 L n,
L(A I) L ( + L) L Plr(I'/)Fe")
I -I); + Il/+ry, - PI ry,+ry, ILl - ry/+ry, LIT 2 T
-~F(I\, +(1'/-1',»[1\, +(p/-p,l_~]
Il,+ry, I 2 L 2 L ry/
his last expression appears to be the simplest form in which consumer surplus can be expressed. In
irnrnary then for drug I:
'SI=
L(A 1)+ L ( + L) L P1f(p')F(P,)1-7); 1),+1), - PI 1),+1), 111 - 1),+1), LIT 2 T
-~F (A + (p,-p'»)[A + (1',-1',) _~ ]
1),+1), 1 2 L 2 L 1),
Y symmetry we can also find the consumer surplus for drug 2:
L(A ')+ L ( + L) L P2F(1'J)f (1'2)
2 -1); 1),+1)2 - P2 ry,+1)2 112 - ry,+1)2 LIT 2 T (p - P )where 1 _ 1 2 < 1
/1.1 L - /1.2
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\ppendix 6.2 Reference pricing equilibria with identical drugs
'or undercutting to be preferable to matching a shared price then:
dJr;(p;,Pj) < 0
dP;
(;~; [(Pi - c),ui (0,0)] < 0 SInce Pi = Pi
df.1;(O,O) dp}
,ui(O,O)+(Pi -c)-,-c--'- < 0
up) °Pj
and since undercutting is akin to increasing a competitors consumer price while leaving yours constant
(0 0) ( ) df.1;(O,O) 0I-li ' - Pi -c -,-c- <
°Pj
(0 0) df.1;(O,O) ( '),ui ' < ---;;;;;- Pi - G
,ui (0,0)
Pi > C + df.1;(O,O)
,' ')11 (0 0) 0 h' , ice is ab
.mce -'-'- > t IS maximum pnce IS a ove cost
r]I)~:
'or charging above the shared price to be optimal then
dJr;(p;'Pj) > 0
dP;
dll;(O,O) ( __) _ _(00)
,c P, c > 1-1, '
UPi
,u i (0,0)
Pi < c - df.1;(O,O)
dpr
T • df.1(OO) 0 h . ., b
sow smce~< t e maximum pnce IS a ove cost
[ow since quantity is more responsive to an increase in a firm's own consumer price than a decrease in
s competitors consumer price we can say:
:0 that:
df.1;(O,O) df.1;(O,O)
-,-c- < ---;;:-;:-
up) Vj);
since both terms are positive
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, , ' b I ,uiCO,O) f' 'II h ", f d hfor a competitor s pnce e ow c -~ a irm WI c arge a premlllm srnce It pre ers to 0 so rat er
hi h ' 'S' ~LiCO,O), I f hi hthan mate mg t e competitors pnce, mce P < c+ It a so pre ers mate mg t e consumer
.I dlli(O,O)
dfJj"
price to undercutting.
~LiCO,O)for a competitors price above c+ a firm will undercut since it prefers to do so rather thandlli(O,O)
dpj
I ' h ., h db h 'S' PiCO,O) '.. hi hmate 1lI1g w atever pnce IS c arge y t e competitor. mce Pi > c -~ It prerers mate mg t e
dpr
consumer price to charging a premium,
, , , ice ab piCO,O) d b I ~LiCO,O) h d f hi hifor a competitor s pnce a ove c -~ an e ow c+ t e pro ucer pre ers mate mg t IS
price to deviating from it. Since both firms are identical and optimally choose the same price there is
a range of equilibria in the case of identical drugs,
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opendix 6.3 Switch point for change of equilibrium type
chapter 6 the case of a difference in efficacy promoted a result where equilibrium consisted of a single
int. The same case without a difference in efficacy resulted in a range of equilibria in the
armaceutical market. The scenario at which the expected behaviour of the equilibrium changes from a
1ge to a single point is of interest. Through analysis of the model the case where}" 1 =: 1'},,2 =: 0.825 was
L1I1d to be the point where the equilibrium type changes. The reaction curve, quantity and profits of
ch firm are given on the following page.
Reaction curves
8.000 " 211
7.000
7.500 i . . . .. ., 1'_'_'_''R2(Pl)
-Rl(P2)
6.500
6.000 ~ .....
~N
5.500
5.000
4.500
.-- ,..,.
.~ - ~ - - - - - - - - - - _.
- - ~ - - - - - - - - - ~ - . - - . - - - - - - -
8.0007.5007.0006.5005.500 PI 6.0005.0004.500
4.000 I ' I ,
4.000
A 11 c *p )..l. 1t
DRUG 1
DRUG 2
1.000 1.000 1.000
0.825 1.000 1.000
6.0000
6.0000
0.49972.4983
0.33911.6956
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ipendix 6.4 The pricing system in New Zealand
Much of this appendix is reproduced from Woodfield, A and others (1997).
Pharmac negotiates over prices with manufacturers and the results of these negotiations appear in
Pharmaceutical Schedule in the "manufacturer's price" or "subsidy" columns. These prices define the
isidy on offer for each drug and not necessarily the actual price at which trade occurs. These actual
ces are not observed by Pharmac.
Manufacturers are paid by whomever receives their products, be they pharmacists or wholesalers
rarrnac is a subsidising agency rather than a drug purchasing agency). Manufacturers may compete
er the discounts they offer in order to gain the custom of pharmacists. Pharmacists keep any such
.counts without the knowledge of Pharmac who, presumably sets the fixed markups given below
suming these discounts are small or zero.
Pharmacists are reimbursed for purchasing pharmaceuticals at similar rates, irrespective of the
Ice they actually pay for the pharmaceuticals. The pharmacists receive a markup of 10% of the
gotiated price if no wholesaler is used plus an 11.28% markup, in addition to fee for the containers
ed to package drugs. All these charges can amount to quite a large sum. In addition to this fee the
oril 1997 Pharmaceutical Schedule notes that an additional markup of up to 50% can be charged on the
isubsidised portion of the negotiated price. In all pharmacists appear to be in a very favourable
isition.
Depending on how or whether discounts are passed on to them patients may face prices at, above
. below the negotiated price. Without any empirical information no attempt was made to estimate the
lationship between negotiated price and actual consumer price. By default the simplistic assumption
at the consumer price equals the unsubsidised portion of the negotiated price throughout Chapters 6-10.
nly in the sensitivity tests of Chapter 10 was this assumption relaxed.
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opendix 9.1 Definition of the marginal firm under screening
lis appendix assumes fixed costs of zero and a constant discount rate of 0 .
: time t (where patents expire at time 1) a firm with a marginal cost of c it receives the following profit
accepts a price of PI in return for charging at a consumer price of p;.
(PI - C)~L(p;) +O(PI - c )p(p;) + 0 2(PI - C)~L(pr)+·· .+OT-I-I (PI - c)p(p;)
==(PI -C)~L(p;:)(l+0+02+ .. ,+0T-I-I)
==(PI- c)P(p;')((1+0+02+ ... )_(OT-I +OT-I+I +OT-I+2+... »
clOT-I
==(PI-C)P(PI )(1-0 -1-0)
1_0T - I c
1-0 (PI -C)P(PI)
. the firm was to instead reject the offer and accept the next period's offer it receives
Cf5 - c)/1+ O(PI+I - C)p(pr+l) + 0 2(PI+I - c)p(pr+1 )+.. .+OT-1-1 (pt+J - C)~L(pr+l)
== Cf5 - c)/1+ O(PI+J - c)p(pr+J )(1 + 0 + 0 2+ ...+OT-I-2)
( - )- 1:( ) ( c )((1 I: 1:2 ) (I:T-I-I I:T-I I:T-I+I »== p-c P+u Pt+J-c P Pt+J +U+U +... - U +U +U +...
_ _ c I OT-I-J
== (p - c)p + O(Pt+1 -C)P(PI+J )(1-0 -1-=8)
_ _ 1_0 T- t - J r:
==(p-c)P+O 1-0 (Pt+I-c)P(PI+J)
_ _ O_oT-t c
==(p-c)P+ 1-0 (PI+J-C)P(PI+I)
[ote that this term is not necessarily the profit accruing to a firm that rejects PI but will equal the
ejection profits for the marginal firm. I The simplest version of this model sees P;~l constant over t.
Vith pr+1 == k firms face the profitsr'
acceptance of today' soffer:
wait until next period:
I.OT-,~(Pt - c)p(k)
I The precise definition of profits in the case of rejection is not required since where consumers join the scheme
each period a marginal consumer is marginal over the choice of when to accept, not if.
2 Any constant will do here but to retain consistency with earlier sections zero is used.
*c
r the marginal firm these are equal.
8 7 - 1 )(PI - c )p(k) = (1- 8)(p - c"}fi + (8 - 8 7 - 1 )(PI+J - c' )/-L(k)
-(1- 8)(p - c")71 = (8 - 87 - 1)(PI+J - c' )p(k) (1- 87 - 1)(PI - c' )/-L(k)
(1- 8)c"'71 - (1- 8)pl1, = p(k)[(8 - 8 7 - 1)(Pt+J - c*) - (1- 8 7 - 1)(PI - C *)]
= p(k)[(8 8 T- I)PI+J - (1- 8 T-')p,] - c*p(k)[ (8 _87 - ' ) _ (1_ 8 T- ' ) ]
(1- 8)c*71 = p(k)[8p'+J - 8 T- ' PI+J - PI + 8 T- ' p,] + c" (1- 8)p(k)
-8)c"'71 - ..' (1- 8)/-L(k) = p(k)[8p'+J - 8 T - 1P,+J - P, +8 T - 1PI - 8PI + 8p,] + (1- 8)pf-L
(1- 8)c' (71 -11(k)) = p(k)[(_8 T - ' P,+J+8 T - 1P, + 8p'+J - 8p,)- (P, - 8p,)] + (1- 8)p:U
= l1(k)[(8-8 T-')(p
'+J
- P,)]-I1(k)(1-8)p, + (1-8)p:U
= l1(k)[(8 - 8 T - ' )(p'+J - PI)] - (1- 8)[p,p(k) - pJi]
p(k) 8_8 7 - 1 ( ) P,I1(k)-pf-L
s:- P,+J - P, -/-L-p(k) I-u l1-p(k)
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, p,p(k)-pf-L
c =
/-L(k)-/-L
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ipendix 9.2 Strategy of a firm under screening
time t (where patents expire at time 7) a firm has a marginal cost of c it receives the following profit
ccepts a price of P, in return for charging at P; .3
he firm was to instead reject the offer and accept the next period's offer it receives
8 _81'-'
-c)Jj+ (PH] -c)p(p;~])
1-8
Firm with cost c will accept subsidisation if and only if:
81'-' c _ _ 8_81'-' c
-8 (p,-c)p(p,»(p-c)p+ 1-8 (p,+]-c)/l(p,+])
1_81'-' _ Jj 8_81'-' p(p~+])
~(p,-c»(p-c)P(p~/ 1-8 (p,+]-c) p(p;")
_ 1-8 P 1-8 8_81'-' p(p;~])
(p,-c»(P-c)I_81'-' j.l(p;)+1 81'-' 1-8 (PH]-C) j.L(p;)
_ 1-8 Jj 8_81'-' p(p;+])
/7 >c+(p-c) " + (/7 -C)-'------'-'-'-'-"--'-
, 1-87-,p(p;) 1_81'-' ,+1 f..L(p;)
'\ssuming zero fixed costs.
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.petuiix 9.3 Incorporation of an unsubsidised firm's reaction function.
anges in the consumer price of competing drugs affect the function p(p"). Firm I is in the process of
;otiating subsidisation and faces an unsubsidised competitor firm 2. Firm 1 has a quantity function
)j! (I)) = PI (Pi' (I), pz) so that subsidisation defines the price it charges once subsidised but not the
ce of firm 2. This new quantity function can be inserted into the profit function under a signalling
nlibriurn.
,w to find the equilibrium the first order condition for the interior of this function is analysed
0= (p-c)Jie- rr -(Pl(t)-C)Pl(pf(I),pz)e-rr + :1: Pl(pf(t),pz)[+e-rl _+e-rT ]
+!!l!..L "fJl' (p (t)-c)[..Le-1"1 _..Le-I"T]
"Pi' "PI I r I"
:I the reaction function of firm 2 (R, (pi')) inserted in place of pz:
(- )--1"1 ( () ) (fJ()R (1')) -I"I dp (I!()R (1'))[1 -I"I 1 -rT]= p - c J.1e - Pit - c f.11 PJ t, z PI e + lit f.11 PI I, Z PI r e - r e
",ll} "Pi' ( () )[ 1 -rl J -I"T]+-- P t -c -e --e
"p!' "I', I r r
Ice simplified with c = c(t) and solved this first-order condition will give a signalling equilibrium that
.orporates the reaction of a firm's competitors to subsidisation.
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Appendix 10.1 Comparison of subsidisation frameworks.
The following tables contain the full results of the comparisons referred to in Chapter 10.
The legend below gives the names and quantities for each figure displayed on the following
tables.
name
ppnce
cpnce
quantity
profits
subsidies
cs
ts
pbar
tcrit
explanation
equilibrium producer price
equilibrium consumer price
quantity over full period to generic entry
profits over full period to generic entry
subsidies required over full period to generic entry
consumer surplus over full period to generic entry
total surplus over full period to generic entry
for JZ scheme only: price charged by entrant pre-subsidisation
for JZ scheme only: time elapsed when subsidisation accepted
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Identically Distributed Drugs
lambda 1.0000 1. 0000 eta 1. 0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 2.3108 2.5532 pprice 2.3935 2.5532
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.3935 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1. 9459 quantity 1.9459 1. 9459 quantity 0.9028 2.6150
profi ts 4.9685 4.9685 profits 4.4966 4.9683 profits 2.1608 6.6769
subsidies 9.9369 subsidies 9.4649 subsidies 6.6769
cs 12.7751 cs 12.7751 cs 9.4296
ts 12.7751 ts 12.7751 ts 11. 5904
pbar 3.4215
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1. 0000 1. 0000 eta 1. 0000 1.0000 cost 1. 0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 2.3673 2.5532 pprice 2.9459 2.5532
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.9459 0.0000
quantity 1. 9459 1.9459 quantity 1.8710 1. 9890 quantity 0.6995 2.7034
profits 3.0226 4.9685 profits 2.5878 5.0785 profits 1. 3 612 6.9027
subsidies 9.9369 subsidies 9.4417 subsidies 6.9027
cs 12.7751 cs 12.5593 cs 8.9875
ts 10.8292 ts 10.6883 ts 10.3487
pbar 3.4353
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1. 0000 1. 0000 eta 1. 0000 1. 0000 cost 2.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 2.3888 2.5532 pprice 3.4773 2.5532
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4773 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 1. 7905 2.0349 quantity 0.5121 2.7677
profits 1.0767 4.9685 profits 0.7565 5.1956 profits 0.7565 7.0669
subsidies 9.9369 subsidies 9.3402 subsidies 7.0669
cs 12.7751 cs 12.3298 cs 8.6658
ts 8.8833 ts 8.7488 ts 9.4223
pbar 3.4773
tcrit 0.5000
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Identically Distributed Drugs
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.3108 2.6002 pprice 2.3935 2.6002
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 cprice 2.3935 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 0.9028 2.6150
profi ts 5.0597 3.1138 profits 4.4966 3.1138 profits 2.1608 4.1845
subsidies 10.1194 subsidies 9.5563 subsidies 6.7995
cs 12.7751 cs 12.7751 cs 9.4296
ts 10.8292 ts 10.8292 ts 8.9754
pbar 3.4215
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1. 0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1. 0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.3673 2.6002 pprice 2.9459 2.6002
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.9459 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 1.8710 1. 9890 quantity 0.6995 2.7034
profits 3.113 8 3.1138 profits 2.5878 3.1829 profits 1. 3612 4.3260
subsidies 10.1194 subsidies 9.5352 subsidies 7.0294
cs 12.7751 cs 12.5593 cs 8.9875
ts 8.8833 ts 8.6993 ts 7.6453
3.1138 3.1138 pbar 3.4353
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.3888 2.6002 pprice 3.4773 2.6002
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4773 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 1.7905 2.0349 quantity 0.5121 2.7677
profits 1.1679 3.1138 profits 0.7565 3.2563 profits 0.7565 4.4289
subsidies 10.1194 subsidies 9.4358 subsidies 7.1967
cs 12.7751 cs 12.3298 cs 8.6658
ts 6.9374 ts 6.7138 ts 6.6546
pbar 3.4773
tcrit 0.5000
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Identically Distributed Drugs
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 2.3108 2.6182 pprice 2.3935 2.6182
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.3935 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 0.9028 2.6150
profits 5.0946 1.2029 profits 4.4966 1.2029 profi ts 2.1608 1.6166
subsidies 10.1893 subsidies 9.5912 subsidies 6.8465
cs 12.7751 cs 12.7751 cs 9.4296
ts 8.8833 ts 8.8833 ts 6.3605
pbar 3.4215
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 2.3673 2.6182 pprice 2.9459 2.6182
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.9459 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1. 9459 quantity 1.8710 1. 9890 quantity 0.6995 2.7034
profits 3.1488 1.2029 profits 2.5878 1.2296 profits 1. 3 612 1.6712
subsidies 10.1893 subsidies 9.5709 subsidies 7.0780
cs 12.7751 cs 12.5593 cs 8.9875
ts 6.9375 ts 6.7102 ts 4.9420
pbar 3.4353
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 2.3888 2.6182 pprice 3.4773 2.6182
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4773 0.0000
quantity 1.9459 1.9459 quantity 1.7905 2.0349 quantity 0.5121 2.7677
profits 1.2029 1.2029 profits 0.7565 1.2579 profi ts 0.7565 1. 7109
subsidies 10.1893 subsidies 9.4724 subsidies 7.2464
cs 12.7751 cs 12.3298 cs 8.6658
ts 4.9915 ts 4.6789 ts 3.8869
pbar 3.4773
tcrit 0.5000
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Balanced asymmetry (}l=O.85, ry=l.lO previously subsidised)
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1.0000 1.1000 cost 0.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3381 2.3381 pprice 2.2129 2.3381 pprice 2.1385 2.3381
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.1385 0.0000
quantity 1.8254 1.9620 quantity 1.8254 1. 9620 quantity 0.8423 2.5593
profits 4.2680 4.5875 profits 4.0393 4.5875 profits 1.8013 5.9840
subsidies 8.8554 subsidies 8.6268 subsidies 5.9840
cs 10.6732 cs 10.6732 cs 7.7238
ts 10.6732 ts 10.6732 ts 9.5251
pbar 3.1718
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1.0000 1.1000 cost 1.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3381 2.3381 pprice 2.2711 2.3381 pprice 2.6945 2.3381
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.6945 0.0000
quantity 1.8254 1.9620 quantity 1.7528 2.0006 quantity 0.6298 2.6416
profits 2.4426 4.5875 profits 2.2499 4.6776 profits 1.0671 6.1765
subsidies 8.8554 subsidies 8.6045 subsidies 6.1765
cs 10.6732 cs 10.4799 cs 7.2920
ts 8.8478 ts 8.7271 ts 8.3591
pbar 3.1855
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1.0000 1.1000 cost 2.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3381 2.3381 pprice 2.2934 2.3381 pprice 3.2277 2.3381
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cpr ice 3.2277 0.0000
quantity 1.8254 1.9620 quantity 1. 6748 2.0416 quantity o. 4362 2.6961
profits 0.6172 4.5875 profi ts 0.5355 4.7734 profi ts 0.5355 6.3037
subsidies 8.8554 subsidies 8.5060 subsidies 6.3037
cs 10.6732 cs 10.2743 cs 6.9922
ts 7.0225 ts 6.9246 ts 7.5276
pbar 3.2277
tcri t 0.5000
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Balanced asymmetry (A.=O.85, ~=l.10 previously subsidised)
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1.0000 1.1000 cost 0.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3883 2.3883 pprice 2.2129 2.3883 pprice 2.1385 2.3883
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.13 85 0.0000
quantity 1.8254 1. 9620 quantity 1.8254 1. 9620 quantity 0.8423 2.5593
profits 4.3595 2.7238 profits 4.0393 2.7238 profits 1.8013 3.5530
subsidies 9.0453 subsidies 8.7252 subsidies 6.1123
cs 10.6732 cs 10.6732 cs 7.7238
ts 8.7112 ts 8.7112 ts 6.9658
pbar 3.1718
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1. 0000 1.1000 cost 1.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3883 2.3883 pprice 2.2711 2.3883 pprice 2.6945 2.3883
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.6945 0.0000
quantity 1. 8254 1. 9620 quantity 1. 7528 2.0006 quantity 0.6298 2.6416
profits 2.5341 2.7238 profits 2.2499 2.7774 profits 1. 0671 3.6673
subsidies 9.0453 subsidies 8.7048 subsidies 6.3089
cs 10.6732 cs 10.4799 cs 7.2920
ts 6.8858 ts 6.7265 ts 5.7175
pbar 3.1855
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1.0000 1.1000 cost 2.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3883 2.3883 pprice 2.2934 2.3883 pprice 3.2277 2.3883
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.2277 0.0000
quantity 1. 8254 1. 9620 quantity 1.6748 2.0416 quantity 0.4362 2.6961
profits 0.7088 2.7238 profits 0.5355 2.8342 profits 0.5355 3.7429
subsidies 9.0453 subsidies 8.6084 subsidies 6.4389
cs 10.6732 cs 10.2743 cs 6.9922
ts 5.0604 ts 4.8831 ts 4.8316
pbar 3.2277
tcrit 0.5000
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Balanced asymmetry (A.=O.85, ~=1.10 previously subsidised)
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1.0000 1.1000 cost 0.0000 2.0000
REF'ERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4075 2.4075 pprice 2.2129 2.4075 pprice 2.1385 2.4075
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cpr ice 2.1385 0.0000
quantity 1.8254 1. 9620 quantity 1.8254 1. 9620 quantity 0.8423 2.5593
profits 4.3938 0.7987 profits 4.0393 0.7995 profits 1. 8013 1.0418
subsidies 9.1165 subsidies 8.7629 subsidies 6.1604
cs 10.6732 cs 10.6732 cs 7.7238
ts 6.7492 ts 6.7492 ts 4.4065
pbar 3.1718
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1. 0000 1.1000 cost 1. 0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4075 2.4075 pprice 2.2711 2.4075 pprice 2.6945 2.4075
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cpr ice 2.6945 0.0000
quantity 1.8254 1.9620 quantity 1.7528 2.0006 quantity 0.6298 2.6416
profits 2.5684 0.7987 profits 2.2499 0.8153 profits 1. 0671 1.0753
subsidies 9.1165 subsidies 8.7433 subsidies 6.3586
cs 10.6732 cs 10.4799 cs 7.2920
ts 4.9238 ts 4.7259 ts 3.0759
pbar 3.1855
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 0.9000 0.8500 eta 1.0000 1.1000 cost 2.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4075 2.4075 pprice 2.2934 2.4075 pprice 3.2277 2.4075
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.2277 0.0000
quantity 1.8254 1.9620 quantity 1. 6748 2.0416 quantity 0.4362 2.6961
profits 0.7430 0.7987 profits 0.5355 0.8319 profits 0.5355 1. 0975
subsidies 9.1165 subsidies 8.6477 subsidies 6.4896
cs 10.6732 cs 10.2743 cs 6.9922
ts 3.0984 ts 2.8415 ts 2.1355
pbar 3.2277
tcrit 0.5000
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Balanced asymmetry (A=0.90, 7]=1.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3994 2.3994 pprice 2.1925 2.3994 pprice 2.0765 2.3994
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.0765 0.0000
quantity 1.9620 1.8254 quantity 1. 9620 1.8254 quantity 0.9317 2.4371
profits 4.7076 4.3797 profits 4.3017 4.3797 profits 1. 9346 5.8475
subsidies 9.0873 subsidies 8.6814 subsidies 5.8475
cs 10.6732 cs 10.6732 cs 7.8528
ts 10.6732 ts 10.6732 ts 9.7875
pbar 3.0667
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3994 2.3994 pprice 2.2504 2.3994 pprice 2.6066 2.3994
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.6066 0.0000
quantity 1. 9620 1.8254 quantity 1.8845 1.8659 quantity 0.6979 2.5301
profits 2.7456 4.3797 profits 2.3780 4.4770 profits 1.1212 6.0705
subsidies 9.0873 subsidies 8.6592 subsidies 6.0705
cs 10.6732 cs 10.4885 cs 7.4423
ts 8.7112 ts 8.6392 ts 8.5635
pbar 3.0800
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3994 2.3994 pprice 2.2725 2.3994 pprice 3.1209 2.3994
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.1209 0.0000
quantity 1.9620 1.8254 quantity 1.8011 1.9091 quantity 0.4770 2.5977
profits 0.7835 4.3797 profits 0.5346 4.5853 profits 0.5346 6.2329
subsidies 9.0873 subsidies 8.5560 subsidies 6.2329
cs 10.6732 cs 10.2920 cs 7.1551
ts 6.7492 ts 6.6898 ts 7.6897
pbar 3.1209
tcrit 0.5000
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Balanced asymmetry (A=0.90, 17 =1. 00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1. 0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4487 2.4487 pprice 2.1925 2.4487 pprice 2.0765 2.4487
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.0765 0.0000
quantity 1.9620 1.8254 quantity 1.9620 1. 8254 quantity 0.9317 2.4371
profits 4.8044 2.6444 profits 4.3017 2.6444 profits 1.9346 3.5307
subsidies 9.2742 subsidies 8.7715 subsidies 5.9678
cs 10.6732 cs 10.6732 cs 7.8528
ts 8.8478 ts 8.8478 ts 7.3504
pbar 3.0667
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4487 2.4487 pprice 2.2504 2.4487 pprice 2.6066 2.4487
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cpr ice 2.6066 0.0000
quantity 1.9620 1. 8254 quantity 1. 8845 1.8659 quantity 0.6979 2.5301
profits 2.8424 2.6444 profits 2.3780 2.7032 profits 1.1212 3.6653
subsidies 9.2742 subsidies 8.7513 subsidies 6.1954
cs 10.6732 cs 10.4885 cs 7.4423
ts 6.8858 ts 6.7380 ts 6.0334
pbar 3.0800
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1. 0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4487 2.4487 pprice 2.2725 2.4487 pprice 3.1209 2.4487
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.1209 0.0000
quantity 1. 9620 1.8254 quantity 1.8011 1.9091 quantity 0.4770 2.5977
profits 0.8804 2.6444 profits 0.5346 2.7657 profits 0.5346 3.7633
subsidies 9.2742 subsidies 8.6502 subsidies 6.3611
cs 10.6732 cs 10.2920 cs 7.1551
ts 4.9238 ts 4.7807 ts 5.0920
pbar 3.1209
tcrit 0.5000
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Balanced asymmetry (A=O.90, ry=l.OO previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4676 2.4676 pprice 2.1925 2.4676 pprice 2.0765 2.4676
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.0765 0.0000
quantity 1. 9620 1.8254 quantity 1.9620 1.8254 quantity 0.9317 2.4371
profits 4.8415 0.8536 profits 4.3017 0.8536 profits 1.9346 1.1396
subsidies 9.3458 subsidies 8.8060 subsidies 6.0139
cs 10.6732 cs 10.6732 cs 7.8528
ts 7.0224 ts 7.0224 ts 4.9132
pbar 3.0667
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4676 2.4676 pprice 2.2504 2.4676 pprice 2.6066 2.4676
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.6066 0.0000
quantity 1. 9620 1. 8254 quantity 1. 8845 1.8659 quantity 0.6979 2.5301
profits 2.8795 0.8536 profits 2.3780 0.8725 profits 1.1212 1.1831
subsidies 9.3458 subsidies 8.7865 subsidies 6.2432
cs 10.6732 cs 10.4885 cs 7.4423
ts 5.0604 ts 4.8721 ts 3.5034
pbar 3.0800
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 0.9000 eta 1.1000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.4676 2.4676 pprice 2.2725 2.4676 pprice 3.1209 2.4676
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.1209 0.0000
quantity 1. 9620 1.8254 quantity 1.8011 1.9091 quantity 0.4770 2.5977
profits 0.9175 0.8536 profits 0.5346 0.8927 profits 0.5346 1. 2147
subsidies 9.3458 subsidies 8.6863 subsidies 6.4102
cs 10.6732 cs 10.2920 cs 7.1551
ts 3.0984 ts 2.8717 ts 2.4943
pbar 3.1209
tcrit 0.5000
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Difference in efficacy o. =1. 00, 77=1.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 1.9288 2.5532 pprice 1.2369 2.5532
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1.2369 0.0000
quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 0.6970 2.6257
profits 3.6322 5.8581 profits 2.7438 5.8578 profits 0.8621 6.7041
subsidies 9.4903 subsidies 8.6017 subsidies 6.7041
cs 9.3355 cs 9.3355 cs 8.5445
ts 9.3355 ts 9.3355 ts 9.4066
pbar 2.1966
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 1.9976 2.5532 pprice 1.7472 2.5532
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1.7472 0.0000
quantity 1. 4226 2.2943 quantity 1. 3558 2.3212 quantity 0.4126 2.7278
profits 2.2097 5.8581 profits 1. 3543 5.9266 profits 0.3083 6.9651
subsidies 9.4903 subsidies 8.6182 subsidies 6.9651
cs 9.3355 cs 9.2805 cs 8.3730
ts 7.9130 ts 7.9247 ts 8.6812
pbar 2.2097
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1. 0000 cost 2.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 2.0240 2.5532 pprice 2.2499 2.5532
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.2499 0.0000
quantity 1. 4226 2.2943 quantity 1.2832 2.3502 quantity 0.13 66 2.8104
profits 0.7871 5.8581 profits 0.03414 6.00062 profits 0.0341 7.1759
subsidies 9.4903 subsidies 8.5679 subsidies 7.1759
cs 9.3355 cs 9.2222 cs 8.2893
ts 6.4904 ts 6.6558 ts 8.3234
pbar 2.2499
tcrit 0.5000
267
Difference in efficacy (,{=1.00, 17=1.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIA.."rr NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 1.9288 2.6002 pprice 1.2369 2.6002
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1. 23 69 0.0000
quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 0.6970 2.6257
profi ts 3.6989 3.6713 profi ts 2.7438 3.6713 profits 0.8621 4.2016
subsidies 9.6645 subsidies 8.7095 subsidies 6.8272
cs 9.3355 cs 9.3355 cs 8.5445
ts 7.0413 ts 7.0413 ts 6.7810
pbar 2.1966
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 1. 9976 2.6002 pprice 1. 7472 2.6002
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1. 7472 0.0000
quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 1.3558 2.3212 quantity 0.4126 2.7278
profits 2.2764 3.6713 profits 1.3543 3.7144 profits 0.3083 4.3651
subsidies 9.6645 subsidies 8.7273 subsidies 7.0929
cs 9.3355 cs 9.2805 cs 8.3730
ts 5.6187 ts 5.6035 ts 5.9534
pbar 2.2097
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.0240 2.6002 pprice 2.2499 2.6002
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.2499 0.0000
quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 1. 2832 2.3502 quantity 0.1366 2.8104
profits 0.8538 3.6713 profits 0.03414 3.76082 profits 0.0341 4.4973
subsidies 9.6645 subsidies 8.6783 subsidies 7.3077
cs 9.3355 cs 9.2222 cs 8.2893
ts 4.1961 ts 4.3055 ts 5.5130
pbar 2.2499
tcrit 0.5000
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Difference in efficacy (A=1.00, 77=1.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1. 0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 1.9288 2.6182 pprice 1. 23 69 2.6182
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1.2369 0.0000
quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 0.6970 2.6257
profits 3.7245 1.4183 profits 2.7438 1.4183 profits 0.8621 1. 6232
subsidies 9.7313 subsidies 8.7507 subsidies 6.8744
cs 9.3355 cs 9.3355 cs 8.5445
ts 4.7470 ts 4.7470 ts 4.1554
pbar 2.1966
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 1. 9976 2.6182 pprice 1.7472 2.6182
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1.7472 0.0000
quantity 1. 422 6 2.2943 quantity 1. 3558 2.3212 quantity 0.4126 2.7278
profits 2.3019 1.4183 profits 1. 3543 1.4349 profits 0.3083 1.6864
subsidies 9.7313 subsidies 8.7690 subsidies 7.1419
cs 9.3355 cs 9.2805 cs 8.3730
ts 3.3244 ts 3.2822 ts 3.2256
pbar 2.2097
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 0.5000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 2.0240 2.6182 pprice 2.2499 2.6182
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.2499 0.0000
quantity 1.4226 2.2943 quantity 1.2832 2.3502 quantity 0.13 66 2.8104
profits 0.8794 1.4183 profits 0.03414 1. 45282 profits 0.0341 1. 7373
subsidies 9.7313 subsidies 8.7205 subsidies 7.3582
cs 9.3355 cs 9.2222 cs 8.2893
ts 1.9019 ts 1.9553 ts 2.7026
pbar 2.2499
tcrit 0.5000
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Difference in efficacy 0.=0.50, ~=1.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 1.9389 1.9389 pprice 2.2474 1. 9389 pprice 1.9312 1.9389
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1.9312 0.0000
quantity 2.2943 1.4226 quantity 2.2943 1. 422 6 quantity 1. 2540 2.0932
profits 4.4483 2.7581 profits 5.1563 2.7581 profits 2.4218 4.0584
subsidies 7.2064 subsidies 7.9144 subsidies 4.0584
cs 9.3355 cs 9.3355 cs 5.0446
ts 9.3355 ts 9.3355 ts 7.4664
pbar 3.4215
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 1.9389 1. 9389 pprice 2.3071 1.9389 pprice 2.9459 1.9389
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cpr ice 2.9459 0.0000
quantity 2.2943 1.4226 quantity 2.2010 1.4636 quantity 0.6995 2.2855
profits 2.1540 2.7581 profits 2.9083 2.8377 profits 1. 3612 4.4313
subsidies 7.2064 subsidies 7.8514 subsidies 4.4313
cs 9.3355 cs 9.0048 cs 3.5656
ts 7. 0413 ts 6.8039 ts 4.9268
pbar 3.4353
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3297 1. 9389 pprice 3.4773 1. 9389
NO SUBSIDISATION cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4773 0.0000
quantity 2.1012 1.5058 quantity 0.5121 2.1911
profits 0.7565 2.9196 profits 0.7565 4.2482
subsidies 7.6855 subsidies 4.2482
cs 8.6529 cs 3.0353
ts 4.4505 ts 3.7918
pbar 3.4773
tcrit 0.5000
MAXIMUM COST FOR SUBSIDISATION 1. 4831
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Difference in efficacy (A=0.50, J) =1. 00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.0053 2.0053 pprice 2.2474 2.0053 pprice 1.9312 2.0053
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1. 9312 0.0000
quantity 2.2943 1. 422 6 quantity 2.2943 1.4226 quantity 1.2540 2.0932
profits 4.6007 1.4301 profits 5.1563 1. 4301 profits 2.4218 2.1043
subsidies 7.4534 subsidies 8.0089 subsidies 4.1974
cs 9.3355 cs 9.3355 cs 5.0446
ts 7.913 0 ts 7.9130 ts 5.3732
pbar 3.4215
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.0053 2.0053 pprice 2.3071 2.0053 pprice 2.9459 2.0053
cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.9459 0.0000
quantity 2.2943 1.4226 quantity 2.2010 1.4636 quantity 0.6995 2.2855
profits 2.3064 1. 4301 profits 2.9083 1.4713 profits 1. 3612 2.2976
subsidies 7.4534 subsidies 7.9486 subsidies 4.5832
cs 9.3355 cs 9.0048 cs 3.5656
ts 5.6187 ts 5.3403 ts 2.6413
pbar 3.4353
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3297 2.0053 pprice 3.4773 2.0053
NO SUBSIDISATION cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4773 0.0000
quantity 2.1012 1.5058 quantity 0.5121 2.1911
profits 0.7565 1. 5138 profits 0.7565 2.2027
subsidies 7.7855 subsidies 4.3938
cs 8.6529 cs 3.0353
ts 2.9447 ts 1.6007
pbar 3.4773
tcrit 0.5000
MAXIMUM COST FOR SUBSIDISATION 1.5730
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Difference in efficacy (}c=0.50, 7]=1. 00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.0310 2.0310 pprice 2.2474 2.0310 pprice 1.9312 2.0310
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1.9312 0.0000
quantity 2.2943 1. 422 6 quantity 2.2943 1. 4226 quantity 1.2540 2.0932
profi ts 4.6597 0.0441 profits 5.1563 0.0441 profits 2.4218 0.0649
subsidies 7.5489 subsidies 8.0455 subsidies 4.2512
cs 9.3355 cs 9.3355 cs 5.0446
ts 6.4904 ts 6.4904 ts 3.2800 33.0000
pbar 3.4215
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1.0000 1.0000 cost 1. 0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.0310 2.0310 pprice 2.3071 2.0310 pprice 2.9459 2.0310
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.9459 0.0000
quantity 2.2943 1. 422 6 quantity 2.2010 1.4636 quantity 0.6995 2.2855
profits 2.3654 0.0441 profits 2.9083 0.0454 profits 1.3612 0.0708
subsidies 7.5489 subsidies 7.9862 subsidies 4.6419
cs 9.3355 cs 9.0048 cs 3.5656
ts 4.1961 ts 3.8767 ts 0.3557
pbar 3.4353
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 0.5000 eta 1. 0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.3297 2.0310 pprice 3.4773 2.0310
NO SUBSIDISATION cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4773 0.0000
quantity 2.1012 1.5058 quantity 0.5121 2.1911
profits 0.7565 0.0467 profits 0.7565 0.0679
subsidies 7.8242 subsidies 4.4501
cs 8.6529 cs 3.0353
ts 1.4389 ts -0.5904
pbar 3.4773
tcrit 0.5000
MAXIMUM COST FOR SUBSIDISATION 1. 6075
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Difference in risk (},=l.OO, ry=5.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 0.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.2807 3.2412 pprice 1.9448 3.2412 pprice 0.9903 3.2412
cprice 0.0000 0.9605 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.9903 0.0000
quantity 1.4008 3.0709 quantity 0.7483 3.7415 quantity 0.2764 4.2109
profits 3.1948 9.9535 profits 1.4553 12.1267 profits 0.2737 13.6483
subsidies 10.1988 subsidies 13.5820 subsidies 13.6483
cs 15.5005 cs 18.7630 cs 18.2936
ts 18.4500 ts 18.7630 ts 18.5673
pbar 2.8082
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1. 0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 1.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6954 3.2412 pprice 2.0180 3.2412 pprice 1.9688 3.2412
cprice 0.0000 0.5458 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1.9688 0.0000
quantity 1.1348 3.3468 quantity 0.7109 3.7784 quantity 0.1020 4.3824
profits 1.9239 10.8476 profits 0.7255 12.2463 profits 0.0988 14.2040
subsidies 12.0797 subsidies 13.6766 subsidies 14.2040
cs 16.8304 cs 18.7261 cs 18.1221
ts 17.5222 ts 18.0152 ts 18.2209
pbar 2.8320
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1. 0000 5.0000 cost 2.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 3.1324 3.2412 pprice 2.0457 3.2412 pprice 2.9044 3.2412
cprice 0.0000 0.1088 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.9044 0.0000
quantity 0.8288 3.6596 quantity 0.6713 3.8175 quantity 0.0378 4.4432
profits 0.9385 11.8615 profits 0.03426 12.3731 profits 0.0342 14.4011
subsidies 14.0595 subsidies 13.7380 subsidies 14.4011
cs 18.3604 cs 18.6870 cs 18.0613
ts 17.1009 ts 17.3444 ts 18.0955
pbar 2.9045
tcrit 0.5000
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Difference in risk ().=1.00, ry=5.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 0.0000 1. 0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.2960 3.2667 pprice 1.9448 3.2667 pprice 0.9903 3.2667
cprice 0.0000 0.9708 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.9903 0.0000
quantity 1.4071 3.0643 quantity 0.7483 3.7415 quantity 0.2764 4.2109
profits 3.2307 6.9460 profits 1.4553 8.4809 profits 0.2737 9.5450
subsidies 10.2663 subsidies 13.6776 subsidies 13.7559
cs 15.4689 cs 18.7630 cs 18.2936
ts 15.3794 ts 15.0216 ts 14.3564
pbar 2.8082
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 1.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.7101 3.2667 pprice 2.0180 3.2667 pprice 1.9688 3.2667
cprice 0.0000 0.5567 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 1. 9688 0.0000
quantity 1.1421 3.3393 quantity 0.7109 3.7784 quantity 0.1020 4.3824
profits 1.9531 7.5694 profits 0.7255 8.5645 profits 0.0988 9.9337
subsidies 12.1449 subsidies 13.7732 subsidies 14.3161
cs 16.7940 cs 18.7261 cs 18.1221
ts 14.1716 ts 14.2368 ts 13.8385
pbar 2.8320
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1. 0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 2.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 3.1465 3.2667 pprice 2.0457 3.2667 pprice 2.9044 3.2667
cprice 0.0000 0.1203 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 2.9044 0.0000
quantity 0.8372 3.6511 quantity 0.6713 3.8175 quantity 0.0378 4.4432
profits 0.9598 8.2762 profits 0.0342 6 8.65322 profits 0.0342 10.0715
subsidies 14.1224 subsidies 13.8356 subsidies 14.5147
cs 18.3185 cs 18.6870 cs 18.0613
ts 13 .4321 ts 13.5269 ts 13.6523
pbar 2.9045
tcrit 0.5000
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Difference in risk (,1=1. 00, 71=5.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 0.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
ppriee 2.3019 3.2766 pprice 1.9448 3.2766 pprice 0.9903 3.2766
epriee 0.0000 0.9747 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.9903 0.0000
quantity 1.4096 3.0618 quantity 0.7483 3.74.15 quantity 0.2764 4.2109
profits 3.2446 3.9087 profits 1.4553 4.7764 profits 0.2737 5.3757
subsidies 10.2924 subsidies 13.7145 subsidies 13.7975
es 15.4567 es 18.7630 es 18.2936
ts 12.3176 ts 11. 2801 ts 10.1455
pbar 2.8082
terit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 1. 0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 1.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
ppriee 2.7157 3.2766 ppriee 2.0180 3.2766 ppriee 1.9688 3.2766
epriee 0.0000 0.5609 epriee 0.0000 0.0000 epriee 1. 9688 0.0000
quantity 1.1029 3.3786 quantity 0.7109 3.7784 quantity 0.1020 4.3824
profits 1.8891 4.3132 profits 0.7255 4.8235 profits 0.0988 5.5946
subsidies 12.2584 subsidies 13.8105 subsidies 14.3593
es 16.8341 es 18.7261 es 18.1221
ts 10.7780 ts 10.4585 ts 9.4562
pbar 2.8320
terit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 1.0000 5.0000 cost 2.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
ppriee 3.1519 3.2766 ppriee 2.0457 3.2766 ppriee 2.9044 3.2766
epriee 0.0000 0.1247 epriee 0.0000 0.0000 epriee 2.9044 0.0000
quantity 0.8404 3.6479 quantity 0.6713 3.8175 quantity 0.0378 4.4432
profits 0.9681 4.6569 profits 0.03426 4.87342 profits 0.0342 5.6722
subsidies 14.1467 subsidies 13.8733 subsidies 14.5586
es 18.3024 es 18.6870 es 18.0613
ts 9.7807 ts 9.7094 ts 9.2090
pbar 2.9045
terit 0.5000
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Difference in risk (,1.=1.00, ry=l.OO previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 1.8756 pprice 2.5765 2.5532 pprice 3.0498 2.5532
cprice 0.6776 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.0498 0.0000
quantity 3.2571 1.2218 quantity 3.7415 0.7483 quantity 1.8418 2.4236
profits 8.3161 2.2917 profits 9.6398 1.9106 profits 5.6171 6.1880
subsidies 8.4009 subsidies 11.5503 subsidies 6.1880
cs 16.3953 cs 18.7630 cs 10.3865
ts 18.6022 ts 18.7630 ts 16.0036
pbar 3.7427
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5532 1.8756 pprice 2.6254 2.5532 pprice 3.4225 2.5532
cprice 0.6776 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4225 0.0000
quantity 3.2571 1.2218 quantity 3.6165 0.8487 quantity 1.6067 2.5523
profits 5.0590 2.2917 profits 5.9602 2.1670 profits 3.8923 6.5165
subsidies 8.4009 subsidies 11.4714 subsidies 6.5165
cs 16.3953 cs 18.2609 cs 9.7432
ts 15.3451 ts 14.6444 ts 13.6355
pbar 3.7520
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 0.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6441 2.5532 pprice 3.7808 2.5532
NO SUBSIDISATION cpr ice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.7808 0.0000
quantity 3.4827 0.9553 quantity 1.3532 2.6585
profits 2.4097 2.4390 profits 2.4097 6.7878
subsidies 11. 2597 subsidies 6.7878
cs 17.7281 cs 9.2119
ts 10.7628 ts 11. 6216
pbar 3.7808
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Difference in risk (A.=1.00, 1]=1.00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.3319 pprice 2.5765 2.6002 pprice 3.0498 2.6002
cprice 0.2683 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.0498 0.0000
quantity 3.5426 0.9437 quantity 3.7415 0.7483 quantity 1.8418 2.4236
profits 9.2115 1.2569 profits 9.6398 1.1974 profits 5.6171 3.8782
subsidies 10.4616 subsidies 11.5855 subsidies 6.3018
cs 17.7861 cs 18.7630 cs 10.3865
ts 17.7929 ts 18.0147 ts 13.5800
pbar 3.7427
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 1. 0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.3319 pprice 2.6254 2.6002 pprice 3.4225 2.6002
cpr ice 0.2683 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4225 0.0000
quantity 3.5426 0.9437 quantity 3.6165 0.8487 quantity 1.6067 2.5523
profits 5.6689 1.2569 profits 5.9602 1. 3581 profits 3.8923 4.0841
subsidies 10.4616 subsidies 11.5112 subsidies 6.6364
cs 17.7861 cs 18.2609 cs 9.7432
ts 14.2503 ts 13.7956 ts 11.0833
pbar 3.7520
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 2.0000 1.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6441 2.6002 pprice 3.7808 2.6002
NO SUBSIDISATION cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.7808 0.0000
quantity 3.4827 0.9553 quantity 1. 3532 2.6585
profits 2.4097 1. 5286 profits 2.4097 4.2541
subsidies 11. 3046 subsidies 6.9127
cs 17.7281 cs 9.2119
ts 9.8075 ts 8.9631
pbar 3.7808
n c:r.nn
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Difference in risk (}1.=1.00, 17 =1. 00 previously subsidised)
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 0.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 2.5765 2.6182 pprice 3.0498 2.6182
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.0498 0.0000
quantity 3.7415 0.7483 quantity 3.7415 0.7483 quantity 1.8418 2.4236
profits 9.7957 0.4626 profits 9.6398 0.4626 profits 5.6171 1.4982
subsidies 11.7549 subsidies 11.5989 subsidies 6.3454
cs 18.7630 cs 18.7630 cs 10.3865
ts 17.2664 ts 17.2665 ts 11.1564
pbar 3.7427
tcrit 0.0000
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1.0000 cost 1.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6182 2.6182 pprice 2.6254 2.6182 pprice 3.4225 2.6182
cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.4225 0.0000
quantity 3.7415 0.7483 quantity 3.6165 0.8487 quantity 1.6067 2.5523
profits 6.0543 0.4626 profits 5.9602 0.5247 profits 3.8923 1.5777
subsidies 11.7549 subsidies 11.5265 subsidies 6.6822
cs 18.7630 cs 18.2609 cs 9.7432
ts 13 .5249 ts 12.9469 ts 8.5310
pbar 3.7520
tcrit 0.2405
lambda 1.0000 1.0000 eta 5.0000 1. 0000 cost 2.0000 2.0000
REFERENCE PRICING JZ VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6441 2.6182 pprice 3.7808 2.6182
NO SUBSIDISATION cprice 0.0000 0.0000 cprice 3.7808 0.0000
quantity 3.4827 0.9553 quantity 1.3532 2.6585
profi ts 2.4097 0.5905 profits 2.4097 1. 6434
subsidies 11.3217 subsidies 6.9604
cs 17.7281 cs 9.2119
ts 8.8522 ts 6.3046
pbar 3.7808
trrit 0.5000
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Appendix 10.2 Sensitivity analysis.
The following tables contain the full results of the sensitivity analysis for the comparisons
referred to in Chapter 10. The legend below gives the names and quantities for each figure
displayed on the following tables.
name
ppnce
cpnce
quantity
profits
subsidies
cs
ts
pbar
tcrit
explanation
equilibrium producer price
equilibrium consumer price
quantity over full period to generic entry
profits over full period to generic entry
subsidies required over full period to generic entry
consumer surplus over full period to generic entry
total surplus over full period to generic entry
for JZ scheme only: price charged by entrant pre-subsidisation
for JZ scheme only: time elapsed when subsidisation accepted
Fixed Charge
lambda 1 1 eta 1 1 cost 1 1
k = 0.00
REFERENCE PRICING JOHNSTON-ZECKHAUSER VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.3673 2.6002 pprice 2.94587 2.6002
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 2.94587 0
quantity 1.94588 1.94588 quantity 1. 87096 1.98904 quantity 0.699537 2.7034
profits 3.1138 3.1138 profits 2.58782 3.18286 profits 1.36121 4.32598
subsidies 10.1194 subsidies 9.53516 subsidies 7.02938
cs 12.7751 cs 12.5593 cs 8.98747
ts 8.8833 ts 8.69928 ts 5.58453
pbar 3.43527
tcrit 0.240488
k = 0.50
REFERENCE PRICING JOHNSTON-ZECKHAUSER VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6412 2.6412 pprice 2.4247 2.6412 pprice 2.94587 2.6412
cprice 0.5 0.5 cprice 0.5 0.5 cprice 2.94587 0.5
quantity 1. 87845 1. 87845 quantity 1.81001 1.91552 qnty 0.773107 2.51436
profits 3.08296 3.08296 profits 2.60975 3.1438 profits 1.50437 4.12663
subsidies 8.04437 subsidies 7.52612 subsidies 5.3838
cs 10.8618 cs 10.6764 cs 7.68224
ts ~7 '8"".0) '8"3~S ts §.:9:SllliAP ~ .'1o 3'3 ts ~ 39 ,~
pbar 3.43527 7-.'19.-'11./4
tcrit 0.240488
Time to generic entry
lambda 1 1 eta 1 1 cost 1 1
T = 5.98
REFERENCE PRICING JOHNSTON-ZECKHAUSER VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.3673 2.6002 pprice 2.94587 2.6002
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 2.94587 0
quantity 1. 94588 1.94588 quantity 1.87096 1.98904 quantity 0.699537 2.7034
profits 3.1138 3.1138 profits 2.58782 3.18286 profits 1.36121 4.32598
subsidies 10.1194 subsidies 9.53516 subsidies 7.02938
cs 12.7751 cs 12.5593 cs 8.98747
ts 8.8833 ts 8.69928 ts 5.58453
pbar 3.43527
tcrit 0.240488
T = 8.00
REFERENCE PRICING JOHNSTON-ZECKHAUSER VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6037 2.6037 pprice 2.3714 2.6037 pprice 2.94587 2.6037
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 2.94587 0
quantity 2.38073 2.38073 quantity 2.30532 2.42413 qnty 0.855862 3.30753
profits 3.81791 3.81791 profits 3.19137 3.8875 profits 1. 6654 5.30419
subsidies 12.3973 subsidies 11. 7126 subsidies 8.61172
cs 15.6299 cs 15.4129 cs 10.9959
ts 10.8684 ts 10.6835 ts 6.8325
pbar 3.44288
tcrit 0.241596
JOHNSTON-ZECKHAUSER VARIANT
pprice 2.3673 2.6002
cprice 0 0
quantity 1.87096 1.98904
profits 2.58782 3.18286
subsidies 9.53516
cs 12.5593
ts 8.69928
pbar 3.43527
tcrit 0.240488
NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.94587 2.6002
cprice 2.94587 0
quantity 0.699537 2.7034
profits 1.36121 4.32598
subsidies 7.02938
cs 8.98747
ts 5.58453
Subsidisation threshold
lambda 1 1
t max = 0.50
REFERENCE PRICING
pprice 2.6002 2.6002
cprice 0 0
quantity 1.94588 1.94588
profits 3.1138 3.1138
subsidies 10.1194
cs 12.7751
ts 8.8833
eta 1 1 cost 1 1
t max = 0.25
REFERENCE PRICING JOHNSTON-ZECKHAUSER VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.6094 2.6094 pprice 2.3783 2.6094 pprice 2.94587 2.6094
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 2.94587 0
quantity 1.94588 1. 94588 quantity 1.90728 1. 96806 quantity 0.699537 2.7034
profits 3.13169 3.13169 profits 2.6439 3.16738 profits 1.36121 4.35083
subsidies 10.1551 subsidies 9.63805 subsidies 7.05423
cs 12.7751 cs 12.6642 cs 8.98747
ts 8.8833 ts 8.78881 ts 5.58453
pbar 3.45591
tcrit 0.122553
t max = 1. 00
REFERENCE PRICING JOHNSTON-ZECKHAUSER VARIANT NO SUBSIDISATION OF SECOND DRUG
pprice 2.5808 2.5808 pprice 2.3441 2.5808 pprice 2.94587 2.5808
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 2.94587 0
quantity 1.94588 1.94588 quantity 1.80425 2.02783 quantity 0.699537 2.7034
profits 3.07598 3.07598 profits 2.48228 3.20553 profits 1.36121 4.27344
subsidies 10.0437 subsidies 9.33501 subsidies 6.97685
cs 12.7751 cs 12.3653 cs 8.98747
ts 8.8833 ts 8.53322 ts 5.58453
pbar 3.39606
tcrit 0.464134
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Appendix 10.3 Reference pricing / JZ variant switch point
The following pages give the outcomes of the nine standard cases under reference pricing and
the JZ variant for the case where AI = 0.62,A2 = 1.000,TJ I = TJ 2 = 1. In this scenario the average
change in total surplus when shifting between the two schemes is less than 0.005.
JZ VARIANT
lambda 0.62 1 eta 1 1
c1 = 0, c2 = 0 c1 = 0, c2 = 1 c1 = 0, c2 = 2
pprice 2.004 2.5532 pprice 2.004 2.6002 pprice 2.004 2.6182
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0
quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1.5992 2.1708
profits 3.20473 5.54252 profits 3.20473 3.47371 profits 3.20473 1. 34191
subsidies 8.74726 subsidies 8.84925 subsidies 8.88825
cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178
ts - subsidy 9.92178 ts - subsidy 7.75098 ts - subsidy 5.58018
pbar 2.49528 pbar 2.49528 pbar 2.49528
tcrit o. tcrit o. tcrit o.
c1 = 1, c2 = 0 c1 = 1, c2 = 1 c1 = 1, c2 = 2
pprice 2.0675 2.5532 pprice 2.0675 2.6002 pprice 2.0675 2.6182
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0
quantity 1.52993 2.20251 quantity 1. 52993 2.20251 quantity 1. 52993 2.20251
profits 1.63982 5.62348 profits 1. 63982 3.52445 profits 1. 63982 1. 36151
subsidies 8.75521 subsidies 8.85869 subsidies 8.89826
cs - subsidy 9.83811 cs - subsidy 9.83811 cs - subsidy 9.83811
ts - subsidy 8.30817 ts - subsidy 6.10566 ts - subsidy 3.90315
pbar 2.50847 pbar 2.50847 pbar 2.50847
tcrit 0.240488 tcrit 0.240488 tcrit 0.240488
c1 = 2, c2 = 0 c1 = 2, c2 = 1 c1 = 2, c2 = 2
pprice 2.0918 2.5532 pprice 2.0918 2.6002 pprice 2.0918 2.6182
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0
quantity 1. 45489 2.23651 quantity 1.45489 2.23651 quantity 1.45489 2.23651
profits 0.146781 5.7103 profits 0.146781 3.57886 profits 0.146781 1.38253
subsidies 8.69301 subsidies 8.79809 subsidies 8.83827
cs - subsidy 9.74922 cs - subsidy 9.74922 cs - subsidy 9.74922
ts - subsidy 6.83943 ts - subsidy 4.60292 ts - subsidy 2.3664
pbar 2.54889 pbar 2.54889 pbar 2.54889
tcrit 0.5 tcrit 0.5 tcrit 0.5
REFERENCE PRICING
lambda 0.62 1 eta 1 1
c1 = 0, c2 = 0 cl = 0, c2 = 1 c1 = 0, c2 = 2
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.6182 2.6182
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0
quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1. 5992 2.1708
profits 4.08311 5.54252 profits 4.15825 3.47371 profits 4.18698 1.34191
subsidies 9.62564 subsidies 9.80276 subsidies 9.87049
cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178
ts - subsidy 9.92178 ts - subsidy 7.75098 ts - subsidy 5.58018
c1 = 1, c2 = 0 c1 = 1, c2 = 1 c1 = 1, c2 = 2
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.6182 2.6182
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0
quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1.5992 2.1708
profits 2.48391 5.54252 profits 2.55904 3.47371 profits 2.58777 1. 34191
subsidies 9.62564 subsidies 9.80276 subsidies 9.87049
cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178
ts - subsidy 8.32257 ts - subsidy 6.15177 ts - subsidy 3.98097
c1 = 2, c2 = 0 c1 = 2, c2 = 1 c1 = 2, c2 = 2
pprice 2.5532 2.5532 pprice 2.6002 2.6002 pprice 2.6182 2.6182
cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0 cprice 0 0
quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1.5992 2.1708 quantity 1.5992 2.1708
profits 0.884704 5.54252 profits 0.959839 3.47371 profits 0.98857 1.34191
subsidies 9.62564 subsidies 9.80276 subsidies 9.87049
cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178 cs - subsidy 9.92178
ts - subsidy 6.72337 ts - subsidy 4.55257 ts - subsidy 2.38177
